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ABSTRACT 
The study is concerned with the production and marketing of 
dura (sorghum) and sesame in the eastern central rainlands of the 
Sudan. The two crops are regarded as major export commodities 
and considerable emphasis has been given to expanding the areas 
under cultivation using mechanised farming cultivation. The 
study examines production aspects and the marketing component of 
the research concentrates on comparing the performancies of the 
public and private sectots. Dura marketing is in the hands of the 
latter and sesame in the former. 
The thesis consists of eleven chapters and begins with an 
introduction to the economy of the Sudan. Four chapters then 
follow on dura production and marketing. The first deals with 
both the economic and agronomic aspects of mechanised dura 
production with special reference to the two main surplus areas, 
Gedaref and Damazine. The second chapter deals with the production 
of dura in the Sudan. The third chapter discusses the internal trade 
in dura - together with the spatial and temporal analysis . The 
marketing situation is also dealt with in detail. The final chapter 
on dura examines the world market situation. In the years with 
good crops the Sudan is a major exporter but when the annual crop 
is low, the Government bans exports. 
The next four chapters deal with sesame. The first concen- 
trates on production, the second on the internal trade, the third 
is concerned with the internal supply, demand and price situation 
and the fourth with the world trade in oilseeds in which Sudanese 
sesame is an important commodity. Chapter ten summarises common 
features of both dura and sesame production and marketing in the 
Sudan and makes various recommendations to alleviate major problems. 
In the final chapter, the thesis is summarised and the conclusion 
presented. 
The private sector is characterised by oligopoly in the marketing 
structure, but the level of efficiency attained in the performance of 
marketing functionsi. s relatively high, given the lack of infrastructure 
in the Sudan. The public sector is characterised by both exploitive 
prices and higher costs because of inefficiency. Both sections 
lead to the depression of producers' prices at a time when production 
costs are rising steeply. All this has a marked disincentive 
effect on the producers. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The Economy and Export of the Sudan 
1.1 
Introduction to the economy of the Sudan. 
The Country 
The Sudan is the largest country in Africa occupying a 
vast plain of one million square miles. Only eighteen million 
acres are currently cultivated althouqh some two hundred million 
acres are considered to have agricultural or livestock potential. 
Two hundred million acres are unsuitable for agriculture (the 
desert tract) and the balance of about one hundred and twenty five 
million acre-e- is forest land. 
(1 
Sudan is bordered on the North by Egypt, in the South by 
Kenye Uganda and Congo and in the West by Central Africa Republic 
of Chad and Libya, on the East by the Red Seaw El-A &PL4 
The main topographic feature of the country is the River 
Nile with its annual floods from May to A ttju3t . The Sudan has a 
tropical continental climate ranging from hot, dry- desert in 
the North to a hot moist, tropical forest in the South with only, 
minor maritime influence on the Red Sea coast. 
The vast flat plain --., slopes qently from South 
to North 
and West with only minor interruptions from mountain ranges. 
The 
country is divided into four broad zones; desert, semi 
desert, 
savannah and west savannah woodland. Zonal 
boundaries are not 
clearly def ined but are a gradual function of 
the rainfall which 
decreases from 1y 500 m. m annually in the South to a negligible 
amount in the desert areas of the North. 
I- 
a) The pesert. The desert covers the Northern third of the 
Sudan. Rainfall in this area is minimal; the winds are constant 
dry northerly airstreams, bringing sand storms in the winter, 
temperatures range from 47-49°C in June to 1-6°C at night in 
January, February. Water comes from the River Nile and also from 
underground supplies which surface at oases. Irrigation is 
confined usually to small bands of land by the river banks because 
the land rises steeply at the side of the river valley. 
b) The Semi Desert and Dry Savannah. This lies in a belt 
across the Sudan between approximately 14°N and the true desert 
and cover some 20% of the country. Rainfall varies from 50 to 
400 m. m per year most of which falls during July and August, but 
evaporation is high. Normal agriculture is precluded and grazing 
is sparse. Temperatures range from 46-47°C maximum in April-June 
to 3-6o in December-February. Northerly winds predominate but 
the rain comesfrom moist southerly airstreams in June to September. 
The plain rises from 350 m to 600m in 800 Km. 90% of the 
country's irrigated lands are situated in this area. 
c) The Savannah zone lies South of latitude 140 North and 
covers 40% of the land area. The rainfall which increases from 
400 mm in the North to 1000 in the South is sufficient to support 
extensive agriculture and livestock production. The natural 
Cons s1 
vegetative cover/of coarse grasses, scrubs and the distinctive acacia 
trees. which becomes thicker with increasing rainfall. In the 
Southern quarter of the zone lies the swamp area of the Sudan which 
is regularly inundated by the seasonal flooding of the Bahr El Jebel. 
The uniformity of the plain is uninterrupted, the land mass rises 
gently from 420 m in the North to _n , 720 m in the South. 
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d) The West Savannah, country of South and South West Sudan 
marks the end of the savannah plains. The land is broken by hills 
and Plateaus rising to 3.000m. 'Rainfall is heavier from 1000 to 
1500 m, m and the humid climate is suitable for a wide range of 
tropical crops. A feature of the zone is the extensive tsetse fly 
infestation which limits transhumant and nomadic systems of 
livestock management. Agricultural production in the zone has been 
limited because of the lack of infrastructure and commercial 
development, but the potentials for both traditional sector and 
large scale crop production are substantial. 
1.2 The People 
The population according to the last census, 1975 was 15.7 
million. with a growth rate of 2.7% per annum. 
More than half of the population live in the central zone while 
one quarter lives in the North and the other quarter in the Southern 
s 
zone. The mixture of Hamitic and Negro is especially noticeable 
among the Nilotic people of the savannah zone. The population is 
very unevenly distributed mainly because of lack of water, and 
permanent all the year round water sources in the dry savannah belt 
are scarce away from the Niles. The greatest concentration of 
population is in the Khartoum/Gezira area. The Khartoum and Blue 
Nile provinces cover 63,000 square miles with 21 million people. 
The three southern provinces of Bahr El Chazal, Upper Nile and 
Equatoria have about the same population. Great tracts of the 
country have very few or even no people. Although the official 
language is Arabic, it is the native language of perhaps half the 
population, many indigenous languages occur specially in the South. 
4 
Finally the North of the Sudan is predominantly Moslem while 
the South is almost entirely pagan. 
(2) 
1.3 Political History 
Sudan became a condominium jointly administered by Britain 
and Egypt. During this period people emigrated from Europe, 
the Middle East and Asia and settled in the Sudan. Historically 
these emigrants introduced into African society a money economy 
linking subsistence farming with the outside world. Out of 
their profits they built factories and established transport 
companies and other activities. They have been the early entrepreneurs 
and pioneered monetarisation through a network of shops 
throughout the vast Sudan countryside. The commercial structure 
they created depended on caste and kinship. 
In October 1951 Egypt unilaterally denounced the condominium. 
Subsequently the two countries in agreement with Sudanese 
representatives arranged for a General Election to be followed by 
Sudanese autonomy. 
January 8th 1954 became the appointed day in which the 
administration was to be Sudanized and the British and Egyptian 
Forces withdrawn. Actual independence was secured at the end of 
1955. 
(3) 
On December 1955 the Sudan became independent as a republic 
with a provisional constitution and a parliamentary system. In 1958 
the provisional constitution was suspended following a military 
coup but reinstated after the overthrow of the military regime in 
October 1965 by teachers, students, lawyers, government officials, 
businessmen and other civilians. From 1 955 to 1969 there was a 
-5- 
0 
succession of civilian governments. In 1969 civilian rule finally 
gave way to another military coup, the second in a decade. 
Following independence internal dissention between the 
Northern and Southern provinces culminated in a civil war which 
flared up intermittently until 1970. The conflict placed a heavy 
burden on the economy of the newly independent state but in 1971 
it was resolved by the Addis AbabaAgreement under which the three 
Southern provinces were granted regional self government. 
1.4 Agricultural, Production and Agricultural Resources 
The Sudan economy depends heavily on agriculture which 
contributes 40% of the gross domestic product and almost all of the 
exports. 
Sudan has over 200 million acres of land suitable for 
agriculturatcrop production but only 10% of this area is currently 
cultivated. Extensive development of irrigation has resulted in 
4 million acres being irrigated at present. 
There are a further 6 million acres of potentially irrigable 
land but the extent to which irrigation Programmesmay be developed 
is limited by the 1959 water agreement between Egypt and the Sudan. 
Under the agreement Sudan is entitled to 18.5 milliard of the 84 
milliard average annual flow of the Nile. At present 16.5 milliard 
of the allocation are being used leaving 2.0 milliard which is 
sufficient for almost 600,000 acres for future development. 
ýýý 
Sudan has two kinds of agriculture: 
1. Irrigated agriculture 
2. Rainfed agriculture which can be subdivided into 
mechanised farming and traditional (Bildat) production. 
. r- Ctd LC ºnebe, - s 
-Ö- 
Irrigation with Nile water has been known in the Sudan 
for many centuries. In 1911 the Sudan Plantation Syndicates 
started trials to grow cotton on irrigated plots. The experiment 
was successful and as a consequence funds were raised to build a 
dam across the Blue Nile at Sennar. This work was completed in 
1925 and made it possible for gravity irrigation on a large scale 
in the Gezira. The area under cotton increased from 22,000 feddans 
in 1923 to 80,000 ? eddans in 1925 and to 600,000 in recent years. 
There are three different types of irrigation schemes: 
I 
1. Larqe schemes cultivated by tenants and managed by the 
G overnment like the Gezira which is the largest cotton scheme 
in Africa. 
2. Private pump schemes along the Blue Nile and White Nile 
South of Khartoum. The Blue Nile has 62 schemes with a gross 
area of 282,000 feddans while there are 186 schemes with a 
gross area of 419,000 feddans. 
' All these schemes were managed 
by the private sector but nationalized in 1970 and now 
managed by the Agrarian Reform Corporation. 
3. Nine major pumo schemes along the Nile North of Khartoum 
are managed by the Northern Province Agriculture Corporation. 
Mechanised Rainfed Aoriculture 
The first mechanised farms were started in the Gedaref area 
in 1945. They were part of a mechanised crop production scheme 
operated by share croppers whose purpose was to produce food 
for 
army units stationed in East Africa. 
In 1 953 mechanised farming developed rapidly as the Government 
decided to allot land to private entrepreneurs provided that they 
cleared the land themselves. 
-? - 
In 1960 the system had been extended to other areas in the 
clay land belt which spread West from Gedaref along the Southern 
part of the Savannah region. By 1.968 the Goverment had allotted 1.8 
million feddans to private farmers and another I million feddans 
were cultivated in unauthorised mechanised farms. In that year the 
Government established the mechanised Farming Corporation (mFC). 
(5) 
As mentioned before agricultural production - dominates 
the Sudan economy, contributes 40% of the gross domestic product and 
almost all of the exports. Agricultural production consists mainly 
of the following crops: - 
cotton, groundnuts, sesame, gum arabic, dura for export and the home 
market, dukhn, wheat and sugar for local consumption. 
COTTON 
Cotton is the main export crop and the foremost foreign exchange 
earner. Proceeds from exported cotton represent 60% of total proceeds 
from exports. Oil seeds represent 20% and gum arabic constitute - 
the larger part of the remaining 20/. 
(6) 
Cotton is the only crop which is grown on a partnership basis 
between the Government and the tenants, whereas the tenants receive 
almost all the revenues of other crops. The production of long staple 
cotton which is estimated to be 40% of the world total production, 
represents 80% of Sudan's cotton production. The other 20% is mainly 
medium staple cotton with small quantities of short staple. 
(7) 
The whole production of cotton is for export except 7% for 
local consumption. 
Acreage and yield 
S 
Cotton production remained at a high level during the period 
-8- 
1969/70 - 1970/71.. totalling 1.3 million bales inspite of a 2% 
decrease in acreage. Between 1971/72 and 1972/73 the total production 
reflected a slight decrease of 0.3%. 
The actual production in 1973/74 was 1,2 47,800 bales and the area 
was 1,178,400 feddans. The decrease in total production is due to 
the lower productivity of the Gezira scheme which was adversely 
effected by shortage of water, scarcity of cotton pickers and 
unfavourable natural conditions. Table 1.1 gives details of area 
and production for the period 1970/71 - 1974/75. 
DURA (Sorghum) 
Dura is the main staple food in the Sudan and it is cultivated 
by both traditional methods and in mechanised farming schemes mainly 
in the ra inland area. 
Output fluctuates from year to year according to the amount of 
rain in every year. For instance the output of dura decreased 
substantially by 39.5% during 1972/73 compared with 1971/72 due 
mainly to the inadequate rainfall. 
(8) 
As a result of better rainfall 
in the year 1973/74 the output increased by 15% and continued to rise 
in 1974/75 when output is estimated to be about 1,744,250 tons* 
achieving an increase of 105,960 tons. Now the Sudan is self 
sufficient in Jura and can export the surplus. Table 1.2 shows 
estimates of area, production and average yield of dura by production 
centres during the years 1973/74 and 1974/75. 
SESAME 
The area of sesame recorded IYER, 4 7 million feddans 
by 1872/'73, when the production recorded its peak. However in the 
*A11 tons quoted are metric tons. 
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Table 1.2 
Estimates of Area Production and Average Yield of Dura 
by Production Centres 
From 1973/74 - 197475 
1973/74 1974/75 
Production Centre Area 
(Fed) 
Production 
(m. T. ) 
Averaqe 
Yield 
Kqs/Fed 
Area 
(Fed) 
Production 
(m. T. ) 
Averag 
Yield 
Kgs/Fe 
Northern' Province ( ) 1 8,950 5,685 300 
Nile Province (16,000 79000 438) 68,030 29$ 795 438 
Khartoum 20,000 19000 050 24,500 2, p 200 90 
Cedaref 1,3909500 4479500 322 196351000 561,000 343 
Cash 30,800 91 000 290 43j 000 17,9000 400 
Taker 359000 159000 430 40,000 16, p 000 410 
Gezira & fvlanagil 300 700 225,500 750 154,000 77,000 500 
m. C. P. , Blue Nile 
Private 598,000 2239000 373 654j280 169! 060 258 
State 53,000 20,000 377 41) 570 15,116 363 
Blue Nile 
(traditional) - - - 500,000 150,000 300 
Gezira (687,000 1370000 199) 96PO00 19.9200 200 
White Nile ( ) 127,000 37) 700 297 
Agrarian Reform 151y700 369000 237 129,000 529000 403 
m. C. P. South 
Kordaf an 124,200 31 9 500 254 160 420 599040 367 
Nuba mountain 266 300 100,000 375 409j. 500 128,992 315 
South Ko rdaf an 
Sand 90Y000 12v690 141 80,000 16S 000 200 
North Ko rdaf an 
Sands 660y 000 89,100 135 690,000 1249200 180 
South Darfur (175,000 57 000 
) 
326 132,000 
38,500 292 
North 'Darfur ( ý ) 50j000 12,500 250 
Upper Nile m. C. P. 
(Renk) 2569000 112,000 437 226 000 85,000 375 
Upper Nile 
(traditional) 979000 25,000 257 2091 000 43p262 207 
Bahr El Chazal 180 000 39y000 217 196,000 31,000 158 
Equatoria 170,000 51 9000 300 1 80,000 
54j 000 300 
Total Sudan 5,301,200 1,638,290 309 5,863,820 1,744,250 298 
Source: Sudan Year Book of Agricultural Statistic Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Khartoum, June 1974. 
(For-details see Appendix A2) 
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1973/74 season acreage decreased by 27% and together with a decline 
of yield resulted in an acute drop of 36% in total 
8 
pý production. 
The favourable price compensated for this acute drop and proceeds 
from sesame exports exceeded sesame proceeds a year earlier. 
The Sudan Oilseeds Company, a monopoly organization responsible 
for the export of all oilseeds including sesame, estimated sesame sales for 
export during the period from 15th September 1974 up to 30th September 
1975 at 52,000 tons and the proceeds at about LS. 13,913,200. Prices 
were estimated to average LS. 277 per ton. Details of areas, production 
and yields are given in Table 1.3. 
GROUNDNUTS 
Production of groundnuts in 1973/74 season registered a new 
record in spite of the decrease in acres e. 
(8) 
g High production and 
high prices resulted in raising proceeds from groundnuts exports. 
It is worth mentioning that prices in 1973/74 were double the prices 
(9) of 1972/73 which was LS. 126 per ton. 
The Sudan Company for Oil Seeds estimated sales for export 
during the period from 15th September 1974 Up to 30th September 1975 
to be about 62,750 tons with a total value of about LS. 15 millions. 
Table 1.4 shows estimates of area, production and average yields of 
groundnuts by production centres. 
GUM ARABIC 
Gum arabic is one of the important cash crops in the Sudan. 
Proceeds from gum arabic represent almost 7- 10% of the total 
exports by value. The Sudan is the main producer of gum arabic in 
- 12 - 
Table 1.3 
Estimates of Area, Production and Average Yield of 
Sesame by Production Centres 
From 1973/74 -- 1974/75 
1973/74 1974/75 
Production Centre Area Production Average Area Production Average 
(Fed) (m. T. ) Yield (Fed) (m. T. ) Yield 
Kg/Fed Kg/Fed 
Gedaref 442 p000 78) 000 176 374,000 p000 33 87 
r, CP Blue Nile . , 
(Private) 2249000 24.9000 108 174,000 25, *000 144 
MCP Blue Nile 
(State) 6r000 500 83 4y000 500 125 
Blue Nile 
Traditional 196, #200 28ý 850 147 
Gezira (235,000 33)000 140) 82 300 50 8 White Nile 9 1 ; 0 225 
Agrarian Reform 3j, 000 300 100 
Nuba Fountains 100,000 16p000 160 143,000 19,000 133 
MCP Kordafan 
(South) 10Y000 1 000 100 2ý 500 2j, 500 100 
Kordafan Sands ( ) 
(South) (951,000 
609000 63) 142,600 
21,100 148 
Kordaf an Sands 
(North) ( ) 843 000 10 6,, 000 125 
Southern Darfur 000 88 12ý 000 
) 
136 
42,000 7j400 177 
Northern Darfur ý ( ) 27,0000 2p 350 87 
MCP Upper Nile 48y 000 3, #000 68 45p000 41000 118 
Upper Nile 
(Traditional) - - - 6,000 12000 1 60 
Bahr El Ghazal 68p 560 80090 118 70,. 000 9.5450 135 
Equator is 17,000 11955 115 25, p 000 3,000 120 
Total Sudan 2,192,550 2379845 109 2,, 199,100 281,650 128 
Source: Sudan Year Book of Agricultural Statistics Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Khartoum, June 1974. 
(For details see Appendix A3) 
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Table 1.4 
Estimates of Area, Production and Average Yield of 
Groundnuts by Production Centres 
1973/74 - 1974/75 
1973/74 1974/75 
Production Centre Area Production Average Area Production Averai 
(Fed) (Ivl. T. ) Yield (Fed) (m. T. ) Yield 
Kg/Fed Kg/Fe( 
Nile Province - - - 1,900 1,200 630 
Gezira & Manag il 216,285 216,000 11000 260,937 388,000 1.500 
Khashm El Girba 45j335 29,500 650 68,000 85, v000 1.250 
El So uk i 169325 49900 300 30j, 235 89000 270 
Blue Nile 14,200 4,000 280 
(traditional) 
Gezira 
White Nile 
46j, 000 ( 9 000 196) ) 62,500 16., 250 260 
Agrarian Reform 16,768 10lp 000 588 229158 6650 300 
Nuba mountains 56ý 140 8'. 300 148 80000 28y 000 350 
South Ko rdaf an ( ) 
(traditional) (929,000 127,000 137) 809000 30., 000 376 
North Ko rdaf an ( ) 8009000 160000 200 
South Darfur (282 000 99ý000 350 ) 
320,000 
85 000 
128,000 
23 000 
400 
280 North Darfur ( y , 
Upper Nile 450 101 225 1,260 280 225 
Bahr El Ghazal 329000 129000 375 51,000 13,000 250 
Equator is 85y000 28p000 329 90, P 000 27,0000 300 
Total Sudan 1,725,303 543j, 801 315 11967,190 919,180 467 
Source: Sudan Year Book of Agricultural Statistic59 Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Khartoum, June 1974. 
(For details see Appendix A4) 
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the world. Sudan's total production of gum arabic represents about 
60 - 80% of world total. Gum production in the Sudan witnessed 
an acute decline during the past five years. Total production of 
22,000 tons during 1973/74 is 38,000 tons less than total production 
during the 1967/68 season. 
Prospects for gum production in 1975 * are optimistic due 
to adequate rainfall which include high yield and enough water for 
gum collectors. Production is estimated to be 35,000 tons. Sudan 
gum exports during the period from 1st January 1973 up to 21st December 
1974 amounted to 20,391 tons representing 90% of total production. 
Proceeds from gum arabic exports totalled LS. 17,108,000 with average 
price of LS. 840 per ton. The selling prices of this season were the 
highest prices ever achieved. Then unfortunately prices declined 
sharply the next year regressing to the same level of 1973. 
(10) 
'Latest year in which information is available. 
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Livestock resources: The estimated livestock population of 14.2 
million cattle 13.4 million sheep, 10.5 million goats and 2.7 million 
camels is spread throughout Sudan with the following approximate 
distribution. 
(11) 
Province Cattle I Sheep j Goats I Camels 
N. and South Darfur 41752,400(l) 2, p900,900 
Bahr El Gazal 3, p 084,41,700 
(2) 
276,800 
N. and South Kordaf an 1y 989,800 
0) 
2j, 961.9300 
Upper Nile 
1 
1,850,800(2) 697p 800 
Blue & White Nile 
and Gezira 
Equatoria 
Kassala and Red Sea 
Northern Province 
Khartoum 
Total 
1J196.9 500 
(1 
628Y 600 
(2 
385,500 
207y 400 
58j 000 
14,153,800 
3,624,000 
47 81400 
1y116,200 
525,800 
91,500 
2,9 507,900 443,300 
1,147,000 - 
1y 004,900 1y231V300 
1,242,700 - 
2403,400 I 252,100 
8515300 - 
655j 600 637,700 
327,900 79,800 
346,100 54, j100 
13, p 372,700 110j 496,800 12.1 698j 300 
(1) Predominant cattle are the Baggra type of commercial importanta-nce 
(2) Predominant cattle are the Nilotic type of social prestige value 
Source: Public Animal Production Corporation 1975. 
The livestock industry is a significant sector of the Sudanese 
economy. It is one of the main sources of food and employment for the 
population and it is a major contributor to foreign earnings. 
In recent years it has accounted for about 10% of GDP and 
livestock exports have contributed from 6 to 10 j% of the value of total 
exports. 
-16- 
In December 1974 a temoorary ban was placed on the export of 
livestock and meat in order to stabilize suoolies and prices. 
1.5 The National Economy 
In the oast decade, public sector finances have been characterized 
by a rapid growth in central government recurrent exoenditure and 
revenue. Between 19b3/1964 and 1973/1974 government revenue grew 
at annual rates of 10.4% (LS. 78.6 million) to LS. 213.9 million( 
2) 
while expenditure rose by 13 (LS. 60.8 million)to LS. 209 
million. During the same oeriod the gross domestic product at 
current prices oreur at a rate of 5.8. This f inure indicates steeper 
rises in' recurrent exoenditure in relation to the GDP (14 to 26 ) 
than in revenue to GDP (17 to 28%) and underline the fact that 
government expenditure is outstrippinq the growth in resources. 
(13) 
Development exoenditure over the same period declined from 
LS. 58.7 million in 1963/1964 to LS. 48 million in 1973/74, the decline 
does not reflect policy but is due to particularly large development 
expenditure incurred in 1963/1964. 
Government deficits on the combined recurrent and development 
budgets have been financed aporoximately by 45%% from external sources 
and about 55% from domestic sources including the Central Bank. 
1.6 Development plan and development exoenditure 
The first comprehensive olan of economic and social development 
covering the period 1961/1962 to 1970/1971 was in March 1962. 
(14) 
Even though it was abandoned in 1964 its quantitative targets continue 
to serve as a general guideline for long run development planning. 
The plan covered, a period during which some large projects were 
17- 
to be comoleted, including the uranagil Extension under the Gezira 
Board and the Roseires and Khashm El Girba Dam projects. Total 
public sector development exoenditure for the period quas estimated 
at LS. 337 million. 
In 1970 a second develooment plan, the Five Year Plan of 
Economic and Social Development to cover the period 1971-1975 was 
S 
published. 
1 It did not contain any orojects for early 
implementation and the largest the Rahad Irrigation Project is only 
now giving rise to substantial annual investment expenditure. 
Recently the ^; ational Five Year Plan has been extended for a 
further two years. The extension has been accomoanied by significant 
rke 
amendments to 1974/1975 development budget which contains revised 
five year allocations amounting to LS. 660 million. This sharp 
increase has resulted from revision of cost estimates and the 
inclusion of additional Projects. 
1.7 Foreign Trade and Balance of Payments 
Over recent years the balance of trade has been consistently 
in def icit. During the period 1964-1 969 the level of imports 
remains relatively static but in recent years 1ýý. ha$- 
increas , q, 
& rapidly from LS. 108.3 million in 1970 to LS. 247.5 million 
During the same period exports which consist mainly in 1974. 
(16) 
of agricultural produce have grown steadily in volume but have 
been affected by the recent slump in levels of cotton prices. 
Despite a6 per cent per annum growth from LS. 68.6 million in 1964 
to LS. 1 22 million in 1974,1974 registered a trade deficit of 
LS. 125.5'million, the largest yet experienced by Sudan. 
The Sudanese balance of payment has shown a def icit every year 
- 18 - 
for the last five years. The deficit has increased from LS. 20.7 
(17) 
million in 1961 to LS. 207.4 million in 1974/75. This deficit 
has resulted in a continuous decline in the Sudan's net foreign 
asset position which by the end of 1975 stands at niinu L 207 
million. 
1.8 Sudanese External Public Debt Cutstandinq 
Sudanese external public debt outstanding has also been 
increasing during the period 1971-1975 from 95.5 millions to 329.1 
million. Much of the increase however is in the last year as a 
result of borrowing to finance the larger trade deficit. A major 
creditor is the IBRD with LS. 30.6 million in 11371 and LS. 26.2 
millions in 1975. Table 1.5 below shows the outstanding Public 
Foreign Debt. 
(18) 
Table 1.5 
LS. Million) 
Countries and institutions, 1971 1972 1973 
1 
1974 1975 
IBRD 
IDA 
1 4. Germany 
United Kingdom 
Italy 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Holland 
USA 
Kuwait 
Libya 
Algeria 
Yugoslavia 
Soviet Union 
Czechoslovakia 
East Germany 
Egypt 
Abu Dhabi 
Saudi Arabia 
China 
Union Bank of Switzerland 
Euro Dollar Loan 
30.6 
4.1 
4.9 
3.6 
3.5 
0.2 
2.4 
0.6 
18.3 
6.1 
0.6 
4.8 
1.4 
1.5 
1.8 
4.9 
29.9 
4.1 
3.8 
5.9 
2.9 
0.2 
2.6 
0.4 
3.6 
21.5 
6.1 
0.4 
4.6 
1.6 
1.8 
1.4 
3.5 
8.2 
0.1 
27.3 
4.9 
5.0 
6.9 
0.9 
0.2 
2.8 
0.1 
2.5 
26.4 
6.1 
0.3 
4.2 
1.6 
1.7 
0.7 
3.5 
11.3 
0.7 
5.2 
29.0 
5.9 
11.6 
3.9 
2.3 
0.5 
2.9 
0.1 
15.8 
52.2 
6.1 
0.2 
5.2 
2.2 
1.4 
1.1 
19.1 
17.6 
?. 2 
5.2 
6.9 
26.2 
13.6 
14.7 
3.4 
2.1 
0.5 
3.4 
21.3 
76.3 
6.1 
0.1 
0.8 
4.6 
1.5 
1.0 
1.1 
13.9 
15.9 
2.1 
2.1 
69.6 
- 19 - 
Table 1.5 (continued) 
(i S. Million) 
Countries and institutions 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
UBAF 5.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 - 
African Development Bank - - - 0.4 0.6 
Bank of Chicago and UBAF - - - 7.0 7.0 
Quatar - - - 4.5 4.9 
Iran Oil Facility - - - 10.9 15.2 
Arab Fund Oil Facility - - - 12.9 12.9 
Iraq - - - - 8.2 
Total 95.0 103.2 112.8 227.6 329.1 
Source: Bank of Sudan 
Table 1.5 does not include liabilities to In1F. It can also 
be noted that since the year 1974, Sudan has started borrowing from 
new sources other than the traditional sources which were tapped in 
the past. The most important of these new sources are: The Euro- 
Dollar (harket, The United States, Iran, Abu Dhabi and the Arab Fund 
for Oil Facility. Kuwait comes on the top of the lending sources 
followed by the Euro Dollar Market and The World Bank/I. D. A., 
(International Development Agency). 
Table 1.6 Repayment of Loans 
(LS. Million) 
Year Principal Interest Total Total 
of ExQorts 
1970/71 10.6 3.9 14.5 13.9 
1971/72 12.3 4.2 16.5 16.1 
1972/73 14.3 4.2 18.5 14.5 
1973/74 11.5 4.4 15.9 11.2 
1974/75 14.9 7.4 22.1 14.0 
Source: ministry of Planning and National Economy 
- 20 - 
Table 1.6 shows the value of repayments of loans and interests. 
These do not include the reoayments of cash loans nor the 
rpayments to IMF. This means that the actual value of annual 
repayments ir-. much higher than is reflected by the figures of the 
Repayment Section of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and National 
Economy. Bank of Sudan figures show- that total repayments on a 
calendar year basis for 1975 amounted to LS. 35 million. The table 
also shows that with the exception of 1973/1974 the value of 
repayments of loans is continuously rising and this is inevitable 
due to the development effort. The coming years will witness higher 
increases which require making the best efforts to activäte and 
diversify exports so that repayments of loans as a percentage of 
total export proceeds should not rise any further. 
(19) 
1.9 Gross Domestic Product 
The growth in the Gross Domestic Production was estimated to be 
5.1% (calculated on an annual average growth rate during the period 
1962-1971 /72) In view of the population growth rate 
ranging between 2.5% and 2.8% and a general increase in the cost of 
living of 17.5% in 1973 compared to 1972, the growth rate was very 
low. The Gross Domestic Product in current prices increased by 2.9% 
during the period 1970/71 compared to the period 196970, while the 
costs of living for low and high income grouos increased by a rate 
of 1.4% during the same period, thus decreasing the purchasing power 
of the Sudanese pound. Hence the real value of the GOP becomes 
LS. 524.3 million and not LS. 531.7 million as shown in Table No. 1.7. 
Therefore the actual growth rate in the GDP (during 1970/71 compared 
I- 
to 1969/70) was 1.5% and not 2.9;::. If we take into consideration 
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the estimated rate of growth of 5.1% in the GDP during 1971 /72 - 
1973/74 and the increase in the cost of living of 17.5; during the 
same period, we find that the estimated rate of growth of GDP is 
rather inf lated. 
In spite of the fact that agricultural production showed 
a continuous growth during 1969/70 - 1973/74, Table 1.7 shows that the 
agriculture contribution to the GDP increased slightly from 40% in 
1969/70 to 41%o in 1970/71 then declined to remain at a level of 38% 
during the period 1971 /72 - 1973/74. Government services comprised 
15/% of the GDP in 1969/70,16% in 1970/71 and then continued at 
a stable rate of 14.5% during the period 1971/72 - 1973/74 . The 
industrial sector which produces mainly imoort. substitufes, is still 
relatively small accounting for a decreasing contribution to the GDP 
of 10.1%, 9.7% and B. 3%, in 1969/70 - 1970/71 - 1971 /72 respectively 
and remained stable at the level of 8.3%- in 1972/73 and 1973/74. 
However in 1970/71 the industrial output showed a slight decline 
of 1.5% compared to 1969/70 followed by an increase of 3% in 1971/72 
compared to 1970/71 and an estimated annual compound increase of 1%. 
over the period 1971/72 - 1973/74. 
(20) 
-23- 
1.10 Direction of trade 
As regards exports the European Economic Community (EEC) was 
the principal customer of the Sudan in the period 1971-1975. During 
the period 1971-1975 its share of the Sudanese total exports 
increased from nearly 29 percent to 41 percent by 1975. The 
share of the Socialist Bloc however declined during the same 
period to only about 21 percent by 1975. The share of individual 
countries tends to fluctuate from one year to another. For example 
that of India accounted for 18 percent in 1975. Such variations 
give some idea of the difficulties in securing the smooth flow 
of foreign trade of the Sudan. 
* 
Details of the foreign trade of the Sudan are given in 
Appendix A7. 
(21) 
Cotton accounts for about 60 percent of the total 
exports followed by other agricultural products such as oilseeds 
especially groundnuts and sesame, another important commodity is 
gum arabic of which the Sudan. is a leading producer. Dura is 
exported when there is a crop surplus but the trade is declining 
and in years of scarcity the export of dura is prohibited. Table 1.8 
gives both the quantity and the value of the principle cash crop 
exports from the Sudan for the years 1964-1975. The two commodities 
which are the subject of the thesis feature as potential major 
exports of this country and details of the international trade in 
these together with the exports from the. Sudan are described in 
Chapter 5 and 9. 
*AF 
*India's share fell because that country was unable to pay for previous 
imports under a 
trade agreement (See Appendix A5 and A6)- 
*4See Appendix A8 for exports of oilseeds, oils and oilcakes for 
19741975 and Anpendix A9 for exports of livestock, hides and skins 
for 1964-1975. 
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Table J. 8 
Exports of Cash Crops from the Sudan 
1964 -1975 
Y 
Cotton Groundnuts Sesame Cotton 
ear 
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
utk w> PCit 9'i' I uýt tw &3z 
1964 115 32,470 156 9,181 101 6,454 54 6,788 
1965 117 31,379 159 8,596 71 4,750 58 7,597 
1966 143 34,998 108 7, v255 168 5,650 56 2,188 
1967 172 40,930 109 6,509 75 6,530 52 8,335 
1968 184 48,562 88 4,598 85 6,217 50 7,849 
1969 172 49,523 82 5,991 113 8,018 49 8,692 
1970 232 65,062 69 5,466 82 9,722 48 8,976 
1971 242 69,423 121 9,327 86 7,996 43 8,435 
1972 249 74,331 115 9,212 86 8,756 44': - 9,124 
1973 226 80,083 139 13,053 105 19,878 36 7,845 
1974 103 57,804 130 18,055 108 21 , 200 31 14,438 
1975 144 66,794 206 34p512 57 12,240 15 7,242 
Quantity in thousands tons 
Value in thousands LS. 
L 
Source: Statistic Section - Department of Agricultural Economics 
CAS. VOL. 1 No. 2. 
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The Sudan's main trading partners as regards imports are the 
EEC which accounts for nearly 38 percent in the year 1975 while 
the share of the Socialist Bloc including China was only about 
10 percent. Japan however was a significant source of imports in 
1975 with 10 percent of the total. 
(22) 
So one can conclude from 
this rather cursory survey that the EEC is the main trading partner 
of the country. It is worth mentioning here that the Sudan has not 
entered into any form of associate membership unlike such trade 
rivals as Nigeria and the Francophone West African countries. 
The composition of imports includes not only those commodities 
associated with less developed countries machinery, construction 
materials and imports of agricultural inputs but also agricultural 
products. These include commodities, alternatives ý® which could 
be produced in the Sudan, such as wheat, rice, sugar, tobacco, tea 
and coffee. 
(23) 
Also a study of the most recent figures reveals 
a very disturbing tendency in that by the early 1970s Sudan had 
become a net importer of cereals. Sales of dura grain and other 
millets did not offset the growing imports of wheat grain, flour 
and rice. Full details of imports of food grains, agricultural 
requisites and sugar and beverages for the years 1964-1975 are 
given in appendices A10, All and A12. 
(24) 
1.11 The objectives and hypothesis of this thesis 
Dura (sorghum) and sesame are export crops of the Sudan and are 
means of diversifying the economy from the present overdependence on 
cotton and cottonseed exports as a source of fore-T gn exchange. 
Such 
dependence leaves the economy "open" to fluctuations in world rr. arlcet 
- 26 - 
conditions. Since independence sudden adverse conditions in 
cotton prices would often lead to a change in the regime,, there have 
been four changes by force since 1956, each of which has had some 
disruption of the economy. Consequently for the sake of continuity 
and stability in Government, there is much to be said for diversifying 
the exports away from cotton. 
Another disturbing trend is that scarce foreign exchange is 
being increasingly used for grain and grain product imports. At 
present in September 1978 only a desperate shortage of foreign 
exchange prevents imports of dura, the basic grain of the country. 
World prices are now below prices in the Sudan. This situation is 
very worrying since great emphasis has been given by Sudanese planners 
for increasing dura production. There is plenty of land available and 
also capital from the Arab oil producing countries. In "act the Sudan 
features as the bread basket of the Arab world in the plans of the 
Arab Organisation for Agricultural Development (AOAD). 
The writer is justly alarmed at the failure of the Sudan to meet 
not only production for the home market but also the new potential for 
increased exports. This thesis is concerned with reviewing the 
constraints on both production and marketing of dura and sesame which 
are the potential alternatives to cotton. The research reviews 
existing production patterns especially in the mechanised farming 
sector of the South East of the Central rainlands, an area which 
produces whatever surpluses are available for export. The writer has 
done intensive fieldwork in the Gedaref and Damazine areas 
-rhich in 1977 were responsible for 86 percent of 
- 27 - 
the total cultivated land under mechanised rainfed agricultura. 
The writer also visited the auction markets in the two areas and carried 
out surveys of the marketing channels. In all five months were 
spent on intensive fieldwork. 
The hypothesis of the thesis is that there are major constraints 
both on production and marketing efficiency. As regards marketing 
producers receive insufficient price incentives to improve their 
farming standards, the lack of incentives is due to imperfections 
in the marketing structure. Another major constraint is the 
standard of management especially in the public sector as opposed to 
the private sector. These lower standards lead to costs being higher 
than they would otherwise be, both in production and in marketing. 
28 
CHAPTER 2 
Production of Pura in the Sudan 
2.1 Introduction 
Dura (sorghum vul9aris) a millet is the main staple food 
in the Sudan and is grown throughout the country both as a rainfed 
and irrigated crop. Gedaref, Dali, mazmoum, Habila and Damazine 
are regions specializing in rainfed production. The crop is grown 
under qravity irrigation in the Gezira scheme and by flood irrigation 
in Tokar/Gash Delta. Dura is also orouwn and irrioated by sagias 
and pumps in the Agrarian Reform Schemes and Northern province. 
In the rainland dura was grown under traditional shifting 
cultivation system mainly for family subsistance, but since 
1950 the area under mechanised commercial cultivation has increased 
steadily. 
(25) 
In the oast Sudan suffered from oeriodic famines where due 
mainly to lack of rainfall or a poor Nile flood, the crop was 
poor or even failed. Under the Condominium the soread of irrigation 
and more control of the Nile flow led to greater stability in the 
annual levels of dura production and the threat of famine was 
largely removed, but by the Second World War the population increased 
and a growing shortage of grain production led the Sudan 
Government to explore further ways of increasing dura oroduction. - 
The approach chosen was the mechanised cultivation of dura in the 
rainland of the Sudan on laroe tracts of land hitherto used by 
nomadic pastoralists. In 1945 the Government started experiments 
with mechanised dura production in the Gedaref area. The eventual 
cultivation system which emerged by 1950 was based on tractor 
s 
- 29 - 
drawn disc harrows for land cultivation, hand weeding, hand 
harvesting and threshing; the three latter operations being 
carried out by hired casual workers. Land was divided into 
thousand acre units and let at a nominal rent to private 
entrepreneurs who met certain capital stipulations to ensure that 
they had sufficient resources to cultivate the land. Under this 
system the cultivated area rapidly increased. Private 
entrepreneurs cleared the land at their own cost, provided tractors 
and later combine harvesters, besides organising the recruitment 
and transport of casual worker. -,, often from considerable 
distances away from the production area. The private entrepreneurs 
provided the workers with food and water. The success of Gedaref 
led to expansion in other areas of the clay plains of the Sudan 
(26) 
rainlands. 
Table 2.1 shows the increase in the area under dura and the 
total production of the crop from 1952 to 1975. The great increase 
in area from 1.6 million feddans in 1952 to nearly 5.9 million in 
1975 is largely a result of the expansion of mechanised dura 
production in the rainland:. The increase in production has largely 
been achieved by the increase in the area grolvn but crop yields have 
been disappointing. The main reason for this trend in average 
yields is that crop yields in the rainlands are 1oýfer than those 
experienced under flood conditions. The mitigating factor is that 
(as will be seen later) the costs of production in the rainlands 
are much lower than in the irrigated areas. The dependence on 
rainfed crops is subject to considerable risk mainly from climatic 
conditions. This area of the 
Sudan is semi arid, subject to a 
strong probability of 
drought, consequently both production and 
prices are influenced 
by annual rainfall. 
30 - 
Table 2.1 Area, Production and Average 
Yield of Sorghum (Dura) 1952/53 - 
1974/75. Area in 1,000 Feddans 
Production in 19000 m. T. 
Average Yield in metric tons per 
feddan 
Year Area Production Av. Yield 
52/53 1636 515 . 315 
53/54 2075 635 . 306 
54/55 1934 613 . 317 
55/56 2135 860 . 403 
56/57 2492 1067 . 428 
57/58 2607 1139 . 437 
58/59 3252 1372 . 422 
59/60 3251 1313 . 404 
60/61 3067 1051 . 343 
61/62 3516 1,434 . 408 
62/63 3517 1 9266 . 360 
63/64 3,277 1 9349 . 412 
64/65 3,158 1,137 . 360 
65/66 3,199 1,095 . 342 
66/67 3i 183 851 . 267 
67/68 41700 19980 . 421 
68/69 29823 870 . 308 
69/70 49229 11453 . 344 
70/71 4,894 19535 . 314 
71/72 41555 1 9591 . 349 
72/73 49 095 11 300 . 317 
73/74 5,301 1,638 . 309 
7 4/75 5,863 1,744, . 298 
Source: Year Book of Agricultural Statisti%19? 4. 
Department of Agric. Economics. 
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The Sudan is now self sufficient as regards dura in normal 
rainfall years and in a good year has an export surplus. On the 
whole, the Sudan is a net importer- rather than a net exporter 
of grain, despite the large expansion of the private 
sector into dura production in the rainlandf27) 
Table 2.2 gives details of the area of production and average 
yield of dura under the irrigated, flood, and rainfed conditions. . 
The basic points of the table are the great expansion in the 
rainfed area and that crop yields are higher under irrigated and 
flood conditions. 
The demand for dura in the home market is increasing with 
rising population and although wheat is now replacing dura as 
the basic cereal of the higher income groups, the natural rate 
of increase in the population in the Sudan( -4/3% a year) is such 
that the loss of part of the market to wheat is offset by the 
increasing demandfrom the rise in population. The market for 
dura is also increased by the movement of the rural people to 
the towns; the rate of urban growth is greater than the overall population 
growth of the country as a whole. 
Consequently the position of the Sudan as a net exporter 
of dura may well be only a temporary phenomenon, unless production 
rises through a combination of increased area and rising crop yields. 
Government policy, however favours the former and ambitious plans 
have been made to increase the area cultivated in the rainlands. 
In fact Sudan has been hailed as a potential bread basket of 
Africa, partly to encourage external investment in rainland areas 
especially from oil producing countries from the Middle Eastt28) 
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Table 2.3 gives dura area, production and yield stjtistics from 
the years 1961/62 - 1975/76 by Provinces. To relate these figures 
to those of Table 2.2 it is necessary to define which system of 
cultivation predominates in each province. The Northern Province's 
production is based on riverain irrigation, the Southern Province's 
(Upper Ni l eg Equato ria, Bahr El Ghazal) production is entirely based 
on rainfed crops grown by small subsistence cultivators. In the 
Western provinces (Darfur and Kordofan) q production is based on 
shifting agriculture carried out by small subsistence farmers. 
Kassala and the Blue Nile Provinces which produce the bulk of the 
national crop, are the areas of mechanised rainland production', 
Kassala province is also the main region for flood production of dura. 
Consequently, the figures on a provincial basis cannot be taken to 
represent those for mechanised rainfed production. They merely 
emphasise the importance of the Blue Nile and Kassala Province in 
the dura economy of the Sudan. 
Traditionally the domestic consumer in the Sudan prefers the 
white varieties of Jura which give white flour. Consequently, the 
yellow and brown varieties are more difficult to sell locally so 
go largely for export in years of surplus production. The coloured 
varieties however are higher yielding than most of the white 
varieties, especially the widely grown popular "Feterita" i hich 
has the additional disadvantage of being unsuitable for combine 
harvesting because of the multi headed long stalks. Consequently 
white varieties will cost more to produce which is to some extent 
compensated by the 
fact that they enjoy a price advantage 
on the home market over coloured varieties. 
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A 
growing shortage of labour however may well curtail p roduction of 
the popular white type. Obviously it is up to the plant breeder 
to solve this problem and produce white. varieties which can be 
combined and will meet the requirements of Sudanese housewives. 
The irrigated areas supply the white dura demanded by the 
domestic market while the role of the rainland is to provide the 
residual of the domestic requirements and then to export the balance 
of the local crop. 
Three 'simple linear regression equations using the data in Table 2.1 
have been constructed to discover the general trends in areas, 
production and yield of dura in the Sudan. The equatiorsand their 
solutions are P. 
y=a+bt 
where y= Areas of dura in 1000 Feddans 
t=A time trend factor ranging 
between I and 23 with 1952/53 =1 
The solution of the equation (1) is as follows 
y= 1677.798 + 145.7994t 
(16.0122) 
0 
A R2 of 0.7979 suggests that nearly 80% of the variation 
in the crop area is due to the time trend, 
y=a+bt 
where y= production of dura in 1000 m/tons 
t time trend 
The solution of the equation is as follows 
y_ 740.7707 + 39.0227t 
(272,025) R2 0.50 
(1) 
(2) 
- 3.7- 
Equation (2) indicates that production of dura increases 
and most of the increase in production results from area expansion. 
ýy=a+bt 
where y= yield in kilograms per feddan 
t= time trend factor 
The solution of equation (3) is as follows 
y= 389.1106 - 2.7? 37t 
(47.94) R2 = 0.14 
(3) 
the low R2 indicates the fluctuations in annual yields cannot be 
a -h%eY4 eve-1 
explained b}4 time. The figure taken 'from table 2' l refer to the 
whole country. A similar exercise for the Gedaref region shows 
thät there is a. negative correlation between crop yield and time. * 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show graphs of area and production over 
time together with linear trend line. For detailed calculation 
of the three equations see Appendices BI B2 and B3. 
*See G. In. Hamed "The Utilisation of public funds mainly originated from 
the agricultural sector and its impacts on the economic development 
of the Sudan" unpublished Leeds Ph. D. thesis, January 1977, page 227. 
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Figure 2.1 
Area of Dura in 100OFeddans 
1952/53 - 1974/75 
Linear Trend 
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Figure 2.2 
Pr duction of Dura in 1000 M. T. 
1952/53 - 1974/75 Linear Trend 
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2.2 The Production of puts in the Rainland5of the Sudan 
Normally the first operation f or the next crop is to burn 
the rubbish left on the field Prom the previous crop before the 
onset of the rainy season. Before the rains start in 
early June, the scheme owner stocks up with tractok fuel, 
machinery, spare parts, seed, food, water and all the other 
materiale necessary for starting cultivation. Grass huts are 
constructed for lodging the owner, staff and labourers. All this 
is done before the rain starts because with the heavy- clay soils, Far* 
tracks and dirt roads become impassable through thick mud. 
There are very few tarmac roade, and a farm during the rainy season 
may be isolated for a period of three months. Consequently, much 
of the success of a season may well depend on the farmer's ability 
to stock up well in advance. 
The operation of burning the rubbish left on the field from 
the previous crop kille a proportion of the weeds, seeds and pests. 
It destroys crop- and weed residuals - which if ploughed it 
would add to the humus of the sail(*29) 
When rain startsjthe soil becomes softer so first discing 
starts about the middle of June and it takes about ten *days to 
disc 1000 feddens if it is not delayed by heavy showers. Then, 
depending on the rains the second discing follows and the seed is 
sown mechanically by seed boxes attached to the disc. The seeds, 
of ten taken from the crop of the previous season, are cleaned and 
chemically treated against the smut diseases of dura. Resowing, if 
necessary, takesplace later of ter the emergence of the plants. 
9 
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Fertilizers are hardly ever applied. One constraint at this time 
of year is the number of days the land is in a- fit state for 
working by a tractor. Too many storms reduce the sail to a morass 
and tractors can be bogged down to the axle if. used unwisely. 
Consequently, too little rain can delay cultivation and reduce 
seed germination. Too much rain, on the other hand, also delays 
cultivation and can lead to flooding which if continued- for' too long 0, 
period can kill the emerging crop* 
(30) 
Given the annual fluctuation 
in rainfall and the fact that rain, when it comes, comes in 
thunderstorms, it will be appreciated that the area sown in each 
year on a particular farm may well vary considerably.! 
* 
Another 
-factor which 
follows is the effects of delays in sowing dates on 
crop yield. Experimental evidence shows that other things being 
equal, the;: crop yield will fall if the crop is sown late. 
ý3ý ý 
Weeding and thinning the dura starts after the emergence of the 
plant. The work is usually done by hand by casual workers working 
on piece rates. The crop is thinned to allow sideways branching 
of the grain heads. Consequently, plant populations are relatively 
low, leaving plenty of space for weeds. Also, allowing the crop 
to branch sideways, adds to the difficulties of using combines at 
harvest. 
Second weeding is more an optional operation. It is done only 
if the crop looks good. If the crop looks poor, the second weeding 
is not carried out on the grounds that the- cost of the operation 
will not be met by the extra crop yield obtained. So a poor crop 
is left to become heavily infested with weeds so building up trouble 
for next year,, 
# See Appendix 84 "Rainfall at selected Centres During Production 
seasons . 
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Herbicides are not used at all. The writer discussed the 
possible use of herbicides with farmers but was told that little or' 
nothing was known about them. The introduction of such an innovation 
Would be a job for the research and extension workers. Weeding 
itself required about 300 labourers for a scheme of 1000' feddans 
gor about a period of a month. The labourers had to be recruited 
and transported to the farm, housed in grass huts or straw shelters 
and pr ovided with all their food and water, (this is done also 
during harvest time). Consequently , the costs of labour, both in 
cash and kind represent a major component of production expenses. 
In the writer's survey of growers, the general complaint made was 
that the labourers wages were rising rapidly together with the costs 
of food and transport. Part of the rise in direct cash wages 
was ascribed to shortages of labour due to the great expansion in 
employment opportunities , resulting from agricultural development 
in both rainland and irrigated areas. These developments will 
continue and a growing shortage of labour can be envisaged. It 
would seem therefore that the extension services should give some 
consideration to methods of reducing the peak work periods for 
manual labour at weeding and harvesting times. 
Harvesting time depends on the varieties sown and the time 
they were sown, together with the climatic condition during the 
growing season. most farmers plant more than one variety of dura 
to stagger out the harvesting season and as crops are generally 
sown over a time period of around two months, all the dura on 
the farm does not come to harvest at the same time. Early crops 
can be cut in October and harvest continues until January. 
-'13- 
Crops are mainly harvested by hand. The usual practice is to 
cut oft the dura heads, leaving the stalks standing (the latter 
are usually burnt off next summer or sometimeSfed to livestock). 
The heads' are collected and either are threshed by hand or fed to 
a combine harvester, used as a stationary threshing machine. 
Occasionally,, short strawed, one headed, American varieties are grown, 
which can be combined directly. After threshing, the crop is 
sacked up and transported to the local town by lorries for sale 
either by auction or direct. to a merchant. 
The mechanised cropping schemes are not entirely mono cropping. 
Dura is the principal crop but not the only crop. Sesame, 
(Sesamum indicum) known locally as Simsim'is the other main crop 
while a few schemes cultivate cotton and to a very limited extent 
Safflower, and Sunflower seed. 
(32) 
A common rotation followed on a mechanised cropping scheme rS 
dura, sesame followed by occasional fallow when the weed population 
builds up and reduces crop yields. Strict rotationSare not adhered 
to because of the varying areas of land which are available for 
cultivation every year because of fluctuations of rainfall. In 
most years for example there is either too little or too much rain 
to sow the entire scheme. Consequently, when conditions are ideal 
at sowing time, the whole area is planted. This was a point strongly 
stressed by Farmers and officials interviewed by the writer. 
(32) 
most scheme owners kept no livestock, but often outside 
livestock owners grazed the crop residuals with or without the 
owner's permission. Broadly speaking however, the crop residuals are 
not fully utilized for other farm enterprises and finally the remains 
See Appendix 85 for 4knumber and Areas of Mechanized Crop Production 
schemes by Province 
(as of April 1976). 
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are burned off before the beginning of the next season. 
Since there are no permanent livestock on the farm and farm 
work on the crops is confined to a period from June to January, 
the farms are left uninhabited for a considerable part of the year. 
Machinery is removed to the towns. It is a common sight to see 
the owner's tractors parked outside his house in the local town. 
This type of seasonal occupation of farm has led to the name 
"suitcase farmers" being applied to the scheme owners. The use 
of the term is also strengthened by the common practice for a 
farmer to move onto new land when his crop yields fall below an 
economic level over a. period of time. For reasons not fully 
understoodscrop yields fall over time, other things being equal. 
Then after ten to fifteen years cultivation, schemes are often 
abandoned and the ownersmove on elsewhere because there is plenty 
of land. Consequently, it would seem that the pattern of mechanised 
cropping of rainland is following that of traditional agriculture, 
shifting agriculture. What is more controversial is the damage 
to the long term fertility of the land. Land recuperates under 
a rest period in traditional shifting agriculture- What is more 
uncertain is whether land will recover quickly of ter a period of 
mechanised farming. However, while there is plenty of land this 
(33) 
problem will receive little attention. 
2.3 Cost of production of Dura under mechanised farming_ 
Costa of production are determined primarily by the costs of 
inputs- and the crop yieldsobtained. The main inputs consist of 
manual labour, imported machinery, spare parts and fuel. The 
cost'! of manual labour 
has been rising together with the cost of 
- 45 - 
(34) 
foodstuffs with which the farmer supplies his labour force. These 
rising costs are a result of both internal inflation in the Sudan 
and the growing shortage of labour. Ipiported machinery, spare parts - 
and fuel are also increasing in price. The supplying countries 
are having inflationary trouble which in turn is reflected in the 
prices of their products. What is important for the producers of 
dura is whether or not the price of dura keeps up with the prices 
of the inputs required for its production. This unfortunately 
from producer's point of view is not happening. He has to sell more 
and more dura to purchase a given quantity of inputs. In other 
words his: -terms of trade are deteriorating. The trends in dura 
prices will be discussed together with prices indices for 
selected machinery and labour inputs. 
Although crop yields on the same piece of land tend to Pall 
over time, yields even on new land are low by western standardso 
There is no underlying tendency for them to rise. For example, in a 
World Bank investment appraisal for sesame and sorghum, the assumption is 
made that with increasing experience on the part of the growers 
crop yields will rise; an optimism which is not justified by the 
subsequent results. 
(35) 
A similar optimism still exists anwng 
planners judging from the pre-investment survey of the "Triad" 
Company. 
(36) 
This assumes a crop yield of a ton of dura per acre, 
compared with the average national yield which is . 322 kg per 
f eddan 
average given for the last ten years 
(see Table 2.1). 
In fact, as has been mentioned earlier, yield tends to fall 
over time rather than rise. Various theories have 
been advanced 
to explain the long term tendency for yields to fall. The explanations 
given range from more 
frequent droughts resulting from climatic 
- 46- 
changes to the exhaustion of the humus of the soil. Consequently, 
whatever the reasons, the output from the land is falling while 
the price of i ru*s is rising. The farmer's response is to 
move on to new land. This involves additional .. direct costs of 
land clearance, building of Haffirs for water supply and possibly 
soil levelling for the construction of dirt roads. The social 
costs may be high in that the abandoned land may have suffered 
irreparable damage. In addition of course, this tendency towards 
shifting agriculture precludes the development of - 
infrastructure; 
tarmac roads, pioed water supplies, schools and clinics, which 
would encourage the settlement of a permanent population. 
So the prosperity of rainfed mechanised farming would 
seem to be in question with the terms of trade moving against 
producers together with the unsolved problem of how to keep the 
land in permanent cultivation. These two factors are additional 
to the risk facing producers in an area of uncertain rainfall. 
Production in semi arid areas is a speculative proposition at the 
best of times without further major complications. 
Table 2.4 summarizes the existing " material on the costs of 
dura production in the rainlands of the Sudan. The figures are 
taken from detailed cost of production surveys carried out between 
1968 and 1976. The first four sets of figures in the table 
shown, that average yields did not exceed 3.75 sacks of dura per 
feddan ' while between 1968 and 1976 production costs per feddan 
rose substantially. Consequently, with low yields and rising 
production cost, cost per m. t have roughly doubled. In other 
words, the increase in production cost per feddan is indirectly 
reflected in production cost per ton as there has been no compensatory 
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Table 2.4 
Comparative Costs of Production 
per Feddan, per ton* 
Year Cost Per Feddsn 
LS 
Yield Per 
Feddan in 
sacks 
Cost per sack 
LS 
Cost 
per 
ton 
1968 (1) 4.975 3.75 1.33 13.30 
1974/'75 (2) 7.035 3.70 1.90 19.00 
1975 (3) 7.809 4.00 1.95 19.50 
1975/76 (4) 9.561 3.50 2.73 27.30 
* Yield expressed in socks assumption 10 sacks aI metric ton 
Weight of sacks differ slightly according to variety of dure. 
1. Abdel Rahmen E1 Hadri 
2. Leeds Survey 1974/75 
3. WC 1975 
4. Leeds Survey 1975/76 
48 - 
rise in crop yield. It should be remembered that these surveys 
are based on samples of farmers which comprise, -- schemes 
where the land has been in cultivation for varying periods of 
years. For the individual farmer who was cultivating the same 
land in 1968 as in 1976 the situation may well be much worse.. 
He is faced with rising cost per feddan At the same time as 
falling crop yields. During the period 1968-1975 , the purchase 
price of tractors has more-than doubled and diesel oil has more 
than tripled (details of price increases are given in Appendix B6). 
Excluded from the table are estimates made in 1976 for the Arab 
Organisation for Agricultural Development. 
(37) 
These give 
produc ti on costs of LS 4.6 per feddan and LS 11.5 per M. t 
In the writer's view, such figures are unrealistic and give too 
optimistic a picture of the potential profits for dura production. 
One reason for the low costs is that land clearance expenses, 
the costs of labourers' food and other significant items have 
been excludedo 
Table 2.5 gives a detailed breakdown of the cost of production per feddan. 
These ere- the latest Figures available at the time of writing which 
are broken down into the component cost items at given yields. 
Cultivation costs as can be seen from the table consist of, in order 
of magnitude, tractors and machinery cost, 
(fuel, repairs, wages, 
and food for drivers, greasers and mechanics)p labour cost for 
weeding. Cultivation costs are not directly related to yield, 
although other things 
being equal, careful second weeding should 
increase yields. If the crop looks not very promising farmers do 
not normally weed a second 
time. The figures given in Table 2.5 
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Table 2.5 
Dura 
Mechanised Crop Production Schemes 
Cost of Production/Feddin 
Based on 478 schemes, N. Gedaref, Deli, - S. Gedarer, Renk - Habila, 
Agadi, 19 5/7( 
ITEMS Cost/Feddan % 
LS total cost 
i) Land Preparation & Sowing: 
Fuels & Oil 550 
Wages of drivers , 525 
-Greasers wages , 125 
Maintenance and spare parts , 600 
Depreciation j400 
Seeds , 105 
Weedin 881 
TOTAL 3,186 % 39.9 
ii) Harvesting Operation: 
Cutting & collecting by hand 1,675 
Threshin by machine 0,719 
TOTAL 21,394 % 29; 9 
iii) Transportation: 
Loading during harvesting 0,188 
Transportation to Market 0,401 
Labour transportation to schemes 0,242 
TOTAL 0,831 %10: 4 
iv) Materials Used: 
Sacks 9,763(l) 
Rations of labour 0800 
Depreciation of Kotia huts 020 
TOTAL 7,993 % 100 
(ý } No crop yields given, Crop yield entered here at 20 45 sack per 
feddan, figure obtained by assuming that v+ spick + strings costed 
31 pt in 1976 (Leeds Survey Figuce for Damazien) therefore given 
a charge of 76.3 pt a feddan for sc, cksj yield 76.3 0v 2.45 sacks. 
31.0 
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are average costs from a sample when the crop was normally only 
weeded once. This sample relates to the crop year 1975/76 where 
rainfall was much above average and crops were affected by flooding. 
Harvest costs comprise the expenses of cutting the crop together 
with threshing and the purchase of sacks and strings. The cost 
of cutting is not primarily related to the yield, since if the 
crop is poor the harvesters have to cover wider distances between 
the individual plants when cutting and collecting heads of grain. 
A thin crop usually goes with a very thick stand of weeds. The 
costs of cutting are the major harvesting expense. The work is 
done by hand and the charge given in the table covers, not only 
the direct cash paynien's to the labourers but, the expenses 
incurred for transporting and feeding. The costs of threshing, 
sacks and string, are directly rebated to the crop yield. In 
this sample the average yield is/2.45 sacks per fe(Idan. The 
average cost for threshing relates to farms where the crop was 
threshed by a combine, which is used as a stationary threshing 
machine. The heads are cut by hand and fed directly to the 
machine. The stalks remain standing in the field. The marketing 
costs comprise the cost of transporting the grain to the 
local 
market and loading and unloading the sacks. 
The cost of 
transport is obviously related to the distance fron% the market. 
Not included in the costs are produce taxes like "Gibana". 
Payment of these is often evaded by unrecorded private sales. 
The final category of costs shown in Table 2.5 cover such 
items as sacks, food for labourers and depreciation on huts. 
No 
'.; harges are allowed 
for a share of initial land clearance costs, 
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construction of roads, ha? Pits and huts nor is any allowance 
included for managerial expenses* If such charges are to be 
included, an additional 10 percent charge could be added to the 
total of approximately LS 8 per f eddan giving a final f figure' of 
around LS 8.80 per teddan, more comparable with the Leeds 
figures quoted in Table 2.4 
Enterprise costs are always somewhat of a controversial 
business, as regards what costs should be included or excluded 
and with capital inputs which last over a period of years how 
these costs should be spread over the estimated lifetime of the 
input. 
All this is somewhat academic in the eyes of the actual 
producer. As far as the individual farmer is concerned, expenditure 
relates to the year on which it is incurred. Once incurred; 
the idea of apportioning the charges. over future years does not 
occur to him From the writer's experience of interviewing 
Parmers, they were concerned solely with the cash flow in a 
particular season and regarded profit or losses as the difference 
between outgoing k and incoming cash in a particular crop year. 
While an overhead charge of one pound a feddan or approximately 
30 piastres per sack is more realistic Prom the accounting aspects, 
the farmer would ignore overheads in his conception of profitability. 
Consequently the production cost given in Table 2.4 overstate5 
the cost from the point of view of the farmer. It is the farmer's 
conception of cost which influences his production decisions. 
In other words once he has cleared his land and purchased his machinery 
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he will continue to produce provided that his cash flow remains 
favourable over a period of years. It would seem that he will 
conti nue until his land and machinery are worn out. The only 
factor which would lead to him giving up farming, before this would 
be a continuing deficit in his cash f low. This situation is likely 
to be more pronounced if the present trend for input prices 
(machinery, spare parts, fuel, food, transport and labour) 
increase-at a quicker rate than dura prices. * 
t See Appendix B7 for Average Cost of Production/Feddan in Gedanef 
mechanized Crop Production Schemes 1975/76 season. 
(38) 
See Appendix B for Average Cost of Production/Feddan in 
mechani(S j) Cron Production Schemes in Blue Nile Province 1975/76 
season. 
See Appendix B for Average C9st of Production/Feddan in Blue 
Nile Province '976/77 season. t39) 
See Appendix BI Jor Average Cost of Production(5gydan in Two 
Districts of Northern Kordofan 1976/77 season. 
See AppendixB 1 for Average 
Cost of Production/Feddan in Southern 
Kordofan Province 1976/? 7 season. 
(39) 
See Appendix B1 for Average Cost of Production/Feddarý31R Two 
Districts of Sou hern Darfur Province 1976/77 season, 
q39 
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CHAPTER 3 
Marketing of Dura - Internal 
3.1. Removal from the farm 
The dura harvest marks the end of the farming year and 
in the period after harvest from January to June nearly all the 
large farms are deserted with even the machinery removed. 
Consequently all dura crops are removed from the farms as 
quickly as po ssibl eg the usual method of haulage is by lorry 
either hired or owned by the farmer 
540) 
The larger lorry operators use powerful vehicles; the 
1` 
most popular make is the large Fiat wagon complete with trailer. 
Some of these vehicles are owned by a Khartoum based haulage 
company 
(41)' 
The removal of the entire sale crop of the area 
within a relatively short period of time must impose a strain 
on the available transport. 
A 
Once the crop is removed from the farm it is either sold 
immediately or stored by the owner for sale after the post - 
harvest price low. Storage by the owner can vary fron keeping 
sacks in his house,, shop or office or by hiring a storage pit 
on the outskirts of the local towns or at Gedaref where grain 
can be stored in the silo owned by the Agricultural Bank. 
Wear and tear on these vehicles on the unmade dirt roads is 
very high and the working life must be short judged by a 
number of wrecked lorries seen by the writer in Gedaref; a 
major primary market for rainfed dura. 
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A 
s.. 
Another alternative is to store grain in the open yards belonging 
to . commercial banks; a common practice when the farmer is 
in debt to a bank 
142) 
Normally a farmer who has a high debt liability does not 
store grain himself for any length of time, his need for cash 
is too great and pressure from his creditors forces him to 
sell immediately after harvest. Consequently the bulk of the 
crop cri ll be delivered straight to an auction market or to a 
merchant and sale follows with the new owner assuming the 
liability for storage. 
3.2 Marketing channels 
Broadly speaking the crop is sold in one of three `rays, 
either by private bargain with a merchant, or through auction 
at a specialised market, or delivered to a bank. This latter 
arrangement is usually associated with a preharvest credit 
transaction, a condition of which will be the delivery of 
the crop to the ba, nkv which will dispose of it on the owner's 
behalf. Not all growers use bank credit despite the lower rates 
of interest charged since the procedure for borrowing is rather 
more complex. There is also a limit on the amount of money 
which can be advanced to a single customer. Large merchants on 
the other hand are more flexible in their lending policies 
but the borrower pays a high rate of interest either in the 
form of a straight interest charge or a discounted sale 
`ý3ý 
price (shei1). 
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The grower who is not tied to a particular outlet by his 
indebtedness can either sell through an auction market or by 
private bargain to a merchant. Chart 3.1 shows channels of 
dura marketing in the Gedaref area. 
The largest auction market for dura is found at Gedaref 
and the writer has made a detailed study of its operation. The 
bulk of the trade is from November to January in the harvest and 
the immediate post harvest period. 
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Chart 3.1 
Marketing Channels of Oura 
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3.3 How the auction market functions: 
Under the Local Government Ordinance 1951 local authorities 
are empowered to set up auction markets at which specified products 
must be sold under conditionslaid down by the local council. 
This system was designed to satisfy two objectives, firstly to 
provide conditions under which the producer can be sure of 
receiving a fair price for his produce and secondly that the 
auction market system should provide a ready mechanism for the 
collection of an agricultural. produce tax. The second objective 
however acted as a deterrent to the use of the market and 
consequently weakened the fulfilment of the first objective. 
Auction markets however are set up by individual local 
(44) 
authorities. Guidance on their establishment and operation is 
provided in model local orders but each authority has considerable 
freedom in deciding where and when these markets should operate 
and how they should be organised. 
A wholesale primary market commonly consists of a large 
space surrounded by walls or fences. Inside are small buildings 
including offices for the market superintendent and his assistants. 
The market space is divided up into a number of pitches, each pitch 
has a number displayed on a small iron plate. Inside 
the market 
compound a purpose built auction hall is provided and weighs are 
sited at convenient places. The whole is guarded day and night, not 
just for security reasons but to ensure that the market users 
pay their dues. 
* Normally dura, sesame, gum arabic, groundnuts and live animals 
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Normally sales are transacted in the following way. 
Producers take their dura in their own containers to the auction 
market early in the morning. The gate clerk allots them a 
numbered pitch on which each seller unloads his produce. If 
the farmer has plenty of grain he may be allotted several 
numbers. The clerk then registers the name of the producer 
and his district, what type of produce he is selling, the 
number of bags,, the variety and the number of the pitch 
in which it has been placed. 
To buy in an auction market a buyer must have a licence 
issued by the local authority, a certificate for taxation 
purposes and a bank guarantee. Buyers usually inspect the 
grain before sale for the presence of dirt, leaves and stalks. 
Early in the morning the auction starts. In the front stands 
the auctioneer and immediately in front of him sit the buyers 
at desks,, usually numbered, and each buyer has the same desk 
each time the auction is held. At the back on benches sit 
the sellers. In between the buyers and sellers sits the auction 
clerk. Bidding starts from the lowest price upwards and the 
grain goes to the highest bidder. The buyer is responsible for 
providing sacks, the payment of Ushur tax, weighing fees, 
I 
marketing dues, and transporting, produce from the mar_; et. 
3* Ushur is a product sales tax levied by the local government 
authority. The level of the tax is determined locally. 
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i 
In many cases merchants buy produce outside. the market 
to avoid the payment of Ushur, some of them take their trucks 
to the main producing areas and buy direct from farmers who 
can not afford the high transport cost to the markets. Some of 
the merchants who own big trucks manage to smuggle dura to 
neighbouring countries where they can get higher prices for 
their produce than on the domestic market. Only big merchants 
with substantial cash resources can afford to keep grain for 
a considerable period. Consequently it is this category 
who benefit from price rises in the months after harvest. 
Holding grain incurs storage cost and the loss of alternative 
earnings from the capital locked up in the grain beside the risk 
of price falls. Broadly speaking however prices rise considerably 
after the immediate harvest period. Some fluctuations in this 
rising trend are inevitable but provided that the time of sale 
is chosen carefully profits can be made by holding grain back 
from the market. * 
3.4 The activities of the Agricultural Bank 
One of the most important marketing and storage operators 
in the dura trade is the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan, founded 
in 1957 with prime objectives of financing crop production and 
* One of the merchants interviewed by the writer was in daily touch 
with the mincing Lane, London price for dura beside local prices 
in other parts of the Sudan. 
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marketing. The bulk of the loans are short term (under one year) 
to finance a crop, until it is sold. Medium term loans are given 
for the purchase of machinery and long term loans for land clearance 
and the provision of infrastructure. * The Bank's main activity 
is giving short term loans for crop production so providing growers 
with their working capital for a particular crop season. In 
order to secure repayment the Bank has entered the marketing field 
and will both store and dispose of its clients' produce. Farmers 
A debt to the Agricultural Bank are required to deliver the whole 
of their crops to the ABS stores ' the same requirements also 
pertain to the debtors of a commercial banks . The requirements however 
ire difficult to enforce in that the banks do not know the actual 
size of the growers, s crops 9 consequently the latter can hold back 
part of their crop for sale elsewhere. Growers will maintain that the 
crop yields are very poor and the banks especially the Agricultural 
Bank , do little to verify the claim , 
In 1974 of a total of LS 2.7 million advanced, LS 2.3 
million were for short term loan while the bulk of the 
residual LS 0.4 million represented medium loans. (From 
the Economic Survey for 1974/75, Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy) . 
N 
- 61 - 
A further facility which is provided by the Agricultural 
Bank is silo storage 
3.5 The Gedaref Silo 
The Gedaref silo was completed in 1967 at a total cost 
of 2 million Sudanese pounds, the Sudan Government raising 45% 
and the remaining 55% was met by a loan from U. S. S. R. The silo 
was constructed by Russian engineers and was equipped with Russian 
plant and machinery. At the time of the writer's visit the 
(46) 
silo was owned and managed by the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan. 
Grain is brought to the silo by lorries or railway wagons, 
it is invariably packed in sacks, on delivery the grain is 
weighed, tipped out of the sacks and then handled in bulk. First 
it is cleaned and then fumigated, it is then blown up the central 
tower of the silo and then handled by a series of conveyor belts 
which move the grain to the cells in which it is to be stored. 
The Gedaref silo consists of ten giant vertical cylinders 
which form a landmark for miles. Inside each cylinder or silo 
there are three narrow cylinders with a space in the middle between 
them. Each of the smaller cylinders is divided into cells into 
which the grain can be moved and removed automatically. The space 
in the middle is also subdivided into storage units termed stars. 
For more details about the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan see 
Chapter 10. 
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The star' cells are very popular because they are small enough 
to be filled with grain belonging to one owner. In the larger 
cells the grain from different owners is mixed up; a point of 
complaint where quality premiums are concerned. The silo is 
seldom full, in fact the manager confirmed (1976) that 
only in 1967 was the full capacity utilised. Normally according 
to the officials, the peak period of utilisation is directly after 
harvest when up to two thirds of the capacity is used. In ist 
years the silo is more or less empty by October and there is 
little or no carry over at all to the next harvest. The accounts 
show that because of under utilization the silo is run at a loss. 
(See Chapter 10) The writer believes that the bulk of the grain 
stored in the silo represents security on loans issued by the 
Agricultural Bank. Farmers who are not in debt to the Bank 
appear to store by less sophisticated but cheaper methods; a 
course which is also adopted by many merchants. The charge at the 
silo for storage was 3 piasters per sack per month in 1976. One 
leading merchant told the writer that this was too expensive for 
him. Instead he rented a Matmo ra (this is a pit in the ground 
on the outskirts of Gedaref) for LS 13 a year in which he could 
store 3,000 sacks. 
So the total cost of storing 3,000 sacks for a year in the 
silo zzould be LS1080 against the LS13 for the r: atmora. Obviously 
at this pricy: differential the less sophisticated storage system, 
despite its higher wastage rate, is a more attractive proposition. 
For more dr-tails about the silo see chapter 10. Page 284. 
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3.6 Illegal marketing of Dura 
It is of course impossible to quantify the extent of 
the illegal marketin.; of dura but judging from local comments 
there appears to be a flourishing illegal trade in existence. 
One motive for the black market is the evasion of local taxes. 
Some traders will send grain direct from the farm to distant 
urban centres of the Sudan by lorries, often at night. By 
moving the grain surreptitiously both the trader and the 
farmer avoid local taxes. To overworked taxation officials 
inquiring about crop yields the usual tale told is that the 
yields are very low and consequently taxes are paid on a 
lower assessment. 
Another important illegal trade is smuggling grain to 
Ethiopia; where dura prices are usually much higher than 
in the Sudan. -A 
At the time the writer visited Gedaref in 1975 he 
heard from different sources that the leading merchant 
families had laid the bases of their personal fortunes from 
the profits of smuggling over the last fifty years, especially 
during the Second World War. 
The writer was told that there was considerable competition 
to get farms conveniently situated near the Ethopian border. 
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The trade was temorarily disrupted in 1975/76 by the Civil 
War in Ethopia. But by 1977, despite the armed forces deployed 
on either side of the border, the trade once again flourished 
with it is said the connivance of both armies. According to 
a spokesman of the Ministry of Commerce it is suspected that 
1.00,000 tons of the 1976/77 crop were smuggled out of the Sudan 
to Ethiopia mainly, it is believed, from the Gedaref district. 4 
By smuggling, local traders and growers not only avoided paying 
their taxes but also obtained a higher price than they would have 
done in the Sudan. In addition they also returned from Ethopia 
with other commodities, mostly goods in short supply in the 
Sudan, which also were usually subject to customs duties. 
So the illegal trade wajs two way with a high profit potential 
and the risk of being caught was apparently small. 
3.7 Marketing the dura of small farmers 
The small Bildat or traditional farmer has long been 
established in the production areas of the Central Rainland 
ý 
The method of cultivation is very primitive. First the farmer 
* Information supplied to a World Bank Mission 1976/77. 
W* Bildat is derived from the word Bildat which refers to a small 
parcel of land up to five feddans which is cultivated under a 
system of shifting agriculture. Cash costs are very low since 
normally all the work is done by unpaid family labour and few 
if any purchased inputs are used. Normally the cash payments 
would be largely for transporting the crop to the auction 
market if it were not sold in the village. The other cash 
liability would be for Gibana tax and sacks. Consequently it 
is a rather meaningless exercise to produce a cost of production 
schedule. If in the future labour Ecquires high opportunity costs 
because of a'ternative employment in the mechanised schemes, then 
obviously thought should be riven to the contraversial question 
of how to cost subsistence labour. 
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clears the surface of the land by burning off the weeds and crop 
residuals in may at the end of the dry season. Then directly the 
rain starts, the crop is planted in the surface only (no soil 
cultivation) by poking seeds into little holes made by a traditional 
tool called Sa]oka.. * The men uses the Sei ka while the wives and 
children planted the seed. The crop is weeded by hand and then after 
harvest cut and threshed by hand also. 
The main objective is to grow enough grain for subsistence 
for the family with the split and undersized grain being used for 
feeding their animals. The seed is invariably home grown and 
saved from the previous harvest. Yields are very low, the writer 
visited many villages and the normal yield figures given were 
around one to two sacks per feddan! 
4? ) 
In view of the small size 
of the Bildet plots and the poor yields a family of any size would 
have little grain to spare. In the past however many families 
were forced to sell part of their subsistence crop before harvest 
by the notorious sheil system. This involves selling the crop 
forward at a highly discounted price which is much lower than the 
harvest price and the difference between the two is in reality a 
disguised rate of interest"Having sold the subsistence crop the 
farmer may well buy part of it back at a grebtly enhanced price on 
A wooden stick with a small ledge near the base to give leverage 
so that it could be easily driven into the ground by the operator's 
foot. Usually the tool is taken from a suitably shaped branch 
of a tree. 
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credit in order to feed his family until the next harvest. The 
writer however learned from the villagers interviewed that the 
sheil system was happily in decline, the reason for this was quite 
simple, many people were able to get casual work on nearby 
mechanised cropping schemes. This cash earning made them independent 
of the sheil merchants. This is an interesting point especially 
in view of the opinion that the extension of mechanised cropping in 
the area has had nothing but a bad effect on the local Bildat 
cultivation. 
When all the Bildet land was cultivated by hand, as the size 
of individual holding was very smallithere was also little 
difference in the areas cultivated by each family, Now however 
tractors are available and individuals who can afford either to hire 
t'ractorsor even buy their own machinery are now cultivating larger 
areas. However the area actually cropped one season depends on 
the climatic conditions (whether the subsequent wet season has 
little, moderate or, excessive rain) . Whereas in the old bildat 
system the cultivators with only a very small parcel of land to crop 
were relatively independent of the climate. Another limiting factor 
to expanding the area cropped is the availability of money not 
only to obtain a tractor but also to pay the necessary casual workers 
at weeding and harvest time. Consequently the larger cultivators 
are generally the sheiks and the village merchants. Quite a few 
Of these people have bought old secondhand tractors from the 
*. It is widely believed that these cultivators have lost land usage 
rights together with the rights to collect wild gum arabic. To the 
writer's knowledge no one_before has noted the connection between 
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mechanised cropping scheme owners. The purchasers of these old 
machines planned not only to use the tractors on their own land 
but also to hire them out on contract work to the neighbours. 
Unfortunately many of the secondhand machines were in poor condition 
and the cost of repairs necessary to keep them in running order was 
beyond their means so the machines were left to rust away, * 
(48 
way. *(48 
3.8 Co-operative marketing in Gedaref and Damazin 
One of the main objectives of a co-operative is to secure 
higher prices for the farmers349) In Gedaref a group of producers 
had organized themselves into what they called the Gedaref 
Cooperative Union. The union was not a success and by 1970 it 
became moribund. ** One of the reasons for failure was a quarrel 
between large and small growers. The union was granted priority 
on the railway and was allocated wagons to move dura from Gedaref 
to Port Sudan. (Rail transport between the two constitute a major 
bottleneck). It was alleged that the larger growers who are of ten 
merchants as_well1monopolised the management committee and then 
allocated the wagons to themselves. This abuse led to a strike in 
* The writer visited a tractor repair: yard in Gedaref which was full 
of old broken down tractors which their owners could not afford to 
repair. All the owners were small village cultivators many of whom 
had spent their life savings on buying a machine in the hope of 
making money from contract work. 
See Khartoum Food Supplies by M. Co Simpson. A study in the 
production and marketing of six basic foodstuffs. Research Bulletin 
No. 2, Department of Rural Economy. 
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January 1966 after which the members generally lost interest in 
the co-operative. 
When the writer visited the co-operative office in Gedaref 
December 1975 the inspector reported that cooperatives marketing 
farm produce, had collapsed and he blamed both the machinations of 
the leadin<- local merchants together with the inefficiency of the 
Cooperative Department. The inspector rather pessimistically 
added - "cooperatives are much less efficient than private companies? Ile 
ascribed, this to the ignorance of the members and the bureaucratic 
nature of the Cooperative Department whose decision making process 
50ý is cumbersome and rather inflexible. 
The local office is now concentrating on short educational 
courses for would be members of new cooperatives. The philosophy 
behind this is that it is neceÜ: -; ary to educate a cadre of potential 
cooperative conmtittee members before starting a local society. 
The educational courses concentrated on book-)Ceeping, the conduct 
of meetings, the keeping of minutes together with short lectures 
on the Sudan Co-operative Movement. 
The writer also visited the local Damazine office of the 
Department of Co-operatives in January 1976 and discovered that 
there wre no marketing cooperatives for dura or any other agricultural 
(51) 
produce in the area. The local activities of the Cooperative 
Department were confined to agricultural production schemes which 
in general were proving a disappointment. One of the troubles 
of the department was the lack of transport, consequently 
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officials could not visit societies often enough to provide 
supervision. Demazine is in the Blue Nile Province in which all 
together there were five offices each with an inspector with his 
assistant, but for the whole province there are only four vehicles 
allocated for the use of officials visiting farmers. Three were 
out of service waiting for delivery of spare parts from abroad. 
The department had a budget of LS 28,000 a year for the province 
and by the time that the salaries and wages bills had been met little 
was available for anything else. The Blue Nile Province and 
Gedaref, as the statistics discussed in Chapter 2 show, are the 
major areas of dura production. 
It would seem therefore to the writer that cooperatives 
were more or less moribund and are likely to remain so until the 
Cooperative Department has sufficient resources both human and 
f financial: 
3.9 The activities of the local merchants 
A survey carried out in Gedaref in 1966 covered 15 local dura 
merchants, the writer obtained the original questionnaires and re- 
analysed the data. The results of the new analysis are given in 
Table 3.1 This analysis showed that even in the small sample taken 
there is a wide variation in the size of the merchants' businesses 
as measured by the annual turnover in sacks of dura handled. Out 
of the f if teen merchants, two were responsible for 88o of the total 
turnover of the group. These two averaged 450,000 sacks each 
annually. The next largest to them only had a turnover of 200,000 
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sacks while the remaining 12 only averaged 10,000 sacks each, 
consequently even this small sample illustrate the dominating 
position of the large merchants. 
Table 3.1 Gedaref Dura Merchants Survey 1966 
Annual Turnover 
Number of merchants Average per 
merchant 
in size group 
(sacks per year) 
Under 5,000 sacks 2 2650 sacks 
5,000 and under 10,000 2 5000 sacks 
10,000 and under 20,000 8 13000 sacks 
20,000 to 50,000 , 
50,000 to 300,000 oaoa 54cfc 
Over 300,000 2 450000 sacks 
15 
Percentage of total turnover of the 15 merchants, contributed by 
the two largest merchants = 88% 
Source: Extracted by the writer from the original questionnaires. 
This is the first time this data has been published. 
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The operations of the smaller merchants were mainly 
conf ined to the internal trade in dura and in the main activity 
was the supply of dure to the Khartoum market. The two large 
merchants on the other hand were primarily concerned with the 
export trade and concentrated on assembling supplies and 
organising their movement to Port Sudan. The main difficulty 
encountered by these large merchants was the transport bottleneck 
on the railway- (hence their interest in the defunct Gedaref 
Cooperative Union, see page 67 ).. 
The survey showed that the smaller merchantSmade modest prof its 
but the larger merchants did very well indeed. The report comments 
that one rather wondered what the role of a smaller- merchant was, 
presumably if he came into conflict with a major operator he would 
quickly be driven out of business. Hence his survival probably 
required following the price lead set by the two giants of the 
trade. Competition by most accounts seems to have been rather 
lacking at Gedaref. 
The writer undertook a detailed survey in December 1975 of 
merchants at Gedaref. The export trade was in the hands of the same 
large^ operators. The writer spoke to many of the smaller merchants 
attending the auction market and learned from them and from the 
inspector of the market that the small traders conf ine their 
activities to the trade inside the Sudan. Thus the situation 
suggested by 1966 survey still pertained in 1975/76. 
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3.10 The larger merchants 1975/1976 
The writer was able to identify the largest merchants in 
Gedaref through the assistant of the auction market inspector 
who kindly provided details of amounts purchased in order to 
discover who are the major operators. 
Five large merchants were identified and the writer was 
able to interview them. * Details of their turnover are given 
in Table 3.2. It will be seen that of the merchants who handled 
over 50 thousand sacks a year of dura three handled over 500 
thousand and accounted for 91% of the turnover of this sub group 
of large operators. It is interesting to note that the largest 
merchant'; in the group (with a turnover of 800,000 sacks) was 
also the largest merchant in 1966 survey. His turnover has doubled 
between the two investigations: and by 1975/76, would not be far 
short of j of the total quantity of dura passing through the Gedaref 
auction market-;. ** 
The writer would like to thank them for their cooperation, assistance 
and for their kind reception. 
* He does not buy all his supplies from the auction market. The 
proportion (1) quoted is given in order to convey some idea 
of the scale of his business. 
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Table 3.2 GedareP Large Dura Merchants December 1975 
Turnover of over 50,000 sacks of dura a year 
Size of Annual Number of merchants Average Turnover per 
Turnover merchant in size group 
50,000 and under 
100,000 1 53,000 
100,000 and under 
260,000 1 150,000 
250,000 and under 
500,000 -- 
500,000 and under 
750,000 2 600,000 
750,000 and over 1 800,000 
Sources Calculated by the writer from questionnaireS 
All five merchants with an annual turnover of 50,000 sacks 
were concerned primarily with the export trade which on average 
accounted for around 70% of their turnover. The residual went to 
other parts of the Sudan with the exception of Khartoum. (The 
latter market appears to be the preserve of the small merchants). 
The writer was able through the kind cooperation of merchants 
concerned to get some impression of the histories of the four 
largest businesses; the firms with turnovensof over 100 thousand 
sacks of dura a year. These firms were either second or 
third 
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generation family businesses. They are run by people who were 
members of a small and well integrated community. Three of the 
families concerned inter-married and beside their trading activities, 
they have considerable family networks which included many of the 
leading personalities in thfvr commercial life of Gedaref. 453) 
Four out of the five leading firms were started in the 
Condominium. period with the founders being immigrants from Egypt. 
These men came to Gedaref as shop keepers at a point of time when 
Gedaref started to grow from a small village to a torn after the 
railway came to Gedaref and the government made the town an 
administrative centre. 
Starting as general store keepers they branched out into 
buying the main agricultural products of the area (sorghum, 
sesame and gum arabic). These were exported through family 
and other Egyptian connections. Minority immigrant groups tend 
to keep together and help one another. It is also interesting 
to know that Muslim Egyptians in the Sudan tend to work with 
Coptic Christians from Egypt because they feel 'kinship' with 
them on cultural grounds. Both groups are very different 
" 
from the indigenous Sudanese. -** 
The writer met many of them at a Christmas party at Gedaref to 
which he was invited. 
In the Mahadia many Egyptians were murdered by the ignorant 
soldiers who did not recognise fellow Muslims because they 
were white not brown. 
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The remaining large firm'belongs to a Sudanese Muslim family. 
The founder started as the Gedaref agent for a large Khartoum 
company founded by Egyptian immigrants in the early days of the 
Condowinium. 
The great rise in the growth of their businesses came from , 
the Second World War. It is alleged that some of these firms 
did well out of the smuggling trade with Ethopia both before and 
after the reconquest of that country. 
Whether the smuggling trade enabled these firms to obtain 
substantial capital resources or not is somewhat of a controversial 
and rather delicate matter, but one point is clear irhen mechanised 
farming startöd in Gedaref in 1945, these families had sufficient 
financial resources to exploit the new opportunities. 
All the large merchants obtain their supply of dura mainly 
from the auction market in Gedaref and to a lesser extent from 
small auction markets in the region and also, on a very limited 
scale from the actual producers mainly those with mechanised 
4 .4 
(54) 
crop schemes. All five big merchants have schemes themselves 
SIE 
The founder of this large Khartoum company came to Sudan as 
a pedlar selling china cups from door to door in Omdurman town. 
The existence of a social homogenity among a limited group of 
middlemen creates an environment which makes collusion easy, but 
of course it does not necessarily follow that collusion actually 
exists in practijg$ For eaamplie see the comment of G. R. Spinks 
and Edith Whetha 
I 
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and naturally market their own produce together with the produce 
of their relatives and friends. It is interesting to note no 
grain was purchased on sheil in 1977 by the group. 
When the merchant receives the grain either from the auction 
market or from producers, he resacks the produce and if the 
(56) 
grain is a poor sample it will be cleaned before resacking. 
For storage the large merchants did not rely on the 
Gedaref silo but instead used cheaper facilities such as 
matmora (pits) and open yards or even in their own houses. 
* 
Normally the merchant is acting on his own account and 
is the legal owner of the grain. However, when he is in debt 
to a bank, he will be required to store the produce in the 
bank's own open compound in Gedaref. 
A(* Merchants borrow from 
commercial banks rather than the Agricultural Bank because 
the credit terms are both more favourable and more flexible. 
The 1966 survey of Gedaref merchants showed that the 
larger operators held on to the grain for a longer period of 
time than did the smaller merchants. The reason for this is 
that the larger merchant is in a better position financially to take 
The writer conducted several interviews with merchants in 
offices piled high with sacks of grain with mice running in 
and out of the sacks. The merchants would have a table. and 
chair plus a big safe, a filing cabinet and a telephone. 
Often a clerk or two sat by the doorway at ramshackle tables 
together with a strong man who obviously provided security. 
A few small boys who act as messengers and tea and coffee 
makers completed the staff. The whole premises did not give 
much impression of the wealth or the scale of the operation 
of its owner". & 
The writer observed that a manager of the local bank was in the 
social circle of the leading merchants. It was very obvious that 
there was a strong link both on social and business i. atters. 
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advantage of any price rises of ter harvest while the smaller 
merchants are short of capital so normally resell the grain 
within a week or two. All agricultural produce which has a 
fixed harvest period tend to have seasonal price movements 
with the price lowest at harvest and then rising until the next 
harvest. This is a general trend but there are of course 
fluctuation and variations of this trend. Consequently to 
hold grain over time involves a speculative risk in addition 
to the costs of storage. The latter include not only the direct 
charges for storage but allowances from the loss of weight in 
storage caused by dehydration and wastage through damage by 
insects and rodents, together with the opportunity cost of the 
capital locked up in the stored crop. 
Usually it is the large merchant who has the expertise 
and resources to store and sell ' -. at the right moment. The 
merchants visited by the writer in 1975 were fully conscious 
of the possibilities of gains and losses from storing the grain 
bought Prom producers at harvest time. 
The other function which influences the length of time 
merchants hold grain at Gedaref is the logistical problem of 
moving it to Port Sudan, a distance of 768 Km by rail. 
The rail services were a constant source of complaint both in 
1966,1975 and 1976. One problem is the capacity of the 
line itself which is single tracked with infrequent passing 
places. As the track is laid on bare earth without 
ballast ( 
for reasons of economy when' built)., r 
ftains 
are limited in speed 
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and when the rainy season comes the service is subject to 
stoppages when the bed of the line is too soft to stand 
the weight of heavy locomotives. A problem at the time of 
dura harvest is the shortage of railway wagons. Priority is 
given to the movement of the Gezira cotton crop which is 
harvested in January and so partly overlaps with the dura 
harvest. Consequently, Sudan Railways concentrate on building 
up a stock of wagons in the Gezira district and too few are 
sent to Gedaref. A further difficulty is the high number of 
wagons out of service at any one time. All major repairs have 
to be done at the railway workshop at Atbara and rolling stock 
may well break down in the remoter areas of the Sudan which may 
be over 31,000 Mn from Atbars. One particular trouble is 
hot boxes, of ten broken down wagons will remain stranded -at the 
remoter end of the system for months on end. * 
The alternative to rail transport is by dirt road to Port 
Sudan, and long distance haulage traffic is increasing rapidly. 
Despite the road conditions, private contractors maintain 
regular services which prove to be run satisfactorily judging from 
(57) 
the lack of complaints about them from the merchants. 
Overheating of moving parts which leads to excessive wear and 
eventual breakdown. 
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One major contractor is a Sudanese firm based in Khartoum 
(Sudanese Transport Company) who operate a fleet of modern heavy 
Fiat trucks each of which pulls&long trailer' ; these vehicles 
are a common sight in the district. 
(58) 
There are proposals to expand the road network in Blue 
Nile Province by about 400 to 600 Km a year so that by 1985 the 
trunk road should have about 5,000 Km of paved roads, together with 
another 2,000 to 3,000 Km of gravel roads: connecting important 
producing areas with Khartoum and Port Sudan. The Chinese are 
building a paved road from Wad medani* via, Gedaref, Kassala and 
Haiya to Port Sudan. By the end of the decade the road should 
be completed and then local merchants at Cedaref believe that 
most of the logistical problems will be solved. 
Normally the Gedaref merchants in the export trade pay 
for both storage at Gedaref and transport to Port Sudan. Once at 
Port Sudan, however, the crop changes ownership.. The five 
large Gedaref merchants did not export the crop themselves but 
sold the grain at Port Sudan. The main buyer of this grain was 
single company who in the writer's estimation was responsible- 
for 80% of the total export of the dura from the Sudan. ' 
Wad medani already has a tarmac road to Khartoum. 
The writer interviewed this firm (1976) who were reluctant to give 
details about the size of their annual turnover. The estimate of 
80% was based on observation and comments by the Agricultural Bank 
manager at Port Sudan who put the figure for market share at 
least 80 j% and possibly 90, '-. 
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This firm has been in business for two generations and the founder 
(59) 
an Arab Muslim came from Aden. The family links facilitated 
the building up of an export trade to the Arabian Peninsular. 
The firm provide an example of the flexibility and initiative 
of an efficient large capitalist organisation, by the manner in 
which it organises the dura export trade to Saudi Arabia. The 
Port of Jeddah the main entrance to Saudi Arabia is very heavily 
congested and ships may queue for months outside the Port waiting for 
a. berth In fact there have been food shortages in Saudi 
Arabia because of the congestion at Jeddah and the Saudi's have 
had to resort to unloading the ships by helicopters at great 
expense. * 
The Port Sudan merchant however has found a way round th 
bottleneck and ships his dura over the Red Sea in small sailing 
dhows (colloquially called Sanbouki)e t 4th good winds the journey 
takesabout twelve hours. The grain is unloaded either in small 
harbours outside Jeddah or at sea into smaller Saudi boats for 
unloading at different points along the coast. Dura from other 
countriesy notably the United States, remains unloaded in large 
freighters queuing up outside the Port of Jeddah for possibly months'. 
* The system employed is to lift sacks by winch and fly with the sacks 
dangling below the helicopter; of ten sacks are dropped or damaged 
and the grain spilt into the sea. 
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This ability to deliver to Saudi Arabia iay'well result 
in larger profits as a result of local shortages there. A 
further source of profit is that by avoiding the Port of Jeddah, 
customs are bypassed and import duties avoided. In addition 
it is widely believed in Port Sudan that Saudi Arabia is the 
source of saiLy goods smuggled into the country on the return 
journey of these dhows. 
The peculiarities of the Saudi trade, however, give conditior 
where excessive profits could be erde. One cannot, however, be but 
amazed at the initiative shown in overcoming the shipping 
bottleneck. The large firm too has a very strong bargaining 
position internally in the Sudan both regarding the producers 
and their distributors. 
The large firm is also engaged in the export of sheep and 
actually owned three freighters to ship livestock, mainly sheep, 
to Saudi Arabia. Recently however the ships have been sold 
because they were rather old and needed expensive repairs and 
the export of sheep have been cut down. The firm also ov. "ned the 
large cotton growing Zidab Scheme in the Northern Province 
(now 
nationalised). It still owns a cotton ginning factory at Swakin 
on the coast. The cotton is grown on pump schemes and brought by 
rail and lorries to the coast where the lint and seed are separate( 
(60) 
and then exported. 
3.11 Marketing Costs 
The production costs given in Table 2.5 Chapter 2 include 
a charge for transporting sacks of dura to the auction market at 
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Gedaref. The cost given in the Table is approximately 
sixteen piasters a sack, this would include loading at the farm 
and unloading in the auction market. (This is an average cost of 
schemes at varying distances from the market). At Gedaref many 
merchants complained to the writer that the labourers hired for 
loading and unloading at the auction market had formed a union 
and had pushed up their wage rates accordingly. 
(61) 
Grain is sold by auction the only charges incurred for 
services of the market are weighing fees at five piasters a sack 
of Jura. No charge is made for the actual suctioneering process. 
When the produce goes through the market, however, local taxes 
are collected by the local council who also of course run the 
market. The first tax "Ushur" is ad valorem tax paid by the 
buyer and not the seller. In 1975 the tax on dura was 13% of its 
purchase price. Ushur represents the main source of income of the 
local council, who is responsible for roads, education and other 
services. The producer also has to pay another tax which for 
convenience of collection normally is levied at the auction market. 
This is "Gibana" which on Jura is a levy of 12m/msper Kantar or 
approximately 0.5 piasters a sack. The "Gibana" tax also goes 
to the local council. In all the two taxes represent a levy of 
approximately 16.5 piasters, * per sack given a purchase price of 
* This 16.5 piasters comprise 16 piasters for Ushur and 0.5 piasters 
for Gibana. 
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LS. 1.25 a sack; a representative price at the time of the writer's 
visit to the auction market in 1976. In the past tax evasion 
has been on a large scale and apparently is one of the reasons 
for smuggling grain to Ethiopia. 
Grain storage costs differ according to the type of storage 
used. The most expensive at Gedaref was that at the silo. The 
charge in 1975 was 3 piasters a sack per month*. This charge 
includes cleaning and fumigating. The dirtier the sample of 
grain and the more efficient the means of cleaning, the greater 
is the weight loss. The average weight loss quoted by the manager 
of the silo, was 3% for dura. 
62ý 
One cause of complaint by local 
merchants was the silo based storage charges on the number of sacks 
delivered before cleaning and not the actual number stored after 
cleaning. Many did not use the silo and instead used pit storage 
which is practical during the long dry season. 
* 
The merchants interviewed by the writer at Gedaref were 
anxious to move the grain to the port as soon as possible but 
transport presented a bottleneck. In 1975 because of the fear 
of shortage of food in Sudan itself, the export of dura was 
prohibited for a few months and consequently merchants had to 
keep the grain at Gedaref for a longer period than usual. 
(63) 
In 
a normal year, given the transport bottleneck, a merchant would 
expect to hold the grain at Gedaref for an average of two to three 
mo ntli s. 
A See comparative costs quoted for silo and it storage, Page 62 
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Cleaning is also carried out by the merchants. Normally 
they buy after inspecting samples and discount the prices they 
pay to allow for a dirty sample. Consequently the farmer is 
penalised for having a dirty crop and the penalty may be greater 
than the actual cost of cleaning which in the writer's estimates 
Was 15.5 m/ms a sack. 
it 
Table 3.3 and 3.5 are concerned with the average costs 
of marketing between the purchase of grain at the Gedaref auction 
market and its arrival at the freight yard at Port Sudan. Tables 
3.4 and 3.6 cover the cDsts incurred between arrival at the Port 
and when the grain is loaded onto the ship, ready for export. 
The Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are based on 1974 figures. From Tables 
3.4 and 3.6 it will be seen that at 1970 - 1973 F. O. B. costs 
per metric ton was LS 25.705 m/ms and at 1974 LS 42.256 m/ms. 
This large rise in the F. O. B cost per metric ton was due to the 
increase in "Ushur" and "Gibana" taxes and the increase in transport, 
storage charges and handling costs 
There are two privately owned cleaning plants in Gedaref 
where most of the merchants send their grain. Assuming 
a charge of 1.5 m/ms a sack for cleaning and a weight loss 
of 3%q the total cost per metric ton of cleaning grain 
would be LS 1.55 or 15.5 m/ms a sack. 
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The costs given in Table 3.4 and 3.6 relate to grain 
privately stored at Port Sudan. If the silo was used as in 
(Table 3.7), the costs would be higher. * To all these costs 
the original purchase price at Gedaref must be added. On 
Table 3.7 figures this would give a F. O. B. cost of 
LS 60.143 m/m per metric ton. 
The Port Sudan silo managed by the Agricultural Bank 
is strategically situated in the only port of the country, 
through which nearly all imports e, nc4 some exports of min have 
to pass. This silo has a capacity of 50,000 tons. For 
more details of the silo see page 284. 
Cleaning and storing grain at Port Sudan silo is more 
expensive than private stores. Normally exporters 
in debt to the Agricultural Bank are required to deliver 
their crop to Port Sudan silo. 
A 
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Table 3.3 Average cost of marketing of Dura 
in Gedaref during the years1970 = 1973 
First Stage from Gedaref to Port Sudan 
LS m/ms 
Price per ton at the auction market 12.250 
Ushur 12 percent 1.470 
Gibana 0.270 
Agent commission 0.330 
11 bags at 24 piaster per bag 2.640 
Handling and loading 0.500 
Transport cost to railway station (2 piasters per sack) 0.220 
Cleaning charge 1.000 
Internal jute bags at five piasters per bag 
* 0.550 
Storage cost 0.200 
Railway freight to Port Sudan 2.980 
Tot al cost per ton to Port Sudan 22.410 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources. 
Department of Agricultural Economics 1970 - 1973 
An inner lining for sacks of grain which are 
to be exported. 
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Table 3.4 Export Expenses per ton of Dura 
Second stage from the Port to f. o. b. 
Storage at port for one month. 
Port and loading fees 
Weighing fees, registration and telegrams 
Brokerage 
Bank interest 
Bank expenses 
Losses .5 percent from export price 
Insurance 
Fumigation 
Transport cost to on board the ship 
Total export expenses 
F. O. B. Price per ton 
Sources Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources 
Department of Agriculturel Economics 1970 - 1973 
LS m/ms 
0,200 
0,690 
0.370 
0.300 
0.170 
0.230 
0.160 
0.300 
0.600 
0.27 5 
3.295 
25.705 
* F. O. B. price consist of Total cost per ton from Gedaref to 
Port Sudan + total cost per ton from Port Sudan on board the 
ship LS 22.410 + LS 3.295 = LS 25.705 
I 
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Table 3.5 marketing Cost of Dura per ton 
at Gedaref Year 1974 
First Stage from Gedaref auction market to Port Sudan 
LS m/ms 
Price per ton at the auction merket 22.727 
Ushur and Gibana 3,300 
Brokerage 1.300 
11 sacks at 30 piasters per sack 3.300 
Handling and loading 0.700 
Transport cost to railway station 0.220 
Cleaning charges 1,000 
Internal jute bags at five piasters per bag 0.550 
Storage cost 0.200 
Railway freight to Port Sudan 5.010 
Total cost per ton to Port Sudan 38.307 
Sources Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources. 
Department of Agricultural Economics 1974. 
iK :; ee footnote Table 3.3 
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Table 3.6 Export Expenses per ton of 
Dura 1974 
Second Stage from the Port to f. o. b. LS m/ms 
Storage at Port for one month 0.200 
Registration fees 0.150 
Port fees 0.040 
Loading 0.650 
Weighing fees 0.220 
Brokerage 0.300 
Bank interest 0.277 
Bank expenses 0.412 
losses .5 per cent of export price 
0.275 
Insurance 0.550 
Fumigation 0.600 
Transport cost from Port to ship 0.275 
Total export expenses 3.949 
F. O. B. price per ton 42.256 
Sources Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources 
Department of Agricultural Economics 1974 
*F. 0.8. price per ton of dura consist of Total cost per 
ton 
from Gedaref to Port Sudan + total cost from the port on board 
the ship 
LS 38.307 + LS 3.949 = LS 42.256 m/ms 
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Table 3.7 Marketing cost of Dura per M. Ton 
Gedaref to Ship Port Sudan+Year 
197#/75 
LS m/ma 
Purchase price per ton in Gedaref 36.000* 
Sacks 3.157 
Storing 2.200 
Handling and loading 0.330 
Fumigation 0.250 
Insurance 0.126 
Handling and unloading at the grain silo 0.400 
Rail freight Gedaref to Port Sudan 9.136 
Handling from silo to quay 0.500 
Total cost per ton before profit 52.099 
And 5% bank profits 2.604 
Price per ton on the silo quay 54.703 
Expenses from silo to f. o. b. 5.440 
F. o. b. price per ton 60.143 
AE From the purchase price the ex - farm -producer price has 
been estimated as follows: 
Purchase price per ton in Gedaref 36.000 
Local tax at LS 0.58 per sack of 90 KG 6.444 
Market fees at LS 0.555 0.555 
Transport farm to market at LS 0.40 
per sack 4.000 
10.999 
less farm producer price 25.001 
Source Agricultural Bank of Sudan. Grain sold by the Bank 
stored at both the Gedaref and Port Sudan silos. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DURA 
Prices, Supply And Internal Demand 
4.1 Introduction 
The main constraint on the expansion of commercial modern 
agriculture is transportation which is deficient throughout 
Sudan especially in the western and southern regions. The 
railway network is not adequate. All season roads are scarce 
and the cost of road transport is high. Credit facilities are 
also inadequate. The loans granted by the Agricultural Bank 
of the Sudan (ABS) are hardly accessible to small farmers who 
are thus forced to seek credit from private traders at interest 
rates often exceeding 100 per cent per annum. These major 
constraints - regional disparities, deficient transport, lack 
of credit and marketing - strongly influence the formation and 
functioning of agricultural prices in the Sudan. Thus there 
are considerable seasonal and regional fluctuations in producer 
prices. 
Prices at harvest fluctuate from year to year a factor which 
creates a number of problems of uncertainty for farmers which 
may well reduce the use of purchased inputs and so slow down 
(64) 
the rate of technological change. Within a given crop year, 
price fluctuations are intensified by inadequate credit facilities 
and farmers in need of ready cash, are forced to sell their crops 
immediately at harvest and consequently depress the price. After 
harvest, prices rise and producers in a strong financial position 
(large f4_ý; rmers and companies) are able to dispose of their crops 
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at much more advanta4geous prices. These temporal price 
differences (seasonal variation in price at the same location) 
are a marked feature in the Sudan and indicate the lack of 
v 
credit and farm storage facilities. 
Dura markets are often controlled by a few powerful 
traders who have sufficient capital or access to credit facilities 
to form a price ring and thus exploit small producers and small 
traders. 
There are regional or spatial price differences between 
various locations at the same point of time which persist for long 
periods due to inadequate, unreliable and costly transportation. 
Prices in different markets are not comparable, indicating that 
supplies do not flow freely from low price markets to high price 
markets, thereby equalising the prices. It is risky for merchants 
to shift the supply to the regions with higher prices since they 
are not certain whether the higher price will still hold by the 
time their consignments will have arrived. 
(65) 
As has been mentioned in Chapter '3' sheil is a widespread 
marketing and credit institution under which farmers sell the crop 
forward before harvest to a private trader in exchange for credit. 
Normally sheil prices appear to be around half the wholesale price 
prevailing at the last harvest. This is the general level taken 
by the merchant as a basis for bargaining and as he is 
invariably in a stronger position than the cultivator, 
the latter has little scope for negotiation. The merchants 
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bear the risk of a fall in prices. but of course stand 
to make a handsome profit if wholesale prices rise. 
Because many rainfed farmers are also merchants 
with adequate working capital, they do not need to resort to 
the "sheil" system, but farmers without other sources of 
income or access to institutional credit often have no alternative. 
The present marketing system of dura is far from being 
an effective link between producers and consumers. The deficiency 
of marketing channels can be illustrated by the extent of 
seasonal price fluctuations, regional price disparities and the 
gap between producer and consumer prices. The producer price 
for dura in the Central Rainlands reached LS. 8 per ardeb in 
1950 and then abruptly fell to LS. 1.5 per ardeb in 1951. At 
the price of LS. 1.5 per ardeb, producers were not able to 
cover their production cost and some 30 per cent of dura producers 
in Gedaref did not harvest their crop and many did not prepare 
their land for the new season. 
66) 
Another crisis which came in December 1960 when for the first 
time the dura crop was over one million feddans in the Gedaref 
area (the main production area of dura) and the price collapsed. 
Some farmers decided not to harvest their crops and the Government 
then intervened and ordered the newly established Argricultural 
Bank of the Sudan to open an office at Gedaref and issue credit 
for the crop against delivery. Then the Bank faced a further 
problem. The grain was stored in open yards waiting removal 
by rail but owing to bottlenecks on the railway some of the grain 
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was still in the open in June 1960 and was spoiled by the first 
rain of the year. This experience led directly to the decision 
to build a grain silo at Gedaref. The silo was finished in 
time for the 1967 harvest; the only occasion when its total 
capacity was utilised. Such fluctuations in -prices of dura 
care the more serious in view of the fact that dura is the main 
staple food in Sudan and occupies some 40 per cent of the 
arable land. 
E ually serious are regional price discrepancies. These 
differences are not transitional but persist for longer periods. 
The writer found that in Gedaref, the main production area, $ 
Prices are on average around half auction prices recorded in 
other important markets, such as Njal a and El Fasher and 
a general complaint of producers and traders is shortage of 
transport to move their produce from the low to the high price 
markets. 
(67) 
Prices received by producers are commonly said to vary 
considerably according to the variety of dura sold. It is 
claimed that white varieties generally are more in demand than 
yellow and brown ones and so command a price premium*. Yet the 
average price paid at Gedaref auction market shows little inter 
Generally the white variety has a higher production cost as it 
is tall growing (cannot be combined easily) and is relatively 
loin yielding (lower plant population ner feddan). The coloured 
varieties tend to be higher yielding short strawed types 
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variety variation except for one type "combinable" which is 
in poor demand because of its colour and its small grain 
size and is less favoured as food grain. Table 4.1 indicates 
average price per kantar of different varieties of dura at 
Gedaref in the year 197475. 
(68 
Table 4.1 
Average price per kantar of 
different varieties of dura in Gedaref 
Year 197475 
1974/75 Varieties Price = LS/m/ms 
1ugad Faterita Dabir Wadakar Combine 
July 197 1,015 Cis 1.01. . 800 
August 1.015 tiý 1b15 . 800 
September 1.015 . 800 
October 1.015 1, 1. pß . 800 
November 1,015 . 800 
December 1,015 1, ýJ 1, gß . 800 
January 19 75 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.000 
February 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.000 
Larch 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.000 
April 1.300 1.30.0 1.300 11000 
May 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.000 
June 1.300 1.300 1.300 1.000 
Source = Auction market, Gedaref 
1 Kantar = 46 Kgs approximately. 
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Examination of output and price data over time shows I 
that farm gate prices are more elastic when crops are g-&©4 and 
less elastic when crops are poor. The converse holds at retail 
level. The Government was aware of the situation and in 1970 
adopted a price stabilisation sc"Liewe operated by the Agricultural 
Bank of Sudan. Under the scheme the Bank was to buy up grain 
when prices were low, store and then resell when prices were 
higher. This it would hope would help stabilise both farm gate 
and retail prices. 
Unfortunately the scheme was a failure and so was dropped 
after two years because of the financial losses incurred. Study 
of the records showed that the prices paid for grain were higher 
than those finally realised, let alone leaving a margin to cover 
storage costs, wastage and interest in the capital locked up in 
the stored grain. The actual margin between buying and selling 
prices showed a loss of LS10 a metric ton over the whole two 
years period. No figures are available for storage costs. As 
some 100,000 tons of grain appear to have been involved the losses 
on the buying and selling transactions (LS 10 a ton) give a total 
of LS one million. 
The reasons given for the failure were storage and transport 
problems together with lack of buyers. On average grain remained 
in store for over a year and unknown quantities were spoiled. 
Transport 4tifficiil_ties often meant delays in sending consignments 
of grain from the stores to high price areas in the Sudan. In fact 
by the time some grain arrived at its destination, the prices had 
already fallen. Looking at the records the grain purchased by AB: ") 
had a high proportion of the combine variety which, because of its 
colour, is unpopular in the home nurket and usually does for export. 
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4.2 Production and Price Cycle 
Dura is an annual crop and the available evidence suggests 
that farmers when they decide what area of dura to grow., take 
into account the market price of dura in the previous year. 
This relationship can be expressed as follows: 
dat 
5 
Pdt -1 
where da equals the area of dura in the current year 
Pdt -1 is unit market price for dura in the previous year. 
This relationship can result in a price/production cycle of a cobweb 
type. # Farmers respond to a low price in year t-1 by reducing the 
area grown in year t other things being equal. This will lead to a 
short fall of supplies in the market which in turn pushes up the price 
of dura in year t. In the next year, farmers respond to the higher 
price by planting a greater area, other things being ecual a larger 
supply cores to the market which in turn depresses the prices in year 
t+ 1 and another cycle begins. These price cycle are decernible in 
the production price statistics for the period 1969-1974. These 
movements are partly arodified by the effe'As of rainfall on crop 
yields hence the expression other things being equal. The message CDO 
of this is that a farmer should not plan his crop area according to 
the prices of the previous year. This policy will only result in a 
level of prices which are different to those he had expected. It 
would be more realistic to assume that the expected price would be 
cooser to that prevailing two years before. If he based his production 
decision on the price. t-2 and the rest of the producers continued 
Since the price of a given year is probably not a determinant of 
output of the same year, the identification problem is not likely 
to be troublesome. See for example Richard Storie, The Role of 
Management in Economic-139 Cambridge, F: nr; land, 19:, 1, pp. 20, '21,24. 
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using t-1 as a base; the farmer would be working against the 
cycle anc; all other things being equal, should make a higher 
profit. In other -fords if a farmer wants to make money, he 
zhould grow the crop the year after the price collapsed and 
avoid increasing his area sown the year after prices reach 
high levels. 
(69) 
4.3 Sun-ply and Farmers' Response to Price Change 
T. W. Schultz* maintains that "the rate at -which farmers 
who have settled into a traditional agriculture accept a new 
factor of production depends upon its profit, with due 
allowance for risk and uncertainty and in this respect the response 
is similar to that observed in modern agriculture. The doctrine 
that farmers in poor countries either are indifferent to or 
respond perversely to change in prices is patently fats., and 
harmful. Price policies based on it always impair the efficiency 
(70) 
of agriculture. " 
A nuriber of other economists agree with Schultz that under - 
developed agriculture has a significant positive response to price 
rises. P. 1. L. Dantwala and W. P. Falcon for example emphasise that 
( 
the composition of output responds to relative price changes . 
71) 
J. W. Mellor suggests that short run responses may be greater 
in agriculture in LDCs than in DCs because of the greater 
flexibility in respect of factor inputs and in respect to distributio 
(72) 
P. T. Bauer and B. S. Yamey cite as evidence the channels. 
response of Nigerian cocoa and palm oil prot: ucers to increased 
A Schultz (11-43 p. 49) 
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price differentials for various grades of produce. 
(73) 
C. R. Wharton suggests as an example the expansion in world 
coffee production after the high prices in the early 1950s. 
(74) 
With specific reference to Thailand, B. Mi sra and R. Sinha - 
have joined Schultz in attributing the expansion of foodgrains 
production to a remarkable price response. 
* (75) 
Other economists like R. N. Mathur and E. Ezekiel maintained 
that food grains prices are dependent not only on total output 
of grain but on the size of the marketable surplus which is 
normally defined as the residual left over after the grain 
requirements of the family farm for seed, human consumption and 
for feeding to livestock are met. 
(76) 
The writer; attack this 
conventional view of the marketable surplus and argue instead 
that this is not the determining factor as regards the amount 
sold instead they argue that the level of market prices partially 
determine the amount of grain retained on the farm. 
... Farmers sell that amount of the output 
which will give them the amount of money 
needed to satisfy their cash requirements 
and retain the balance of their output for 
their own consumption. The residual is 
Dantwara (1-26 p. 87) Falcon (1-29 p. 324), Mellor (11-29 pp, 199-200'), 
Bauer and Yamey (1-10, pp. 300-305), Wharton (VI-44, p. 3,14), 
Brown (V-7, p. 18)ß Platinius (VI-26, p, 17) and Schultz (11-43, p. 32) 
ý-(`lathur, P. N. and Ezekiel, Hanan, Marketable Surplus of Food and 
Price Fluctuation in a Developing Economy, Kylos 14:. 396-408,1961. 
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thus not the amount sold but the amount 
retained. If prices rise, the sale of a 
smaller amount of food grains provides 
the necessary cash and vice versa. Thus 
prices and marketable surplus tend to move 
in opposite direction. 
Also P. N. Mathur, D. R. Khatkhate and S. Enke all argue 
that subsistence farmers may have fixed or relatively fixed 
monetary obligations and therefore only sell as much of their 
production as is necessary to obtain the desired cash level. 
situation, the relatively fixed desire for money income, may 
exist because of relatively fixed monetary charges for rent, 
This 
debt service and inescapable small amounts of consumption of non 
agricultural goods. Because of a high rate of propensity to 
consume extra foodstuffs by the farmers family and their livestock 
+ he farmer maximises production within climatical and technological 
constraints' 
The present writer would add that this movement is within 
a fixed parameter. Obviously if the price were very low the 
I 
producer would not sell his entire crop, he would have to retain 
that part necessary for his minimum requirement. At the other 
extreme very high prices will not entirely stop sales, the producer 
has still to satisfy his minimal cash requirement. 
An alternative formulation-which could underlie the hypothesis 
of an inverse relationship between the marketed surplus of a 
A D. R. Khatkhate and S. Enke: 
Problem of marketable surplus in Indian ; %grical it., e. T'»! ý In 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 1930. 
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subsistence crop and the market price, is presented by 
R. O. Olson and T. N. Krishnan. * They do not concern themselves 
with a fixed demand for monetary income but merely argue that 
an increased price for a subsistence crop may increase the 
producer's real income sufficiently so that the income effects 
on production and consumption of this crop outweighti the price 
effects on production and consumption. The marketed surplus, 
therefore could within limits vary inversely with the market 
(77) 
price. 
R. O. Olson also indicates that the inability to increase 
output in agriculture is not because producers are unresponsive 
to price, but their response's are inhibited by other factors 
such as the lack of knowledge, non-availability of fertilizer, 
lack of credit institution etc. Improvement in such circumstances 
requires government action in providing services suchimore 
research, an aggressive extension programme, an efficient 
agricultural supply system, an effective credit system and the like. 
*Olson (1-88. p. 104) and Krishnan (1-59, pp. 325-328). R. Krishnan 
(1-59) also uses the same formulation but implies that the 
relationship between prices and the marketable surplus cannot be 
inverse. K rishnans conclusion however seems to result from a 
questionable treatment of income in the demand function for on 
farm consumption of the subsistence crop. 
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To show that farmers in less developed countries are 
responsive to normal economic incentives, Professor Schultz 
(131, pp. 64-65) stresses the fact that 
... Studies of the observed lag in the 
acceptance of new agricultural factors 
show that these lags are explained 
satisfactorily by profitability. 
To conclude there is considerable disagreement on the effect 
of product price on the supply curve of agricultural products 
in less developed countries. If farmers in less developed countries 
do not respond to price incentives as some economists claim, 
there are serious repercussions as regardsthe use of agricultural 
prices as instruments in increasing the size of the marketable 
surplus. 
4.4 Influence of Supply on Prices - Domestic Market 
I 
The area sown under dura. is not only influenced by the 
farmers response to last yea d prices but also by the climatic 
condition in the land preparation and crop sowing season, with 
dura June to Septemberp Farmers cannot start to cultivate their 
land until a certain minimum amount of rain has fallen, * 
Once rain starts farmers are faced with the problem of fitting 
their cultivation into limited periods of time where their land 
Several farmers 
1OZd he writer that they would not start 
cultivation until sufficient rainfall had fallen to close 
up the deep cracks in the clay soil. 
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is fit to work (see page 40 ). All this means that the area 
cultivated with all other things being equal, will be larger in 
a year of moderate rainfall than in years where the rainfall is 
either little or too much. 
Once the crop is planted the subsequent rainfall effects 
the yield, too little rainfall in the next two to three months 
can stunt the crop and decimate yields, while excessive rainfall 
resulting in water-logging and/or flooding could stunt the crop 
or kill it. 
(79) 
In fact the relationahip between rainfall 
and yield is that of a parabolic function. Av 
Farm gate sale of dura is concentrated in the harvest months 
between October and February with the peak supply coming in 
November and December. The crops generally come straight from 
the field and in the Gedaref area the great bulk arrives at the 
auction market for sale directly at harvest. Table 4.2 indicates 
the dura supply to the Gedaref auction market in the two years 
1973/74 and 1974/75. 
The writer discussed this point with one of the scientists 
at Abu Ni'aina research station during his field w rk. 
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Table 4.2 
The Supply of Dura to Gedaref 
Auction Market for 1973/74 and 1974/75 
Month 
Quantity 
1973/74 
Quantity 
1974/75 
Kantars M. T. Kantars M. T. 
October 283,245 12748 2979,276 13377 
November 456,073 20523 402,788 18125 
December 778,557 35035 588,295 26383 
January 369,201 16614 488,295 21973 
February 316,303 14234 239,782 10790 
Source: Gedaref Auction (harket. 
The Table above indicates also that the supply was sii11 
at the beginning of the c. : ". ) ýý season mainly from early 
maturing varieties of dura and rose in November and reached 
its peak in December when most of the farmers finish harvesting 
the bulk of their produce. 
4.5 Influence of Demand on Prices 
In the Sudan -dura has an inelastic demand since as a basic 
food grain it has to be purchased almost irrespective of increases 
in its price. * However at lower prices large quantities of dura 
*The Omdurman house hold budget survey gives an elasticity of demand 
coefficient of 0.04 for dura, 1965 while in a rural district an 
elasticity of demand of 0.7 was reported in 1965. See the 
Household Budget Survey in Omdurman and in the Gezira tianagil area 
1965. 
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might be ground up for animal feed. Thtis demand for dura 
may be inelastic between a certain one price level and elastic 
at very low prices. Inelastic demand for dura will allow 
wholesalers to raise the prices without incurring1reductions 
in total sales. Sales revenues increase so increasing the profit 
margin. For this and other reasons, retail prices for dura 
have been fixed by the Government. However the official 
fixed prices are not enforced effectively and so are not 
observed by traders. 
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Dura Utilisation in the Sudan 
Table 4.3. 
Dura Utilization in the Sudan for. 1970/71 - 
1974/75 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Total supply met. 1,535,110 1,590,913 1,299,789 1,628,290 1,704,853 
Exports m. t. 18,910 55,261 58,010 105,149 78,399 
Domestic 
utilization: 
Total m. t. 19516v200 1,535,652 1,247,779 1,533,141. 1,626,454 
Feed 
. m. 
t. 25,000 25,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 
Seed m. t. 18,596 15,943 15,560 20,144 21,193 
Waste m. t. 75,810 76,783 62,088 76,657 31,323 
Gross Food: 
m. t. 1,396,794 1,417,926 1,139,131 1,406,340 1,488,938 
g/caput 101.3 100.3 78.6 94.7 97.8 
m{ 
r 
.. 
,. 
g/caput 101.3 100.3 78.6 94.7 97.8 
Source: Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics Department of 
--- Agricultural Economics, 1975 
Table 4.3 above indicates that the average net food supply 
for the five years was 193699825 metric tons while the average 
total supply was 19553t791 metric tons. The surplus 183,966 m, t. 
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, ent usually for export. 
(80) 
Domestic demands for dura have almost 
ialanced with supply in recent years * with a small margin for export. 
'onsumption growth with 3% annual population incriase,. will soon 
Lbsorb this margin and if exports are to cbntinue output must 
)e increased. Since average yield is not rising and seems unlikely 
to rise in the present production areas, probably due to soil 
lutrient depletion resulting from existing farming practices, 
aeir areas would have to be opened up and ' crop yields increased, 
and all this is under active consideration by the Government of 
the Sudan.. One of the problems is that traditional long strawred 
multi headed varieties have limited potential for increasing 
yields through the application of fertilizers. Another complication 
(see also page 33 ) is that the consumer both at home and in the 
neighbouring Arab markets has a preference for the traditional 
varieties. The colour (white) is right and the grain has a 
distinct taste, be ause of its higher protein content than the 
3o gee 
short 'strawed, headed American type which is less favoured as food 
grain and can be exported to the world markets only for animal feed 
so competing with maize. 
The expansion of intensive poultry production and of feed 
lots for fattening cattle and sheep have increased the demand for 
feed grains and ambitious schemes for expansion if realised, would 
greatly increase home demand. Also the de: land for starch and 
glucose is growing rapidly as a re-cult of the establishment of 
local industries such as textiles, sweets and fruit canning. Table 
4.4 shoirs the arrount and value of starch and glucose imported during 
the years 1968 - 1075.81) 
i. 
/ 
1 
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Table 4.4 
Amount and Value of Starch and Glucose 
Imports for 1968 - 1975 
R YE 
Starch Glucose 
A 
Air. int Value LS Amount Value LS 
1968 1600 102,128 4076 186,473 
1969 1467 92,961 4047 187,428 
1970 802 43,222 3061 1711,904 
1971 701 41,880 5848 332,858 
1974 1969 - 5443 - 
1975 1952 - 5183 - 
Source: The Report of the Committee formed by the Council of 
Ministers.,: 1972, p. 29. 
A policy of import substitution would help the chronic 
deficit in the Sudanese balance of payment$ and also provide 
employment for the growing population. With these objectives in 
view the Government is actively investigating the possibility of 
establishing a factoryfor the processing of starch and glucose 
from dura. An annual capacity of 11,000 tons of dura to give both 
4400 tons of glucose and 2800 tons of starch is envisaged. A report 
published in 1972 by the Council of Ministers give5an account of 
the possibilities but none of the plans ha5, yet materialised. 
The extra demand resulting from population increase, industrial 
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. evelopment and the spread of intensive livestocks enterprises 
rill not be met at existing levels of production, let alone .- 
., he requirements of an export trade. 
;I 
The writer is of the opinion that given proper price incentives 
Droducers would expand the area under cultivation and so meet the 
leficit. Unfortunately when there is a shortage in the markets 
the Government normally steps in and bans the export of dura and 
with growing future deficits is likely to ban the use of the crop 
for all purposes other than for direct human consumption. 
Government action in the past has usually resulted in the fall of 
farm gate prices and there is reason to believe that any future bans 
would have a similar effect on producers' returns. 
Other price disincentives to producers include taxation 
policies and lower farm gate prices resulting from the existence 
of imperfections in marketing. 
4.6 Imperfections in Price Formation 
Imperfection in price formation results from the presence O'ff'`' 
absence of a variety of factors. In the Sudanese coiktext the 
lack of knowledge of ir-arket conditions especially by producers is 
of importance. Also the absence of effective competition between 
the various buyers of agricultural produce is a common occurrence. 
X 
When the writer was doing a field study in Gedaref 1975, the current 
ban on exports of dura was lifted and prices immediately rose at 
Ge A y_g$ auction market. 
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Under perfect competition each trader in the market expects 
to exert no influence on price because of his relatively 
small influence in the total market operations. 
(82) 
But the 
situation applies neither to dura nor, sesame as has been shown 
in the study. 
The fact that there is only one major exporter of dura and 
the internal prices are influenced by the export prices somewhat 
complicate the situation. With sesame the existence of the 
Government monopoly (The Oilseeds Company) makes the application 
ofetfree market model unrealistic. As is shown in chapter 8 
producers tended to be underpaid for sesame as the Company 
made a handsome profit which largely went to the Government. 
Imperfections in the first stage of the marketing process 
(sales at the primary markets or farm gate) are mainly due to 
concentration in the wholesale trade. The farmer faces relatively 
few potential buyers who may well operate a 'ring' in which 
tacit agreements are made about the maximum price they will pay 
farmers. In the writer's opinion such agreements are common in 
Gedaref. One tangible example of this is that for commodities 
which have a prescribed minimum price (sesame,, groundnuts, gum 
arabic), this minimum price becomes the maximum as far as the 
primary market is concerned. The buyers obviously come together 
and agree not to exceed the minimum price. The writer 
was told of such practices by the market inspector in 
Gedaref while in Damazine the secretary of the local 
Farmer's Union also complained of such practices. 
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Another complaint of price abuse is the gains made by traders 
because of the uncertainties among producers about the actual 
floor price for sesame - an example of imperfect knowledge. TraderS 
have a greater understandirg of the pricing and grading system 
and so are able to turn their greater knowledge to profit by under 
paying producers. It is also alleged that corrupt practices are 
sometimes employed in that merchants bribe local officials not to 
display notices about floor prices and grades. 
It would seem therefore that the system of floor prices 
does not operate in the way originally envisaged. The producers 
face 
,a maximum rather 
than a minimum price due to collusion among 
traders. The extra money concerned goes to distributors rather 
than producers and traders will riefend or improve on their position 
through unfair trading and even corruption. In the writer's opinion 
the operation of the floor price system needs to be very carefully 
monitored. If this cannot be done it is probably better not to intervene. * 
-X-The writer witnessed an incident. in Damazine when a producer 
brought in a consignment of gum arabic (commodity with a floor price) 
for sale. The trader manipulated the weight and underpaid the 
seller. As the producer was illiterate he accepted the price 
unquestioningly. 
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Marketing reform is a prerequisite to expanding production, 
producers need price incentives. One of the first objectives 
in any such reform programme should be the provision of adequate 
price information. This could include daily reports from the 
principal markets and periodic fuller information about the 
prospects for individual crops. The first type of information 
would enable farmers to improve their bargaining position when 
they sell and the second type would help them plan their future 
cropping programme. In view of the prevalence of illiteracy and 
the great distances in the Sudan1 the choice of media is undoubtedly 
the radio. There are few if any local newspapers (even if the 
producer could read) national papers are usually out of date 
by the time they reach the main production areas. At present no 
marketing information is given in the press. It might be an 
effective way of spreading such information if the Sudan Farmers' 
Union published market reviews and price data which could be 
distributed through the local secretaries of the Union. In combatting 
the imperfection of the marketing system one obvious approach is 
to utilize the farmers own organisations, the Union. 
The second objective of a Government price policy should be 
to adopt measures which alleviate the present fairly large 
oscillations in producer's prices which in turn affect retail 
prices. Inter-seasonal variations could be modified either by 
building more storage capacity and then buying the grain direct 
from farmers at harvest time for storage. Farmers themselves are 
usually hard pressed for money and unlikely to store the grain 
themselves. By building up buffer stocks government will be in the 
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position to manipulate wholesale and retail Prices. The earlier 
failure of such a policy (see page 96) should not divert attention 
from the possibilities of planning an effective buffer stock scheme. 
A realistic policy if implemented efficiently should help to 
remove some of the more violent oscillation in producer and 
consumer prices and perhaps increase the producer's share of 
the final consunier price by raising the farm gate prices at 
harvest; the time when the bulk of the crops are sold off 
the farm. 
(83) 
4.7 The Internal Trade Wholesale Prices 
The emphasis in this section is on t' e internal marketing 
of dura especially on the activities of local wholesalers in the 
consumption areas and the retailers to whOwr -they supply grain. 
The large wholesalers of dura in Gedaref, (see page 73 
are concerned nºainly with the export trade and only very peripherally 
with the internal trade. Gedaref itself supplies Khartoum and the 
Northern Province. It al so holds the final reserve for deficit 
areas of the country when local harvests are bad. Outside 
Khartoum most of the supplies are produced locally. For example 
the Western Provinces of the Sudan are supplied with local grain, 
only when supplies are short is dura moved from Gedare f. Shortages 
in the Southern Provinces are met by the Renk and Damazine areas of 
the Central mainlands. Any surplus from these two areas after the 
Southern Provinces' requirements are met, will be sent to Khartoum 
or the Northern Province. 
As will be seen from section 4.19 the Agricultural Bank of ')udan 
failed to manage its buffer. stock efficiently. 
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In the areas other than Gedaref, the wholesalers 
operate on a much smaller scale. They normally buy either 
from auction markets or direct from the local villages often, 
if the latter, dealing through their local agents who could 
well be village shop-keepers. 
These wholesalers are primarily engaged in supplying 
grain to retail shops normally situated in the local small 
towns of the area. In the case of the South and other deficient 
provinces the grain will also be retailed in shops in numerous 
villages. These wholesalers are expert in buying dura and 
retailers depend on their organisationcLt-__. skil1s in supplying 
them with grain at the required times and of standard variety 
and quality. Different areas of the Sudan have different 
preferences as regard varieties. Given the traiispor t 
difficulties in the country, the fact that supplies normally 
move smoothly is a tribute to the wholesalers logistical 
skills. 
These wholesalers often are concerned with providing 
credit both to producers and retailers. The producers who 
cannot easily obtain credit from elsewhere will resort to 
sheil. This involves selling the crop forward before harvest 
at an agreed price which is ý. sua'11y represented by a heavy 
discount on the prevailing price at harvest time. The sheil 
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system is discussed on page 92. Its main disadvantages 
are a distortion of market prices and that the producer is 
tied to a particular sale outlet, the one that supplies the 
credit. 
The wholesalers also provide credit to their retailers 
who then take the risk that supplies arrive undamaged. The 
sacks of grain arrive unopened and the retailer is debited 
with the cost of the whole sack whether the contents are 
damaged by insects or contain impurities. If he pays cash 
after delivery he is in a stronger position to make deductions 
for short weight and damage than if he buys on credit. Small 
retailers lack sufficient capital to finance the purchase of 
their stocks and so are in a weak bargaining position 
regarding the wholesalers. 
Table 4.5 shows the wholesale price of dura in three 
selected towns of the Sudan, Gedaref, which has the lowest 
price as befits the main surplus area, Um Ruwaba in North 
Kordofan Province where in years of low rainfall the province 
is a deficit area and may in a year of great scarcity, have 
to be supplied from more distant areas including Gedaref. The 
West because of its remoteness is associated with both higher 
transport costs and with great difficulties in actually moving 
commodities. The third town Wad iedani is the capital of the Gezira 
scheme, the major production area for irrigated dura. This irrigated 
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grain commands a price premium in the Khartoum market and large 
quantities of the Gezira dura are sold there. Consumption levels 
in the Gezira are maintained by bringing in the cheaper grain grown 
under rainfed conditions. So the Gezira is both a production 
area and a market for grain grown elsewhere. The figures in 
Table 4.5 are based on averages for all the varieties. Consequently 
the Gezira prices of Table 4.5 represent the prices of both the 
more expensive irrigated dura and the cheaper rainfed varieties. 
This is the reason why the Gezira prices are higher. than the 
other two series since the latter all refer to rainfed varieties. * 
Table 4.5 also shows a twenty years time series 1955-1974. The 
prices normally fluctuate from year to year, as also do the 
differences between prices at the three markets. For example, 
as regards inter-year price differences, the price at gedaref 
range f rom 289 m/ms per kantar in 1960 to 996 m/ms in the year 
1967. Examination of MFC unpublished statistics shows the reason 
for this fluctuation very clearly. The basic reason for fluctuation 
is the amount of grain produced. SVhere a large area sown coincide 
with a higher than average crop yield, then the market tends to be 
flooded with grain and the prices depressed. The reverse happens 
where a lower than average area sown coincides with a lower than 
average crop yield. 1960 was a year of higher than average area 
'The irrigated dura is more expensive7than the rainfed dura because 
canals and irrigation ditches are needed. The Government 
also charge water rates from farmers , 
A 
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sown and higher than average crop yield and 1967 a year of the 
reverse situation. In 1960 the Government had to intervene both 
to prevent the collapse of the market and to ensure that farmers 
continued harvesting the dura crop. 
Table 4.5 
Wholesale Prices of Oura in Selected Towns 
Annual Averages 
Years Gedaref 
per Kantar 
M /ms 
Wad fledani 
per Kantar 
M /ms 
Um Ruwaba 
per Kantar 
M /M3 
1955 552 556 710 
1956 540 574 566 
1957 469 760 621 
1958 614 649 586 
1959 533 588 650 
1960 289 568 336 
1961 430 505 419 
1962 408 602 637 
1963 523 852 615 
1964 689 854 836 
1965 437 733 600 
1966 550 628 683 
1967 996 1,579 710 
1968 335 944 552 
1969 581 965 984 
1970 764 1,343 1,118 
1971 664 700 985 
1972 483 600 800 
1973 458 732 637 
1974 849 1,353 1,200 
Source: Department of Statistics 
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Inter-years variation for Wad-ledani time series range 
between a peak of LS 1.579 m/ms per Kantar in 1967 (f peak year 
also for Gedaref) and 505 m/ms in 1961. A Similar range for Um 
Ruwaba shows a peak of LS 1,200 m/ms per Kantar in 1974 and a 
low of 336 m/ms in 1960.84) 
The comparisons between market prices in the three markets 
in the same years show considerable differences in the sizes of 
the margin between these three localities. Marketing theory 
postulates that under perfect competition the spatial price 
difference at the same time between the markets should not exceed 
the transfer cost. Such spatial comparisons are difficult to make 
between Wad edani and the other two towns because as has been 
mentioned the grain is not homogeneous as regardsvariety and quality. 
A comparison between Gedaref and Um Ruwaba dura is more meaningful 
since both refer to rainfed varieties. Examination of Table 4.5 
syggeststhat the margins between the two series fluctuate very 
widely from year to year which suggest5the presence of imperfections 
in the marketing system since the transfer cost would not be 
expected to vary so much between years. For example the margin 
between the two series is 351 m/ms per Kantar in 1974 compared with 
179 m/ms in 1973 and 317 m/ms in 1972. Given the poor state of 
internal communicationsin the Sudan such differences would be 
85 
expected. 
( 
The statistical examination of price series data of Table 
4.5 pagel17 was subjected to a standard regression analysis to 
determine the relationship between wholesale prices and time. The . 
dependent variable taken is wholesale prices per Kantar in all 
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three localities and the independent variable iS time. The first 
year 1955 is given a value 1 and the other years are numbered 
in sequence with 1974 being year-, 20. 
The results from Um Ruwaba are significant (see Appendix C3 
for details) and show that 59 per cent of the variation in prices 
between the years is due to the time factor, in that prices rise All 
over time. The Gedaref and Wad"fedani show no significance between 
prices and time but the sign in the statistical calculations t5 
positive. The rising trend of prices over time is broken by 
large year to year oscillation over time especially the high prices 
for 1967. If this year was excluded then the relation between time 
and price would be greatly strengthened. Gedaref and Wad-4ledani 
are relatively close together while Um--Ruaba is remote even by 
Sudanese standards. The rainfall in Gedaref was low in 1967 so 
affecting local prices. 
It could well be argued that there is nothing not+2worthy in rising 
prices over time, givEn the present inflationary situation in the 
Sudan. What is more surprising is that the relative annual increases 
in dura prices between the three localities a-re dissimilar. The 
figure of Um-"Ruaba 23.03 m/ms per Kantar is given by the regression 
coefficient of the model for that locality. The figure suggested 
for Gedaref is much lower around 9 m/ms per Kantar annually, while 
that 
. for Wad-"rledani could 
be in the region of 26 m/ms. * (See Figures 
4.19 4.2 and 4.3) 
*The last two figures are based on the results of the two non- 
significant models. For details see Appendix C1 and Appendix C2. 
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Figure 4.1 
Wholesale Price of Ours in Gedaref per Kantar 
1955-1974 Linear Trend 
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Wholesale Price of Dura in Um-"Ruaha ner upntar 
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These wide differences suggest that factors other than 
inflation influence the movement of local prices over time. 
Gedaref of'cou rse is the largest production area in the Sudan 
and the main supplier to the export markets. Prices in Gedaref 
are influenced by world prices. When exports are temporarily 
stopped for a few months as in 1975 and 19 779 because of 
national shortage, then prices in Gedaref tend to fall. The writer 
was in Gedaref in December 1975 when the ban on exports was lifted 
and the wholesale prices in Gedaref market immediately rose steeply. 
There was considerable excitement among merchants that day; some 
of whom had bought up stocks during the period of the ban and then 
were anticipating considerable profits when the export markets were 
reopened. A recent report shows the effects of stop-go policy regarding 
dura exports on local prices at Gedaref. Such large price 
variations offer opportunities for speculative profits. * 
4.8 Retail Prices 
0 
Retail prices and retail margins are important aspects in any 
marketing study. Retail prices in the Sudan refer not only to the 
prices charged to consumers in shops but also to prices prevailing 
in the Su $ the open retail market complete with market stalls. 
Most of the consumers buy the grain whole and have to make their own 
arrangement for grinding. , 
*Differences between producer and consumer prices in 1977 can be partly 
explained by changes in the Government export policies. Dura which 
was sold by farmers in Damazine in January 1977 for around LS 2.2 a 
sack retailed in Khartopm in, December 1977 for around LS 9.50 a sack. 
, Exc° epcwN by Flee ee©ºIGmI¢ d+vtsiarri cF the M, 'K-'6j'rY cF 
In Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan, this is the general procedure 
specialised shops for flour milling are found even in the first 
class residential area like Khartoum 2. 
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Table 4.6 gives monthly average retail prices per ton for 
dura in Khartoum from January 1966- to December 1973. It is 
obvious this is not the unit consumers buy in. Table 4.7 
gives a similar time series for Kassala town from January 
1968 to May 1973 (Kassala is the capital of its province 
which also includes the Gedaref district and itself is on the 
boundary with Ethiopia). Table 4.8 gives time series data 
from January 1968 to December 1973 for Wad Medani the major 
town in the Gezira. Comparison between tables show considerable 
spatial variations between the three towns. For example in 
January 1973 prices per ton were LS 32.595 m/ms, LS 23.850 
and LS 29.080 in Khartoum, Kassala and Wad Medani respectively. 
Temporal differences are by comparison relatively minor as the 
study of the table will show. For example in Khartoum the 
retail price remained the same for the whole year and the same 
situation was found in Wad Medani while in Kassala there were 
monthly differences usually relatively minor but in 1973 the 
price rose from LS 22.260 a ton in March 1973 to LS 3! -. 
-#800 in 
April 1973, perhaps the proximity to Ethiapia and the thriving 
smuggling trade could account for these differences. 
The spatial variations indicate imperfection in the market. 
For example the difference quoted between Wad Medani and Khartoum 
retail prices at the same periods of time, are greater than the 
transport cost. To take 1973 for example the average difference 
between the two marketsL9j, 515 per ton, is greater than transfer 
cost between the two towns. It will also be seen from tables . 
4.6 
and 4.8 that retail prices in the two towns are very 'sticky'. 
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Table 4.6 
Monthly Consumers Prices of Dura in 
Khartoum for 1966 - 1973 LS/Ton 
Month 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
January 17.600 27.200 18.285 25x440 32.595 32.595 32.595 32.595 
February 17.600 27.200 18.285 25.440 22.595 32.595 32.595 32.595 
March 17.600 32.800 18.285 25.440 28.620 32.595 32.595 32.595 
April 19.200 35.200 18.285 25.440 28.620 32.595 32.595 32.595 
May 19.200 35.200 18.285 25.440 28.620 32.595 32.595 32.595 
June 19.200 35.200 18.285 23.850 28.620 32.595 32.595 32.595 
July 22.400 41.600 19.080 34.980 32.595 32.595 32.595 32.595 
August 23.200 44.800 19.080 27.825 32.595 32.595 32.595 32.595 
September 23,200 48.000 19.080 26.235 32.595 32.595 32.595 32.595 
October 28.800 30.400 19.080 27.825 32.595 32.595 32.595 32.595 
November 30.400 24.800 19.080 33.390 32.595 32.595 32.595 32.595 
December 30.400 18.400 19.080 33.390 32.595 32.595 32.595 32.595 
Source: Department of Statistics 
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Table 4.7 
Monthly Consumer's Prices of Dura in 
Kassala for 1968 to 1973 LS/Ton M. T. 
Month 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
January 15,900 17.790 23.850 23.850 20.670 23.850 
February 15,900 17,790 23.850 20.670 20.670 22.260 
March 15,900 17.790 27.825 20.670 20.670 22.260 
April 15,900 22.250 27.825 22.670 25.440 31.800 
May 15,900 23.850 27,825 21.465 25.440 32.595 
June 15,900 23.850 32.595 21.465 21.465 - 
July 15.900 23.850 32.595 21.465 21.465 - 
August 15.900 23.850 32.595 20.670 21.465 - 
September 15.900 23.850 32.595 20.670 21.465 - 
October 15,900 23.850 32.595 20.670 20.670 - 
November 19.080 23.850 32.595 20.670 20.670 - 
December 14.490 23.850 32.595 20.670 20.670 - 
Source: Department of Statistics 
s 
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Table 4.8 
Monthly Consumer's Prices for Dura 
in Wad Iledani City from 1968-1973 LS/Ton A4. T. '' 
Month 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 
January 15.900 23.850 31.800 31.800 23.850 119.080 
February 15,900 23.850 31.800 31.800 23.850 7,9,080 
March 15.900 23.850 31.800 31.800 23.850 299.080 
April 15.900 23.850 31.800 23.850 23.850 19.080 
May 15.900 23.850 31.800 23.850 23.850 19.080 
June 15,900 23.850 31.800 23.850 23.850 X9.080 
July 15,900 23.850 31.800 23.850 23.850 29.080 
August 15,900 23.850 31.800 23.850 23.850 7,9.080 
September 15,900 23.8 50 31.800 23.850 23.850 '9.080 
October 191,080 31.800 31.800 23.850 23.850 119.080 
November 191,080 31.800 23.850 23.850 23.850 19.080 
December 19,080 31.800 23.850 23.850 23.850 19.080 
Source: Department of Statistics 
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In 1973 for example the same prices are shown for each month 
LS 29.080 per ton for Wad Medani and LS 32.595 in Khartoum. 
Such stickness is an indication of the presence of imperfect 
competition. 
The fact that prices remain constant over a period of 
time in retail markets, provides an e-sample of price levelling; 
a practice which results from the knowledge that producers' 
prices reach a season low at harvest and then rise until the 
next harvest is imminent. Consequently many traders and 
retailers will operate a system of inverse margins; prices 
being levelled at the retail end while wholesale prices 
fluctuate. Levelling means that the retailers make a higher 
profit when producers' prices are low and lower profit when they 
are high. Normally this practice gives larger overall profits 
than the normal pricing policies followed by the employment of 
either, constant or percentage margins. 
* 
Under conditions of perfect competition one would expect 
retail prices, wholesale prices and farm gate prices to be 
correlated. Under a system of price levelling the prices 
charged to consumers will bear no relationship to the movement 
in producers'prices. At harvest time for example when producers' 
prices normally reach their seasonal lour the consumer does not 
get his grain any cheaper. 
PR = retail price 
P, V = wholesale price 
n= retail margin 
Percentage warg in 
PR= n PW 
na constant 
Constant u-argin 
Pit = PWY +n 
n=a constant 
Inverse wurgin PR = PWY +n 
`There PR is a constant 
and n and P, Y fluctuate 
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CHAPTER 5 
Dura in the World markets 
5.1 Introduction 
The international market for dura is an integral part of 
the world grain trade. The price of the various grains tends to 
move together over a period of time since one grain can be broadly 
substituted for another especially in the compounding of animal 
feeds. Wheat is generally regarded as the price leader and 
variations in. the prices of wheat on the world market ü. ffect 
those of the coarse grains. Dura on the world market either goes 
for direct human consumption or for animal feed. It is the staple 
food grain in many hot semi-arid and arid countries, while it is 
used for animal feed in Western countries together with Japan. 
The role of wheat as a price leader both in the markets for 
grain for direct human consumption and in those for animal feed was 
dramatically illustrated in 1973. This was the year when the 
Russians bought up the American wheat surplus. This action 
triggered off a large rise in wheat prices which in turn led to 
major increasetin the prices of all grains. As far as Sudanese 
dura is concerned the f. o. b. Prices per m. ton rose from LS 26 in 1973 
to LS 42 in 1974. (See Table 3.4 and . 
3.6) 
Table 5.1 gives details by continents of the total production olf 
dura, crop yield and areas sown. It will be seen that Asia has the 
*This increase is not reflected in a similar rise' in farm-gate 
prices. This is yet another indicator of the presence of 
imperfect competition in the Sudanese internal trade. 
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largest area but as regard'total production the output is 
considerably less than that of North America, an indication of 
the difference in productivity. Africa also has a larger area 
sown than North America but the output is less than half of that 
of North America. Crop yields in both Asia and Africa are 
approximately a quarter of those of North America, While both 
Africa and Asia are in deficit, this deficit will be largelyin 
grains for human consumption. The other deficit continent is 
Europe,, which imports course grain for animal feed and dura is a major 
component of the trade. Other surplus areas are South America 
and Oceania but their overall total is considerably less than 
that of North America. 
(86) 
Table 5.1 shows that the world area harvested is growing 
but that total production still fluctuates independently of the 
rise in area due to annual variations in crop yields. Dura is a 
grain of the semi-arid tropics where rainfall can fluctuate annually 
and droughts are an ever present risk. Even North America is 
affected; -it will - be seen 
from Table 5.1. that crop yields vary 
from year to year. Variations in yield however do not transform 
a continent from a surplus to a deficit position except in the case 
of Africa. From Table 5.2 it can be seen that in the six years 
from 1970-1975 Africa was surplus in half and deficit in half. 
Consequently it can be said that this continent is in a marginal 
position. The deficit and surplus position is of course the basis 
for the world trade. North America is the major surplus area. 
Asia is the main deficit area while Africa is marginal. 
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U. S. A. is the largest single exporting country followed in order 
by Argentina, South Africa and then the Sudan. The South African 
grain, because of the trade boycott by African countries, goes 
largely to Europe. 
Table 5.3 shows the intercontinental export trade for the 
years 1970-1975 and Table 5.4 indicates the imports of dura by 
continents for the same years. It will be noted that continents 
record both exports and imports,, since they contain both surplus 
and deficit countries. Table 5.5 gives for each continent the 
average annual export f. o. b. prices per m. ton for 1970-1975. It 
will be seen that prices have increased over time and that they are 
lowest for those continents (South America and Oceania) furthest 
away from the deficit regions. This differential presumably reflects 
differences in transport costs. Why in 1975 Asia should return the 
lowest prices is not clear. 
* The Sudanese figures are included in 
Table 5.5 for comparative purposes and it will be seen that in the 
six year period 1970--1975, in half the years the Sudanese f. o. b. 
prices were lower than the overall African average and in the 
other half higher. In fact there is a considerable difference 
between the prices for the Sudan and the prices for Africa as 
a whole. The latter are reflected in those received by the two 
Figures for Asia are based on F. A. O. estimates. 
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largest exporting countries and the fact that in three 
years out of six years the Sudanese obtained lower average 
prices than those for the continent as a whole suggest that 
South Africa obtained higher ones despite its geographical 
position and trade boycott. 
V 
To turn to the Sudanese trade it will be seen from 
Table 5.6 that the Sudan exports dura for direct human 
consunption to nearby Arabian countries and exports dura 
for animal feed to Western Europe and Japan. 
(87) 
The 
division between the two trades is approximately equal 
over the last decade. It will also be seen from Table 5.6 
however that the trade is somewhat irregular both as 
regards the countries concerned and the total volume exported. 
For example, Japan only imported dura in 1973, but in that year 
took 23 percent of the total exports. The total overall exports 
of the Sudan fluctuated widely from year to year, 
(88) 
not so 
much due to fluctuation in demand but rather to the quantities 
available inside the Sudan for export ". Total production varies 
from year to year according to climatic conditions and when 
grain stocks are low the Sudanese (government will move in to 
safeguard internal food supplies by banning exports. This 
policy has been criticised by merchants on the grounds that it 
forces them to dishonour export contracts so not only causing 
them financial losses but detracts from the public image of 
SIE 
If this is indeed so it implies considerable 
South African exports or conversely relative 
part of the Sudanese exhorters. The south A 
presumably for animal feed while part of the 
goes for direct human consun-ption. 
skill in placing 
inefficiency on the 
frican aura goes 
: sudanese exports 
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the Sudan as a dependable exporting country. Between 1975-1977 
there have been three such bans each lasting se-Feral months. 
(89) 
It is alleged that these bans are based on insufficient 
knowledge of the true position inside the country. Officials 
who are criticised for imposing these bans proclaim that the 
lack of knowledge about the size of stocks is due to the merchants 
witholding information about the size of the stocks held. It 
is further alleged that merchants give a distorted figure in 
order to raise internal prices. All this is indicative of 
the general lack of accurate marketing information. 
* 
In addition the Sudan has a considerable illicit export 
trade in which either grain is smuggled by dhows across the 
Red Sea to Saudi Arabia or over the land border to Ethiopia (see 
Page 63 and 64> Naturally no figures are available for these 
illegal transactions but their size would seem to be considerable. 
(90) 
The authorities are aware of smuggling but find it almost impossible 
to guard effectively the long land frontier with Ethiopia where 
the country is wild and roads are few. 
The writer has exan; fined several cost schedules relating to 
marketing costs of dura which have been compiled by experts both 
Sudanese and foreigners. These appear to be somewhat misleading 
since they omit certain items or do not specify the breakdown of 
an aggregate figure. The resultant estimates vary considerably 
as regardcthe overall distribution costs. Variations were 
difficult to interpret especially since it was not clear what 
costs had been included in the schedules. Table 5.7 gives these 
A The writer in discussion with local officials and rerchants gained 
the impression that a lot of grain was stored in pits -hose 
existence, let alone sizes and contents are unknown to the officials. 
One rerchant showrbll he -vriter a pit in hi. s '), ICI: garden safely aý, (ay 
f rovi t)r-, ink eyes. 
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figures, the Basic material has been collected from a leading 
merchant in Gedaref who also is a producer. 
(91) 
The 
distribution costs amount to LS 25/m. ton and this price does 
not include either profit margins or production costs. It will 
be seen that the largest item is for railway transport followed 
by cleaning and resacking the grain. Handling charges at both 
Gedaref and Port Sudan cover loading and reloading. The grain 
is first moved from the auction market to a Gedaref cleaning 
plant and then taken to Gedaref station and loaded into 
railway wagons. At Port Sudan the grain is then unloaded from 
the train and taken to the quay and then loaded into the ship. 
Taking the charges for both Gedaref and Port Sudan together 
these handling costs account for 29 percent of the total. All 
the loading and unloading is done by hand and with the rising 
cost of labour in the Sudan, perhaps consideration should be 
given to alternative methods. 
A To make Sudan grain competitive 
in the world market., efficiency is required not only in production 
but in distribution. It seems to the writer that the present 
system of loading and unloading is in need of improvement. 
5.2 Profit Margins 
A very broad approximation of profit margins can be gained 
from using Table 5.7 v It will be seen that farmers 
made very little in the way of profit on the production of dura 
because of lour crop yield. The University of Leeds survey suggests 
* When the writer visited Port Sudan in 1973/76 the dockers were on 
a strike for wore money. 
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Table 5.7 
Distribution Costs at Gedaref Market 
to Port Sudan 
F. O. B. 1976 - 1977 
Total distribution cost per m. ton LS. 26.00 
Percentage Breakdown 
/O 
Handling charges - Gedaref 10 
Cleaning and rebagging 22 
Rail freight Gedaref 36 
Handling Port Sudan, office 
Expenses and Agent fees 32 
100 
Source; Leading Gedaref Dura Merchant 
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that an average producer price of around LS 25 a m. ton gave 
little or no profit to producers given the average level of 
yields. Included in the farmer's production costs* are the 
expenses of transporting dura to market, the initial purchase 
of sacks, and payment of the nedessary taxes. Consequently 
the LS 25 of distribution costs does not include the initial 
transfer from farm-gate to the primary market. 
Assuming a price of LS 25 a m. ton at Gedaref market, then the 
cost f. o. b. Port Sudan would be LS. 50 (distribution costs LS. 25 + 
producer price LS. 25). The profit made by the distributor is the 
difference between the latter and the prevailing world price. In 
that world prices have been considerably over LS. 65 m. ton in recent 
years (see Table 5.5)9 the distributors should have been able to 
earn a handsome profit. In that producers normally sell directly 
at harvest, the distributors can buy cheap grain which by the time 
it reaches Port Sudan should have increased in value as a result 
of internal seasonal price rises. The writer suspects that it is 
these seasonal rises which are the major source of the distributor's 
profit. Consequently in order to hold on to the grain and finance 
its handl ing9 the distributor would have ample capital resources. 
It can be categorically stated that at prevailing yields and 
production costs, any profits in the production and marketing of 
dura tend to go to the distributor rather than the producer. In that 
world price has increased dramatically since 1973 (see Table 5.5), 
the nro fit made by distributors raust have risen considerably 
Producers' marketing costs are shown in Table 3.3 page 86 
4Dura is marketed by the producers in new sacks and then resacked 
by distributor if the crop is to be exported. 
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while the unfortunate producer especially in the mechanised 
sector was squeezed by declining yields and rising input costs. 
It is this latter tendency which is under scrutiny by the third 
Mechanised Farming Mission of the World Bank to the Sudan in 1978. * 
The writer studied export trends over time. Figure 5.1 
indicates exports for 1951-1975 (see Table 5.8) and illustrates 
the point made earlier on the wide fluctuations in the quantity 
exported between one year and another. 
(92) 
The writer carried 
out a regression analysis between time and the quantity exported «nd 
discovered that there was a tendency for a trend of rising 
exports over time, but that this tendency was not statistically 
significant because of the wide movement between years, which 
masked the effect. The peak--. in 1960 especially distorted et 
significant relationship. *- 
The writer performed a similar exercise with the total value 
of dura exported and time. Since the value of exports is 
determined by the physical volumes and export prices both of which 
fluctuate widely from year to year it is not surprising that 
again no significant statistical relationship was found between 
the value of exports and time. Figure 5.2 shows the movement in 
*A confidential document which the writer has been able to see. 
**In_ 1960 there was a record harvest in the Gedaref area and producers 
prices slumped, hence much of the crop was exported very profitably. 
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Table 5.8 
Sudan Dura Exports (1951-1975 
Quantity in Thousand m. tons 
Value in LS. 
Year Quantity Value 
1951 10 175,46 
1952 24 439,139 
1953 55 1,075,405 
1954 72 1,135,562 
1955 8 158 9029 
1956 18 356,364 
1957 55 1,124,877 
1958 12 294,917 
1959 73 1,657,343 
1960 171 2,793,270 
1961 93 1,844,904 
1962 76 1,479,245 
1963 74 1,619,766 
1964 61 1,539,860 
1965 112 1,441,915 
1966 79 1,871,784 
1967 1 16,000 
1968 55 1,071,000 
1969 2 43,000 
1970 2 61,000 
1971 37 1,136,000 
1972 56 1,619,103 
1973 46 1,245,622 
1974 98 4,817,000 
197.5 48 2,366,000 
Source: Department of Statistics, Sudan 
2c c 
, 
c1C 
15c 
-d 
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Figure 5.1 
Quantity of Oura exported in 1000 M. T. 1951/52 - 1974/75 
linear trend 
y 
Source: Appendix D 
'ýý ý 
:., 
ý1 
-146- 
50,01 
4$ßi 
of 
1.2a 
IIa 
3 $°°. 
36°° 
34ý*o 
r 
3aß 
-1.64 
. 12, o 
Igor 
1600 
l4-0v 
)GOO 
80 
60, 
I4 
3.0 1 
Figure 5.2 
&, eq )) 
te-- o: 
0- 
ý. ¢ twýýS 
Source: Appendix D2 
- 147 - 
the value of exports from 1951-1975. Again it will be seen 
there are wide movements with a peak in 1974 when world dura 
prices exploded. Referring to figure 5.2 it will be seen that 
this explosion did not result in a major increase in the quantities 
exported. 1960 was the peak year as regards the volume of exports 
and 1974 the peak for value of exports. (For details see 
Appendices: Di and D2) . 
5.3 Sudan Exports Potential 
Following. recent publicity about the possible role of Sudan 
as a bread basket, it is necessary to examine very briefly the 
future possibilities of this potential being realised. The first 
point to make is that the Sudan's population is rising by 2.7 
percent annually, 
« 
and'that dura is the basic grain for human 
consumption. This means of course that given no great increase 
in production the Sudan will have little to spare for exports. 
The question then is can production be rapidly expanded? In the 
past twenty years expansion in production has been through increase 
in the area cultivated (horizontal expansion) rather than increasing 
crop yields (vertical expansion). As regards production cost, 
a very important facet as regards the competitive position in 
the world marlcetý vertical expansion would be expected to reduce costs 
r 
See Growth, Employment and Equity the report of the ILO/UNDP Employment 
M1i, 3sion 1975, a United National 
? 
nter-Agency team organized by 
the International Labour Office. 
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while horizontal expansion would be expected to increase them. 
It is obvious that higher yields reduce the incidence of fixed 
costs per ton of grain produced. Horizontal expansion in the 
Sudan has a further cost disadvantage since it means the 
lengthening of the lines of communication between the production 
areas and the port. This is true not only of exports but also 
of the costs of imported inputs such as machinery, spare parts 
and petroleum products. A recent Sudanese application to the 
World Bank for a loan to develop mechanised farming in Western 
Sudan focused attention on these disadvantages. * The Bank now 
recommends consolidation rather than expansion, and is to consider 
the possibilities of raising crop yields in existing cultivated 
areas especially Gedaref the major production area near the port. 
If this policy is ', officially adopted then there will be 
a time lag between the introduction of new inputs (fertilizers, 
improved seeds, better machinery control of pests, disease 
and weeds, better cultivation techniques) and their adoption by 
the great majority of farmers. 
The future prospects for exports depend in the writer's 
opinion on the successful diffusion of the necessary inputs and 
techniques. If the average yield of dura can be raised from its 
present miserable level to say half of the national average 
of U. S. A. then the prospects of both feeding the growing Sudanese 
<A confidential report which the writer had access to. 
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population and increasing the export of grain would be very 
promising. The problem is how to do this within say the 
next ten years. If there are serious delays in securing 
significant increasecin dura yields then there is a strong 
possibility that many farmers will be forced to give up dura 
production because at present yield and the prices of inputs 
and outputs, dura does not pay (see cost of production Table 
2.5 page 49 ) . In that adjustment to both the structure 
and logistical aspects of the present marketing system 
could help,, then such changes might be able to alleviate 
part of the problem. The introduction of more competition 
in the market should help the producer to secure a larger 
proportion of the final export price while cost reductions 
in the actual marketing process would help Sudanese dura to 
be more competitive. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Sesame Production in the Sudan 
6.1 Introduction 
Sesame -ý- 
(known locally as Simsim)grows to a height. 
of 2-4 feet. The seed head is about one inch long, pointed at 
one end. It splits on ripening into two halves which again 
subdivide into four pods. The seed is small and flattened and 
the colour varies according to variety from black to red-brown, 
yellow and white. The oil content of the seed varies from 45 
percent to 58 percent which compares favourably with the oil 
content of sesame in other countries. 
(93) 
The Sudan grows mainly white and red-brown sesame practically 
all under rain cultivation. Kordafan Province grows the red 
variety which comprises the bulk of the produce. The white 
variety is grown in Kassala, sing and the Southern Gezira as 
well as in some parts of Equato ri a and Bahr El Ghazal. Sesame 
needs 20" to 25" of rainfall in clay soil and 15" rainfall in 
"Go zla. nd" . 
'* 
The seed is normally sown by hand broadcasting as soon as 
possible after the rainy season starts. The early type mature' 
in 80 to 100 days, while the late maturing types take 100 -120 
days or longer. Yields are very sensitive to sowing dates 
and any appreciable delays in soaring leads to a lower 
yield. 
(94) 
The seedlings are very small and if there is a 
* Gotland is a local expression for a sandy soil in Western Sudan 
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shortage of water then the young seedlings shrivel and die. 
Sesame is also exceedingly sensitive to water-logging and if 
flooding results, the crop is also badly affected. 
** Harvesting 
also presents a major problem since when the seed ripens it 
shatters very quickly and most of the crop may be lost by 
delay in harvesting. Combine harvesters are no help since 
the models available in the Sudan are not equipped with the 
right attachments and consequently shatter the seed when 
the plants come in contact with the reel and cutterbar. 
* 
Farmers are therefore forced back to the employment of casual 
labourers. So great is the demand for labourers and the 
urgency of the work increases this demand, that labourers 
command high wages for their services. 
Gedaref farmers interviewed by the writer remarked that 
Gedaref was not really sesame country since often there 
was insufficient rain in the first crucial months of the 
plant's life. 
In Damazine which has a higher rainfall than Gedaref, many 
farmers complained to the writer that the land is too wet 
for sesame. One remarked that he had lost his crop because 
"the water had eaten it". 
Recent trials suggest that a possible solution to this 
problem is to spray the crop with a chemical which delays 
maturity and then combine the crop using a special attachment. 
Trials are proceeding in the Damazine area. 
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These constraints often deter many farmers from growing 
sesame and consequently many engage in the monoculture of dura 
which is of course bad for the fertility of the soil. 
A 
Sesame yields fluctuate widely. They are determined by such 
factors as rainfall distribution, delays in sowing and harvesting, 
the incidence of pests and diseases, the state of soil fertility 
and the level of weeds. Like dura, sesame yields in the mechanised 
schemes of the Central RRainlands decline over time, mainly due 
to the depletion of the soil fertility and the build' ">1tp weeds 
and pest populations. 
(95) 
The principal pest of sesame is the 
sesame bug (Aphanus litorlalis - elasmolomus sordiehus) named 
locally "Kaook". This insect attacks the ripe seeds when the 
crop is lying in the field awaiting threshing. The insect sucks 
the oil out of the seeds using long suckers attached to its head. 
An attack of these insects can ruin the crop in a matter of a few 
days. The only remedy adopted widely is to sprinkle gammxene onto 
the ground on which the sesame bundles are placed to dry out. 
The principle disease is bacterial leaf spot disease caused by 
Xanthomonas Sesami known locally as marad El Dam, the disease of 
the blood because affected plants show characteristic deep red 
stains on the stalks and leaves. Normally no control measures are 
taken, 
(96) 
Sesame and dura are said to be complementary to one another as 
regards soil fertility. Dura is shallow rooting while sesame 
wh cb h deep tap roots help5in the circulation of soil 
nu riehrts. 
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Most of the varieties grown are indigenous but trials are 
proceeding at research stations to improve yields and reduce losses 
from shattering. Work is also proceeding to improve the strains 
of white sesame. The colour of the oil is determined by the 
colour of the seed and it is the white colourless oil which commends 
the highest prices in the world market since it can be used easily for 
blending. Unfortunately the indigenous white varieties are lower 
yielding than the coloured ones. Progress is likely to be slow 
owing to the general lack of facilities and the shortage of 
trained staff. When improved varieties are available further 
delays can be expected before they are widely grown since seed 
propogation facilities in the Sudan are inadequate. 
These constraints are indicative of the many problems awaiting 
solution in the agricultural sector of the Sudan. These problems 
of course add to the risk and uncertainties facing the agricultural 
producer and the success of an export trade depends in the long 
term on overcoming some of these obstacles. 
Sesame oil is one of the principle vegetable oils in world 
trade and the colourless variety is a perfect substitute for olive 
oil. Sesame is also used for confectionary purposes. The seed is 
used whole as a decoration for cakes and bread. More mundane 
uses of the oil include soap, paint, varnish, linoleum manufacture 
The seed propogation centre at Tozi in the Central liainlands is 
very poorly equipped and even lacks a cleaning plant to separate 
weeds from the seeds. Consequently farmers who used Tozi seed 
are reluctant to buy further stocks since they claim that the Tozi 
seed brought new weeds onto their land. 
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and in straight form as lubricants. The culinary market demands 
better quality colourless oils and pays a higher premium for 
these types of oils than manufacturing industries such as paint 
and soap. 
modern oil pressing mills are situated at Tandalti, Rahadj 
Um Ruabe, El Obeid, Dueim and Khartoum North. (See oil mills 
in Appendix E1). A valuable residual cake is exported together 
With unprocessed seed. 
Sesame is widely used in the Sudan for Pood consumption and 
little price differential is paid by local consumersfor the 
various colours. 
6.2 Areas, Production and Yield of Sesame 
Sesame is traditionally the cash crop of the C entral Rainlands 
of the Sudan. At the end of the nineteenth century a British 
observer noted that in the Gedare? area villagers grew primarily 
dure and sesame, the first for subsistence ehd the letter for sale 
to cover their modest requirements and obligations to the world 
outside their village. Sesame with dura became the two crops of 
the mechanised farming development in the Central Rainlanda since 
vq. 1A 
the end of the Second" 3r. Primarily as the result of these 
development the area of sesame increased from 326,000 f eddans in 
1952/153 to 2 9,199,000 f eddans in 1974/75 
(see Table 6.1). The 
average yield' in both the mechanised forming sector and the traditional 
Bildet sector are very low and tend to decline over time (see page 163 
v 
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Table 6.1 
Area, Productiom and Average 
of Sesame 1952/53 - 1974/75. 
1.000 Feddans, Production in 
Average yield in metric ton 
for the whole Sudan 
Yield 
Area in 
100 Me T. 
per Feddan 
Year Area Production Av. Yield 
52/53 326 670 . 206 
53/54 422 690 . 164 
54/55 378 990 . 262 
55/56 636 1500 . 236 
56/57 793 1530 . 193 
57/58 563 1410 . 250 
58/59 747 1540 . 206 
59/60 991 1750 . 177 
60/61 693 1270 . 183 
61/62 981 2330 . 238 
62/63 776 1420 . 183 
63/64 1,184 1740 . 147 
64/65 1,116 1840 . 165 
65/66 948 1600 . 169 
66/67 924 1340 . 145 
67/68 1234 1870 . 152 
68/69 1f 321 1540 . 117 
69/70 i359 1750 . 129 
70/71 1'ý 857 2970 . 160 
71/72 1,921 2960 . 154 
72/73 2y 847 3400 . 119 
73/74 2y192 2380 . 109 
74/75 2199 2810 . 128 
Source: Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics 1974. 
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The overall national average yield for the country was 117 Kg/Feddan 
for the latest available year 1976/77 while for the mechanised 
sector the corresponding figure is 142 Kg/Feddan. Differences in 
yields between the mechanised (rainfed) and traditional sector 
are not very great, a very disappointing situation which must be 
remedied if the Sudan is to maintain its export position. 
(97) 
Figure 6.1 shows the increase in thq 'CtD-eta. -from the year 
1952/53 - 1975/76 together with the calculated linear regression 
line showing the relationship between time and area. The R2 for 
the regression is 0.80 suggesting that 80% of the change in the 
area of sesame grown is due to time. The fit of course would 
have been much better if freak year 1972 had not been included. * 
*1971 saw the opening of major new production schemes as a result 
of a World Bank loan. Sesame is included in the recommended 
rotation. But many new farmers after growing it once and obtaining 
disappointing results switched over to monoculture of dura. 
By 1977 83% of the area cultivated in mechanised cropping schemes 
was devoted to dura. 
-- 15 7- 
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1ý 
1 0°ý 
t1L Tsai 
IT, 
l; 
I 
i 
3 
ýýý`bbl 
4' 
le 
r1 
yi? ,, ws 
-- 158 - 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the production of sesame for 1952/53 
- 1974/75. It will be seen that there is a very marked tendency 
for production to increase over time as the consequence of the 
increase in the area sown and the trend line based on a linear 
regression has been included on the figure. The relationship 
between production and time is of course weaker than that between 
area and time since area is not the sole determinant of production 
- yield also enters in. It will be seen from the figure that 
Production oscillates from year to year around the trend line. 
Figure 6.3 shows the relationship between yield and time. 
It will be seen that the trend line has a negative slope -a 
slope which would have been more pronounced if yields had not 
slumped in 1953 - the second year of the time seriesýpa year of 
drought. The figure for yield over time is very disturbing since 
it indicates the productivity of the land is f alling1 a point 
which has already been discussed in chapter 2 page 37 with 
regard to dura. 
6.3 Provincial Distributions of Sesame, Area Production and 
Average Yields 
Table 6.2,6.3 and 6.4 respectively give details of area, 
output and yields of sesame for the period 1965/66 - 1976/77. 
It will be seen from Table 6.3 that production of sesame has 
moved both northward and southward. The principle production 
provinces in the mid 1960s - Blue Nile and Kassala had been over 
taken by Kordofan in the Western Sudan and the further western 
f 
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Figure 6.3 
Yield of Sesame per Fedden 
for 1952/53 - 1974/75 Linear Trend 
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province of Darf ur. has also reported modest increases. The 
spectacular change in position is that' of the Blue Nile Province 
where the area sown has actually fallen by 1976/77. The Blue 
Nile has a higher average rainfall than most of the other provinces 
listed and in years with above average rainfall 
_ 
the crop 
may be a failure because of flooding. In Kordofan where the 
area sown has increased spectacularly from 40,400 feddans in 1965/66 
to over a million feddans by 1970/71.. '; oils are 
generally much freer draining than the heavy soil of the Blue 
Nile. It would be expected that the movement westward in production 
areas would lead to a higher transport cost which in turn could 
inhibit the economical production in these more remote areas. 
Sesame however is a much higher value product than dura, so is 
able to bear higher transport costs. 
Table 6.4 shows annual average= yields for each province, 
the figures of course are averages for combined yields of both the 
modern and traditional sectors. All that can be said is that 
yield oscillates from year to year but the general level is very 
disappointing compared with yield in other major producing countries. 
Low yield of course has important implications as regard production 
costs. If yields are low ceteris paribus then cost per ton will 
be high. 
(98) 
Table 6.5 (Part A) gives details of sesame production by 
province as percentage of total production of sesame in the Sudan 
in the year 1976/77. It will be seen that three provinces dominate 
* See Table 6.2 
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Table 6.5 
Sesame Production in the Sudan 
1976/77 
A) Provincial Distribution :- 
Province Percentage of Total Area Percentage of Total Output 
Kordofan 49 35 
Kassala 19 28 
Blue Nile 14 19 
Southern Provinces 99 
Other Western 
199 
Total Sudan 1 100 1 100 
B) Sector Distribution: - 
Province Percentage of Total Area Percentage of Total Output 
Modern mechanised 
rainfed sector 38 39 
Traditional sector 62 61 
Total 1 100 1 100 
Source: The writer's own computation 
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the sesame production - Kordofan, Blue Nile and Kassala. The 
year 1976/77 was a bad year for Kordofan Province which with 49% 
of the total area sown in the Sudan, produced only 35% 
of the total output. The yield was only 0.110 metric ton per 
feddan compared with 0.152 for Kassala. Part (B) of the Table 
shows the distribution between the modern mechanised rainfed sector 
and the traditional sector. The split between the two as regards 
both the share of total area and total output is very much the 
same, indicating that crop yields between the two sectors are 
very similar] a very disappointing result considering the wide 
differences in the level of inputs applied. On such yield level 
one almost wonders whether the production of sesame should be 
left entirely to the traditional sector with its abundant family 
labour and independence from expensive imported inputs such as 
tractors and petroleum products. * 
6.4 Cost of Production of Sesame 
Cost of production per feddan is determined by the production 
inputs used and the unit prices, Cost of production per sack 
reflects not only these factors but the level of crop yields 
*Appendix E5 indicates areas of sesame seed by province as 
percentage of total areas in the Sudan years 1967/68 - 1976/77. 
Appendix E6 indicates production of sesame seed by province 
as percentage of total production of sesame in the Sudan years 
1967/68 - 1976/77* 
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obtained. The main inputs consist of-labour.. machinery,, 
sacks, transport and marketing expenses and various miscellaneous 
items. In recent surveys #, - 
Labour comprise 69 percent of total-costs 
machinery comprise 25 percent of total costs 
Other items comprise 6 percent of total costs. 
Total 100 
Cost per sack depends partly on yields, all other things being 
equal high yields are associated with low costs end low yields with , 
high costs per sack. As has been shown in Figure 6.3 page 160 
the trend of yields of sesame is to fall over time. In addition to 
this the farmer is faced by rising inputs costs while the prices 
obtained for his sesame have not risen to compensate for these 
increases in costs. Consequently the farmer is being squeezed by 
inflationary pressures in the Sudan economy which are not reflected 
in the world prices for his products. 
The high labour costs arise Prom the heavy manual work demands 
at weeding and harvesting. Total labour requirements to grow sesame 
have been estimated around 47 man hours per Peddan of which 19 man 
hours is for weeding and 26 man hours for cutting and threshingi 
At a total of 47 man hours to grow one feddan of sesame for an 
average crop yieldý" of one sack of sesame per feddan, a metric 
ton of sesame requires 611 man hours. 
'For details see Appendix E7 
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Harvesting costs are more or less independent of crop 
yieldso The worker merely cuts and bundles the weed together with 
the sesame, but the labour required for threshing depend partly 
on the size of the crop. The costs of labour not only include the 
direct wage paid (usually piece rates) but also the costs of 
providing water and food and shelter for the labourers beside the 
expenses incurred in recruiting and transporting the workers to 
the farms. As has been mentioned earlier with dura the fast 
rate of development in the CentralR ainlandshas led to a growing 
shortage of casual workers which is reflected in an increasing 
piece rates paid by farmers. A complication with sesame which is 
not experienced with dura, is that the crop has to be harvested 
immediately otherwise the seed will shatter. Consequently farmers 
have to engage sufficient workers to do the work if they wish to save 
their crop. The workers know this and will strike a hard bargain 
with the farmer. In fact the scarcer labour becomes the higher 
the price the farmer will pay to save the crop. Recently, however, 
in the Simsim district farmers have hired ordinary combines to cut 
their crop on the ground that it is cheaper to incur the inevitable 
losses resulting from the use of corbine harvester than to pay the 
very high piece rate for hand cutting and threshing demanded 
by 
workers. In fact it could be said that labourers have over priced 
themselves. Farmers also compete for workers by offering them a greater 
variety of foods in their diets and other items such as free 
cigarettes and dura to brew their national drink All these 
additional items of course have increased costs while 
the prices 
of such staple foodstuffs as dried fish, onions, sugar and cooking 
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oil have risen considerably in the last few years* 
(99) 
The second major category of costs, machinery expenses, has 
also risen. The prices of new machinery of which all are imported, 
reflect the inflationary trends in the manufacturing western 
countries, * All the fuels and lubricants required for these machines 
also have to be imported and world prices have risen and continue to 
rise. One particular problem which is somewhat peculiar to the 
Sudan is the blackmarket for . machinery spare parts. There was 
a very serious shortage of spare parts in the Sudan in 1978. p 
confidential report to the World Bank states that unless international 
assistance is rapidly forcoming, the entire machinery complement of 
the Sudan will slowly grind to a halt because of the lack of foreign 
exchange to import spare parts. Consequently some enterprising 
entrepreneurs have set up a very flourishing blackmarket in spare 
parts in which the farmer is forced to deal if he wishes to 
continue to keep his machines in running order. 
Table 6.6 gives costs of production of sesame per feddan in 
different areas of the Sudan from a number of surveys carried out 
by the ministry of Agriculture, Khartoum University, M. F. C. and Leeds 
University in the years 1974/75, 1975/76 and 1976/7?. For more 
" It is interesting to know that prices of machinery imported from 
Eastern Bloc " countries have risen in line with imports from the 
West. 
"1 
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details about the average costs of production of sesame in 
different provinces see Appendices E8, E9, E10, Ell i, E12. 
I 
*Appendix E8 indicates average cost of production per feddan in 
Gedaref mechanised crop production 1975/76 season. 
Appendix E9 indicates average cost of production per feddan in South 
Darfur Province 1975/76 season. 
Appendix E10 indicates average cost of production per feddan in 
Northern Kordofan Province 1975/76 season. 
Appendix Ell indicates average cost of production per feddan in 
two districts of Northern Kordofan Province 1976/77 season. 
Appendix E12 shows average cost of production per feddan 
Blue Nile Province 1976/77 season. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Marketing of Sesfm-e 
7.1. Institutional changes in the marketing of sesame 
The marketing of sesame differs from that of dura since the 
state through the operation of parastatal organisations donina; es 
the internal and export trade, while as has been seen earlier 
the marketing of dura is in the hands of the private sector. 
The state intervention in the sesame market dates from 1970. 
Prior to that year the trade gras in private hands. 
The Government in 1970 had strong left }wing leanings and 
among sectors which attracted ider. olo gical attention was that of 
the marketing of oilseeds largely groundnuts and sesame. The 
leading private sector trader was the Osman Salih Company which was 
nationalised in 1970. The owner left the country and established 
a new Company in London. This Company as will be seen became a 
major rival to the Sudanese parastatal organisations. The 
Government nationalised the Osman Salih interests within the 
Sudan, but was unable to gain control over the external outlets 
of the Company. The London Company was able to continue to supply 
their old customers with oilseeds not only from countries other 
than Sudan but also from Sudan itself. 
On the 28th May 1970 the President of the Sudan issued an 
Ordinance establishing three new Corporations to deal with 
the export of oilseeds from the Sudan. These were 
100) 
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1. Octomay Trading Corporation 
2. El Shuhada Trading Corporation 
3. The United African Corporation 
The reason for having three Corporations is that the trade was 
dominated by three private Companies - the Osman Salih Company 
and two expatriate firms. Nominal compensation was paid to the 
latter, but the Osman Salih Company being Sudanese owned received 
no cor; pensation. This was one of the reasons for subsequent feuds 
between the new London Company and the Sudanese parastatal 
organisations. 
The new Corporations enjoyed between them a complete monopoly 
in the export of oilseeds. Internally they were concerned with 
the fixing of floor prices, prices which were intended to be 
minimum producer prices. The Corporationsdid not buy direct from 
producers and only entered the wholesale markets when either the 
price fell below the floor price or where large surpluses of 
sesame piled up as a result of the failure of the market to 
move them, otherwise the Corporationsonly bought from licenced 
wholesalers who delivered oilseeds to the Corporations' w4rehouses 
at Port Sudan. 
On the 29th of August 1974 the Sudan Oilseeds Company Limited 
was established in Khartoum. This organisation took over the 
The Osman Salih fancily not only had their oilseeds company 
nationalised but also other business interests including one 
large oil pressing mill in Ithartoum North and one of the few 
ir, ajor international hotels in the centre of Khartoum. The 
reasons for the non payrr-ent of compensation appear to he political . 
The family is associate(c with one of the right wing parties. 
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oilseeds activities of the three trading Corporations set up 
in 1970. 
ý101ý 
As has been mentioned previously each of these 
earlier Corporations was set up to take over the various 
activities of individual privately owned Companies. By taking 
away the oilseeds side of their businessythe Governemcent 
presumably rationalised the oilseeds marketing activities by 
placing them directly under the control of one organisation. 
The new Company which is called "Sudan Oilseeds Company Limited" 
is given the complete monopoly of trading in oilseeds in the 
Sudan. The capital of the Company is LS 4 million of which 
75 percent was directly contributed by the Government and the 
residual 25 percent by selling shares of ten pounds each to the 
public. As before the parastatal Company did not deal directly 
with the producers but operated through wholesalers who, in 
theory, obtain their supplies from the auction markets where, 
again in theory ,a floor price was maintained of which 
the producer 
had perfect knowledge. 
Exempt from the company's jurisdiction are the local oil mills 
who are allowed to buy direct from the oilseeds markets and even 
from producers.. As regards the export tmde, this is completely 
under the control of the Company. When sesame is delivered to 
the company's warehouses in Port Sudan consignments are inspected 
for impurities. A sample is taken in the presence of the seller 
or his agent and then sent to the laboratories of the Ministry of 
Commerce at Port Sudan for analysis. The samples are then tested 
for impurities and oil content. 
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Unlike dura there are stringent regulations on the grading 
of sesame (see Appendix Fl for detail. s). There are three grades 
which are based on the percentages of oil, fatty acid, water 
content and impurities together with the percentage of different 
coloured seeds. Sesame is normally white, red, brown or black. 
Where a sample of sesame is labelled mixed colours there are 
prescribed regulations about the composition of the various 
colours. 
(102) 
The highest prices are realised by the white 
variety as it gives a colourless oil, while mixed corour 
samples command the lowest prices. 
7.2 The marketing activities of the private sector 
Before the state intervened in the marketing of sesame, 
the trade was largely in the hands of local wholesalers in 
the production areas who supplied both the home market and 
the major exporting companies. The setting up of the Oilseeds 
Company eliminated the role of the private sector in the legal 
export trade, but did not supercede the local wholesalers 
enti rely. 
Gedaref because of its proximity to Port Sudan concentrated 
on the export market and the merchants are primarily concerned with 
assembling the local produce for the export trade.: In Western 
Sudan the local merchants are concerned more with the internal 
market. What4ýver the ultinate destination of sesame however certain 
basic functions are performed by local merchants. 
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Legally merchants are supposed to buy sesame only from local 
auction markets where floor prices prevail. In practice however 
they also deal directly with producers especially when the sheil 
system is in operation. For example sheil transactionfreported 
to the writer at Damazine in November 1977 show that merchants 
bought crops forward before harvesting at a price which was highly 
discounted in comparison with the floor price prevailing in the 
local market. Producers ?. ere forced to resort to sheil as they 
had exhausted their credit facilities at the local off ice of the 
Agricultural Bank of the Sudan and could not raise sufficient money 
to pay for harvesting their crops. * Such transactions are of course 
illegal as regards oilseeds but the sheil system is deeply imbedded 
in society and of course is a lender of last resort. 
It is indicative of the plight of producezthat they are forced to 
(103) 
sheil in order to harvest their crops. 
merchants also bought directly from producers at discounted 
rates in relation to the floor prices on the pretence that if 
the producer dealt directly with them he would make a considerable 
saving because of tax evasion and a reduction in the cost of 
marketing as regards the expenses of taking sesame to the auction 
market. Whether or not dealing directly with a merchant rather than 
going to the auction market actually increases producer returns is 
*many farmers were unable to repay the outstanding debts with the Bank 
because of the poor crop yields obtained in the previous year and 
until these debts were cleared the bank would not lend them any more. 
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rather more questionable. Again these transactions are 
illegal, but despite this appear to be widespread especially 
where small Bildat producers are concerned. 
Legally the merchant is supposed to buy from an auction 
market. As has been mentioned earlier a floor price is declared 
by the authorities 
A 
and merchants then compete for supplies and 
if there is sufficient competition, the market prices rise above 
the floor price. At the niarket the grower and wholesaler are 
subject to local produce taxes and various market dues. All 
these extra costs differ from one Province to another and also 
may differ from one year to another. It is because of those 
charges that both the merchants and producers are tempted to 
do transactions outside. In the market sales take place 
in a special building and the procedure is the same as that 
described for dura in Chapter 3. 
On purchase the buyer cleans and resacks the crop and then 
arranges for its local storage until transport is available. 
Whether the produce goes for internal consu;. ption or for export, 
it is the wholesaler who is responsible for the cost of removing 
the produce from the production areas. If it goes for export 
the wholesaler has to pay all the charges for delivery to the 
Oilseeds Company's warehouses at Port Sudan and he also has to bear 
the risk of losses on the journey and the possibility that the 
produce is not up to the grade he thought it was. A general complaint 
X The floor price policy is given in Chapter 8. 
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reported to the writer was that the merchant has to give the 
Oilseeds Company a long period of credit since the latter takes 
time to settle accounts. No charge of course is made for this 
credit. In fact some wholesalers were reluctant to deal in 
sesame because of long delays in obtaining payment. 
It is interesting to note that the Oilseeds Company and the 
Corporations in the past used to take responsibility for moving 
sesame to the Port, but after organisation difficulties and high 
costs1'rent out of transport and left the transportation function 
for the merchants. Experience with other crops ha3, - shown that 
the merchants are much wore efficient in dealing with the Railway 
Corporation. Hence another important function of merchants is 
that of transporting the produce to Port Sudan. 
7.3 Marketing channels of sesame 
Chart 2 gives details of marketing channels legal and illegal. 
It will be noted that a smal 1 farmer does not necessarily follow 
the legal procedures of selling directly to an auction market 
but deals with local merchants also. The large farmer also has 
alternative outlets besides the auction market, he may well deal 
with a local wholesaler especially if he is short of 
money. The sheil system situation in Darnazine in 1977 covered 
farmers with holdings over 1000 feddans beside being rife among 
the small Bildat cultivators. 
-- 17 9 
CHART 2 
Marketing Channels of Seeani 
Source, From fieldwork Jnnue ry 1975. 
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The sheil merchants will either sell the sesame legally 
through an auction market or especially in Gedaref area they may 
dispose of it to smugglers who are engaged in a lucrative trade 
with Ethiopia. ' 
At the auction market the main buyers are the large merchants 
who are obtaining supplies for the export trade. As has been 
mentioned earlier these supplies are delivered to the stores of 
the Oilseeds Company in Port Sudan. Other purchasers at the auction 
market include buyers from the Khartoum oil mills and merchants 
operating in other areas of the Sudan who are anxious to obtain 
sesame for local consumption. In some areas sesame is pressed for 
oil by grindstones which are turned round by a blindfolded camel. 
** 
The export of sesame will be discussed in great detail in 
Chapter 9 together with the world trade in oilseeds. Before the 
export trade is considered however it is necessary to give more 
detail about the uses of sesame. 
At one stage Ethiopia exports eLceeded those for the Sudan, a 
position which it is believed the smuggled sesame from Gedaref 
the largest production area is partly to blame. 
4+* Such traditional camel driven presses are even found in Omdurman 
(the largest city in the Sudan). The writer had seen several 
where it is claimed that the oil is extracted at a lower cost than 
at the n-: odern oil pressing mills at Khartoum North at the opposite 
Side of the Nile. The flavour of the oil is better and the oil 
cake produced is in demand for livestock feeding in the nearby 
market area (The Zariba) of Orrdurman the largest cattle market 
in the Sudan. In addition to the demand for livestock feeding 
freshly produced cake is a much sought after delicacy for salad 
dishes. Oil cake produced by the modern mills is hard while 
the traditional Product while fresh is soft. 
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7.4 Utilisation of sesame in the Sudan 
Table 7.1 gives details of sesame production and utilisation 
for five years 1970/71 - 1974/75. 
104) 
The average total production 
for the five years is 290,621 tons while the average gross domestic 
utilisation is 204,611 tons, the difference 869010 tons is for 
export -which represents about 31 percent of the total production 
in the Sudan. From the average gross domestic utilisation 9.3 
percent is used as direct food. Sesame seed is used for decorating 
bread and cakes and is also used in the manufacture of s': eets. 
Part of the crop has to be retained as seed while part is wasted. 
It will be seen from the table that wastage accounted for 4.6 
percent annually of the average total domestic use. Of the oil 
cake produced (just slightly greater in wt-i ; ht than the amount of 
oil extracted), the bulk was used in the country for stock feeding 
while the residue, was exported. 
7.5 Oil Mills 
Modern industry started in Sudan after the First World War. 
In 1956 manufacturing output amounted to only 5 percent of national 
output, since then it has grown rapidly and now accounts for about 
10 percent of the gross domestic product. The expansion of 
industrial output has been as much the result of Government 
policy as a natural accompaniment to development in other sectors 
of the -economy. 
Very considerable fiscal concessions have been 
made to encourage the establishment of industry 
in the private 
sector of the economy and the Government has 
been active in 
(I05) 
promoting agricultural industries. 
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Industrial development has been concentrated largely on the 
processing of agricultural products and on textile production. 
So far it has been almost exclusively directed to import 
replacement and to providing for home needs. 
As has been mentioned in page 180 until very recent 
times oil was extracted by means of the primitive camel driven 
nresses (Assaras). These Assaras were a conr: -on feature in very 
many villages and towns especially in the areas producing sesame 
and groundnuts. The oil extracted was almost all for local 
consumption. The oil cake was also used locally for livestock 
feeding. 
After independence the oil industry was flourishing and was 
encouraged by the Government. Private mechanical oil mills were 
constructed in different parts of the country pressing large 
quantities of sesame and groundnuts for both domestic use and 
for export. The oil mills are niainly concentrated in Um Ruaba, 
. Khartoum North, Eastern Kordofan, El Obeid and Port Sudan. Oil 
is normally tinned and sent to different parts of the country where 
it is consumed for food. Inferior oil which is cheaper is used m4;; 7/ y 
i:: soap manufacture. The production of oil from the Port Sudan of l, 
mill is usually for export (For details of oil mills see Appendix El) 
7.6 Costs of marketing 
As has been mentioned earlier the sesame trade falls in two 
broad categories, the internal trade which is concerned mainly 
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with the delivery of sesame to processers, either traditional or 
operating large modern mills. 
* The 'internal trade in sesame is 
operated by the private sector subject to the floor price and 
other related regulations of the Oilseeds Company. The export 
trade as has been explained earlier is directly controlled by the 
Oilseeds Company. The private sector buys sesame destined for 
export from producers' auction markets and then resells it to 
the Oilseeds Company on delivery to Port Sudan. Consequently 
it is necessary to differentiate the cost of marketing according 
to the divisions of the sesame between external and internal trade 
and then according to the various stages within the two divisions. 
In coon to all the various possibilities is the stage where 
the sesame passes from the producer to the primary market. The 
farmer invariably has to purchase new sacks for his sesame since 
the very small seeds can easily leak out of old sacks. In December 
1976 sacks cost LS 85 for a bale of 300 sacks at Damazine in the 
Blue Nile Province. Strings to-fasten up the sacks were included 
in this price. Transport charges averaged 0.5 piasters per sack 
per kilometre by motor lorry. Typically farms were 30 - 50 
kilometres from Er Roseires auction market, the principitl market 
of the region. Producers also faced a charge of 4 piasters a 
sack for loading and unloading the lorry. At the auction market 
the local Ushur and Gibana tax amounted to 85 piasters a sack which 
in theory was paid for by the buyer. Farmers Union officials 
Af For details of utilisation of the sesame crop, see page 181 
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complained that the buyers try to pass the incidence of this 
tax on to producers. If the floor price system operated 
satisfactorily this would prove difficult, but it was alleged 
that the merchants still managed to pass the tax on to the 
producers. 
« In other provinces the local taxation system 
is different but normally it is borne by the buyer. As with 
dura, produc e taxes are aa major source of revenue of the 
provincial local Government authorities. As sesame is a 
higher value crop by weight than dura, produce taxes are higher 
per sack. 
Where the sesame is to be exported the second stage is the 
cleaning 
,,! p . 
resacking and transportation of the crop to Port 
Sudan. The total costs of this operation depend on the distance 
between the primary markets and Port Sudan. 
VA Tables 7.2 and 7.3 
compare the costs of this stage according to whether the primary 
market was in Gedaref or El Obeid which is much further away from 
the Port. The Tables give marketing costs corresponding to various 
producer prices per Kantar. The lowest price is the floor price 
set for the 1973 crop. This division of costs according to price 
is necessary since the local provincie01 taxes are based on an 
ad valorem 10 percent for Ushur at El Obeid (Kordofan Province) 
and 12 percent at Gedaref (Kassala Province). The other local tax 
< The 'writer has. attended the Roseires market and noted that 
merchants tended to denigrate the quality of sesame offered for 
sale by producers. It would seem to the writer that the quality 
of the sesame should be independently assessed before it is 
offered for sale in the auction, market. 
See Appendix F2 which illustrates how transport costs contribute 
to high marketing margins. 
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Table 7.2 
Marketing cost of Sesame at Gedaref 
Auction market for 1973 
Ls mms. Ls mms. Ls mms. Lamms. Ls mms. 
Buying price/Kantar 2.800 2.850 2.900 2.950 3.000 
e 
23.1875 Kanter x pric 64.925 69.084 67.244 68.403 69.063 
Ushur 12% 7.791 7.930 8.069 8.208 8.348 
72.716 74.014 75.313 76.611 77.911 
Gibana 15mms/Kentar . 348 . 348 . 348 . 348 . 348 
Transport, loading, 
string 38mms/Kantar . 881 . 881 . 881 . 881 . 881 
Brokerage 14 mms/Kantar . 325 . 325 . 325 . 325 . 325 
Cleaning . 750 . 750 . 750 . 750 . 750 
Value of 13.333 sacks 
x 200 mms. 2.667 2.667 2.667 2.667 2.667 
Transport to railway to 
Port Sudan 13.333 x 7mm s . 093 . 093 . 093 . 093 . 093 
5.064 5.064 5.064 5.064 5.064 
Rail freight to Port 
Sudan 4.510 4.510 4.510 4.510 4.510 
Off loading . 150 . 150 . 150 . 150 . 150 
4,660 4.660 4.660 4.660 4.660 
Cost per ton of Sesame 
delivery Port Sudan 
stores 82.440 83.738 85.037 86.335 87.635 
Cost per Kanter 3.704 3.762 3.820 
3.878 3.937 
Sources Octomay Trading Corporation's books. 
4 
1 m. t. = 23.1875 Kantars or 13.373 sacks 
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Table 7.3 
Marketing cost of Sesame in El Obeid 
Auction Market for 1973 
Buying price/Kantar in El Obeid 2.800 2.850 2.900 2.950 - 3.000 
23.1875 Kantars x price* 64.925 64.084 67.244 68.403 69.563 
Ushur % 6.493 6.608 6.724 6.840 6.956 
71.418 72.693 73.968 75.243 76.519 
Gibana 75 mms/kantar 1.739 1.739 1.739 1.739 1.739 
Transport, loading, string 
49mms/per Kantar 1.136 1.136 1.136 1.136 1.136 
Brokerage 200mms/kan. tar . 464 . 464 . 464 . 464 . 464 
value of 13.333 sacks x 200 
mms/ per kantar 2.667 2.667 2.667 2.667 2.667 
Cleaning 1.250 1.250 1.250 1.250 1.250 
Loading and offloading 
133.333 sacks x 28 mm/s . 423 . 423 . 423 . 423 . 423 
7.679 7.679 7.679 7.679 7.679 
Rail freight to Port Sudan 6.720 6.720 6.720 6.720 6.720 
Off loading . 150 . 150 . 150 . 150 . 150 
6.870 6.870 6.870 6.870 6.870 
Cost per ton of Sesame delivery 
Port Sudan 85.967 87.241 88.517 89.792 91.068 
Cost per kantar 3.862 3.919 3.977 
4.034 4.091 
Sources Octomay Trading Corporation's books. 
1 m. t. = 23.1875 Kantars or 13.333 sacks. 
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Gibana is a flat rate per unit of weight. Additional costs 
incurred by the merchants include cl'eaningg loading, unloading 
and delivery to either El Obeid or Gedaref station and then 
collection at Port Sudan station, together with a large item 
for railway freight charges. Altogether at the floor price the 
total costs delivered to the Corporation stores at Port Sudan 
is LS 82.44 per ton from the Gedaref region and LS 85.97 per 
ton from El Obeid. The respective marketing cost per ton for 
the two areas in 1973 is LS 17.51 for Gedaref and LS 21.04 
for El Obeid. The differences are largely accounted for by the 
railway freight costs but part of the locational advantage of 
Gedaref is offset by higher local taxes. 
(106) 
Table 7.4 indicates sesame marketing costs at Gedaref 
auction market for the 1975/76 year. There is a considerable 
rise in prices and marketing costs compared with 1973 (see Table 
7.2) For example the average purchase - price per ton for sesame 
rose from LS. 65 in 1973 to LS. 107 in 1975/76, a rise of 64 percent. 
Ushur and Gibana rose from LS 8.232 in 1973 to LS. 16.249 in 1975/76 
a rise of 97 percent. Railway freight rose from LS. 6.720 per ton 
to LS. 17 in 1975/76 a rise of 152 percent, jute and bags also rose 
from IS. 2.667 in 1973 to LS 4.389 in 1975/76. These increases 
in the prices led to the increase in the cost per ton of sesame 
delivered to Port Sudan from LS. 83 in 1973 to L5.157 in 1975/76 
(107) 
a rise of LS. 71. 
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Table 7.4 
Sesame marketing Costs 1975/76 
Based on purchase price at Gedaref market of LS. 4.600 per 
kantar of 45 kg of undressed sesame seed equivalent to a raw 
material cost of LS. 1'06.662 per ton of dressed seed. 
LS. per Kanter LS. per ton 
Local Dealer Expenses 
Purchase of 23.187 kantars of undressed 
sesame 106.662 
Ushur (local tax) 12% 12.799 
Gibana (local tax) 0.150 
Brokerage 0.015 
Loading to cleaning plant 0.080 
0.245 5.681 
Cleaning charges 1.750 
New jute bags, 13.3 bags at Ls. O. 330 4.389 
Storage and insurance 0.600 
Handling and transportation to railway 
station 13.3 bags at Lsd. 0.045 0.600 
Railway freight to Port Sudan 17,000-- 
Offloading charges 0.200 
43.019 
Local dealer total expenses 149.681 
5% profit 
7.484 
Price delivered store Port Sudan 157.165 
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Table 7.5 shows the percentage breakdown of the marketing 
costs given in Table 7.49 Gedaref to the Quay, Port Sudan. 
The costs do not include the charges for loading on board 
the ship. It will be noted from Table 7.5 that the producer 
receives 55 percent of the total while taxes both local and 
export accounted for 10 percent leaving 3.5 percent for the 
costs and margins of the distributor. Perhaps the most 
striking figure in the table is the 21 percent for the costs 
of handling and storing the sesame in Port Sudan itself and 
of course this does not cover the actual loading of the boat. 
The high figure for Port Sudan is partly reflection on the 
efficiency of the Sudan Oilseeds Company. The latter incurs 
considerable storage costs and penalty charges are incurred 
for failing to fulfil a contract by a specific date. The 
Company is unable to move the crop quickly to overseas 
markets. This cannot be blamed on the private sector who 
deliver sesame to the Company warehouses in Port Sudan, where 
sesame obviously must pile up there incurring both storage 
costs and other charges. Table 7.5 is based on a waiting 
period of four months in Port Sudan. 
A 
The activities of the Sudan Oilseed Company will be discussed 
in Chapter 9. 
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Table 7.5 
Percentage breakdown of Gedaref marketing 
costs and margins from auction market 
to Quay Port Sudan 197576 
Price paid to producer 55 ýoý 
Local taxes 80. 
Marketing costs and margin 
Gedaref to Port Sudan 14 3 
Marketing cost and margin 
Port Sudan to quay 21 
Export taxes 2 
Total 100 
Source: Computed by the writer from Table 7.4 + 
charges for Port Sudan, brings total to LS 195. 
A Not on board ship. 
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CHAPTER 8 
The Price Analysis of Sesame in the Sudan 
8.1 Introduction 
The production of sesame as well as. many of the rainfed crops 
in the Sudan is subject to quite large variations due to factor 
completely beyond human control; bed weather, pests, diseases 
and other natural causes are capable of reducing output to a level 
well below that planned by the Government, while exceptionally 
favourable conditions can cause production to be well above the 
Planned level. Such unplanned variations in output must be kept 
in mind when we draw the supply curve for sesame. 
The theoretical model wes introduced by Cournat in the 19th 
century to explain the market forced under perfect competition. 
(108) 
Demand and supply are each subject to the expansion force of 
consumers and producers respectively. Both forces are checked by 
the market price. At the equilibrium price the two forces are equal. 
For interpretation a supply curve such as drawn in Fig. 8.1 shows 
the total quantity farmers desire to produce and offer for sale at 
various prices. If' the price were oa, then planned Production would 
be ob, but actual production might well differ greatly from this 
planned amount, owing to causes beyond the farmer's control. 
Unplanned fluctuations are assumed to cause output to vary between 
oc and od, if there were no unplanned fluctuations in production 
prices would settle down at oa and the quantity at ob. Since the 
supply coming on to the market fluctuates between oc and od prices 
will fluctuate between oe and of, if for example the actual production 
is oc, then a shortage will develop, prices will rise to oe and at 
this price demand will be reduced to a point at which it is equal 
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Figure 8.1 
Market Forces And- The Equilibrium 
Prices Under Perfect Competition 
r 
Price 
e 
Equilibri 
Price a 
F 
C 
Quantity 
- 194 - 
to the available supply. If on the other hand conditions are 
particularly favourable actual production will exceed planned 
production, a surplus will occur and price will fall. If for 
example production is ad then price falls to o at this price 
the quantity' demanded will be increased sufficiently to take up. the 
entire available supply. 
These price fluctuations caused by change in the supply of sesame 
will bring about price fluctuations which in turn affect farmer. 
incomes. 
To curb such fluctuations the Government of the Sudan followed 
a system in which some commodity prices are fixed by law and not 
by supply and demand in a free market. The Sudan Government each 
season announces separate floor prices for each of the nine major 
wholesale t1rkets dealing in sesame. The wholesale markets in 
which these prices are posted are: - 
1" Gedaref 
2. El Obeid 
3. Al Rahad 
4. Umm Ruwaba 
5. Tandalti 
6. Kosti 
7. Al Nuh ud 
8. Nyala 
9. Ed Da'ein 
The purpbae of this floor price is to guarantee to the producer 
a minimum price which should slightly exceed his cost. 
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It is the stated policy of the Government that the 
producer must obtain a sizeable share of the returns from 
the exports of sesame in order to give him incentive to 
increase his production both vertically and horizontally. The 
floor prices, as have been mentioned earlier, are said to be 
due to the geographical location of a market in relation to 
Port Sudan. It will be seen from both Table 8.1 and 8.2 that 
the nearest market, Gedaref has the highest floor prices both 
in 1973/74 and 197677 while the lowest floor price in both 
seasons are those for A? yal a the market furthest away from the 
(Port. 109ý 
By such price differentials the producer in the more 
remote areas is penalised. If he were mechanised he would be 
doubly penalised, since he will have to pay higher prices for 
such production inputs as fuel p machinery and sacks, since 
they have to be transported a much longer distance from the 
port of entry. Such inputs would have to bear far higher freight 
charges than those for areas such as Gedaref which are far nearer 
Port Sudan. The bulk of the sesame marketed in the Western 
Provinces however is from traditional producers whose wain 
requirement for imported inputs is sacks. In view of the 
Government's avowed policy of giving priority to the development 
of the Western Sudan, these sesame price differentials deserve 
further consideration. In that the Shtetl system is more likely 
to affect the smaller traditional producers than the large 
farmers of the modern sector, then it is unlikely that the 
traditional farmers of the West will achieve the floor prices 
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Table Be I 
Floor Prices for Sesame Seeds at Wholesale markets 
Season 1973/74 
Wholesale markets 
El Obeid 
El Rahad 
Um Ruwaba 
Kosti 
Nya 1a 
El De'ein 
Gedaref 
Floor Prices per Kantar 
LS m/ms 
3 300 
3 300 
3 300 
3 300 
3 200 
3 200 
3 400 
Source: The Octmay Trading Corporations Books 1975/76 
Sudan, Khartoum 
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Table 8.2 
Floor Prices for Sesame seed at Wholesale markets 
Season 1976/77 
Source: The Sudan Oilseeds Company Ltd. 1976 
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posted in the wholesale markets. The western small cultivator 
suffers from a further disadvantage which is apt to drive him 
to sh Zt1 in that drinking water shortage during the dry 
season forces him to purchase water in barrels or tins from 
local village merchants and often such purchases are made under 
I 
the shQwl system. 
8.2 The price policy of the Sudan Oilseeds Company Ltd 
The Oilseeds Company is the instrument by which the 
Government executes its decision as regards the export control 
of oilseeds. As has been mentioned earlier the Government's avowed 
policy is to pay the producers a price over and above the costs of 
production to provide an incentive for increased production. In 
practice, as it will be argued, this policy is not implemented. 
The producer has been subject in the form of indirect taxation to 
excessive deductions in that in 1975 the Company nude a profit of 
LS 2 million,, most of which went to Government as the principal 
shareholder. The producer also bore the incidence of the high costs 
incurred by the Company, for example the costs resulting from delays 
in Port Sudan described in Chapter 7. 
The floor price is very much bound up with the world prices for 
the various grades of sesame. The floor price however is a single 
price which relates to one specific set of specifications which 
are given in Appendix Fl. The world prices however are 
differentiated according to colour and quality. The Oilseeds Company 
in determining the price starts by making assumptions about both the 
world prices for the next season and the qualities of the sesame 
to be 
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exported. Based on these projections the Company then estimates 
the prices which the next crop will fetch. These projected prices 
also serve as guidelines for basing future export contracts. Often 
these guidelines serve as minimum prices to be charged for sesame 
sold abroad. Ideally they will be exceeded, the Company policy- 
being to sell on contracts to the highest- bidders. 
Given an estimated average export price, then the floor price 
S'ZrVe 
is fixed by a committee on which? 'representatives from the Department 
of Commercej-"-- the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the 
Oilseeds Company, and many persons well acquainted with the marketing 
of oilseeds in the Sudan, but no representatives of the Sudanese 
National Farmers Union. Criteria used in fixing the prices 
(beside the estimated world prices) are the Company, 'expected 
operating expenses, level of taxes' the marketing costs of the 
private sector and an allowance for reasonable profit marginsch10) 
8.3 Supply and prices of sesame 
There are many factors which affect the supply of sesame. 
The area sown in each year is influenced by the price of sesame in 
theprevious year, in other word there is a lagged price response, 
the area sown is also partly determined by the rainfall in may, 
June and early July. If the rainfall is excessive then it is very. 
*The Company pays over LS 10 per r? -' ton as an export tax 
and about LS 4 per ton as a development tax. 
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difficult for farmers to complete their sesame sowing by mid July, 
the latest time at which the crop can safely be sown. Sesame yield 
depends greatly on timeliness of sowing. Yields also are partly 
determined by the rainfall in August and September. Too little 
rainfall leads to the shrivelling up of the plant while too 
much rain also can be fatal. When the farmer decides to increase 
his area of sesame because the prices were high in the previous 
year, he cannot depend on soil moisture conditions being ideal 
for his new crop. Even if the moisture conditions are all right 
he still faces the problem of harvesting the crop before the seeds 
shatter. Normally losses from shattering are considerable; to 
harvest a larger area than normal increases the risk. Besides 
these hazards the farmer faces the risk of heavy losses from 
pests and diseases. 
(III) 
The official floor prices are not known until a month or so 
before harvest. This lack of information adds to the farmer's 
a 
problems, especially as regards forward sales by the shtLl"-. system. 
Also this uncertainty makes it more difficult for the farmer to 
decide how much to pay for scarce labour at harvest in order to 
minimise the risk of shattering. If sesame commands a high price 
it might well pay a farmer to engage a large gang of labourers 
to complete the harvest as quickly as possible. To do this a farmer 
must plan in advance and lay in the necessary food and water supplies. H, 
' See also page 152 for a fuller discussion of these cultural problems. 
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then may well have to arrange transport for his casual workers 
coming from a distant area. If he decides that it is not worth 
his while to do all these arrangement in advance then higher losses 
from shattering are probably inevitable and he takes a risk in making 
his decision. Uncertainty about the price also of course affects 
the amount of effort put into other operations especially weeding, 
farmer is more inclined to carry out a second weeding if he knows 
that the cost will be recovered by the extra revenue earned by 
the subsequent addition to the value of the yield. 
8.4 Purchasing of sesame and volume of marketing in domestic markets 
The marketing year starts in late October when the first 
crop comes off the field. The volume marketed builds up to a peak 
in November-December as normally most of the crops are sold either 
directly at harvest or a few weeks later. Most farmers are short of 
money and sell quickly. In the crop year 1974,93% of the total 
estimated sesame crop was sold in the Cedaref area through the 
auction market at harvest time. The total crop production figures 
used by the writer in this calculation; 4- those of mFC and 'the volume 
of produce marketed Wd5 extracted by the writer himself at Gedaref 
market. Those farmers who grow Jura as well as sesame 
rely on the proceeds from the sesame crop to cover costs of dura 
harvesting. 
Af ter the direct harvest period little sesame is left on the 
farms and the seed entering the local markets mainly comes 
local traders who have held it fora period of time hoping for a 
rise in prices. Nether prices rise above the floor price in the 
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months subsequent to harvest depends on Supply and demand. 
person holding a crop cannot be guaranteed a profit on his 
transaction. 
me 
The private sector as has already been mentioned in Chapter 7 
dominate the internal marketing of sesame whether the crop is 
destined for export or home consumption. If the first then the 
private sector organizes the assembly of the produce from the farm 
and its delivery to the Oilseeds Company warehouses in Port Sudan 
if the second then the trade is entirely in private hands. 
Before the Oilseeds Company was established in 1974 the export trade 
was dominated by a few large merchants based mainly in Port Sudan 
and Gedaref'. These merchants operated through a chain of local 
agents some of -ko,, t- were smaller merchants in local towns in the 
production areas and some were even village shopkeepers. The -$I, eil 
system was important and the large merchants provided the necessary 
funds to the local agents for forward purchase of the crop. The 
S. hei1 system of course has a notorious reputation with the merchants 
cast as the villains of the piece. The writer however in the course 
of discussions with both the large merchants and local agents heard 
the other side of the argument. Farmers it is alleged are notorious 
for their failure to fulfil their obligations under the system. 
Of ten the crops are said to have failed while in practice they have not , 
In fact the character given to the farmers was exceedingly bad both 
for the failure to deliver crops, repay debts and for the evasion 
of taxds. 
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As has been seen in Chapter 3 the Agricultural Bank of the 
Sudan also experienced great difficulties in retrieving loans 
from farmers in spite of the fact that a farmer in its debt 
is under an obligation to deliver his crop to the local stores 
of the Bank. In despair the ABS has started a contract combine 
harvesting service which its debtor farmers are supposed to use so 
that the Bank can obtain the true yield of the crop, and secure 
delivery. In Gedaref also much is said about the smuggling 
activities of some of the larger producers especially those with 
farms convenient for trading over the Ethiopian border. 
30 percent of the total sesame produced in Sudan in the year 
1976/77 (the latest figure available) was produced in the Gedaref 
area and much of this crop went through the Gedaref central auction 
market. The writer was able to collect details of the amount 
purchased by different merchants in the harvest months of October 
(112 
A total of 393,000 Kantars went through the and November 1974. 
market during these two months. 
* The crop was purchased by 96 
It is very difficult especially in underdeveloped countries to 
monitor the effectiveness of the enforcement of Government 
regulations. 
ýE It is said that leases for these farms are illicitly sold at a 
large premium. In practice land is leased from ? JFC at a modest 
rental of 5 piasters per feddan annually'and that such leases 
are not transferable. If a tenant gives up, then the land 
reverts to the MFC, in fact this does not happen. For farms in 
a popular location, farmers can receive considerable illicit payments 
to leave their farm and merely retain the tenancy as a nominee. 
Farms bordering the Wad , edan 
pGedaref tarmac road also exchange 
at a premium. 
This represents 58 percent of the total quantity sold at the ntarket 
in 1974/75. (For details see Appendix F3 ). 
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merchants in all. Figure 8.2 gives the Lorenz curve of this data. 
This curve illustrates the degree of concentration in the marketing 
of sesame at Gedaref. This concentration is shown by the difference 
C 
between the actual and 45 line. If all the Eerchaits concerned had 
° (113) an equal market share then the curve would be the 45 line. As 
this is not so then the gap between the line and the curve shows the 
extent of concentration. There is obviously inequality. It will 
be seen from the figure that just over 8 percent of the merchants 
purchased 40 percent of the total produce sold. 
* This 8 percent 
represents 8 actual merchants who have been interviewed by the writer. 
This includes three Coptic merchants who are related to one another 
and these three together purchased 18 percent of the total produce 
sold. Included in the 8 is the owner of the leading sweet factory 
in the country who purchased 3 percent of the total sale. The 
remaining big four are of Northern Sudanese origin and not related. 
They purchased vainly to resell to the Oilseeds Company and deliveryto 
the latter's warehouses at port Sudan. The 88 smaller operators are 
responsible for about 60 percent of 
4he 
quantity and either bought 
to resell to the Oilseeds Company or for sale for the modern oil mills 
in Khartoum North. Small quantities would be bought for pressing 
locally in traditional camel driven oil mills. 
** 
The figures so far discussed relate to the year 1974/75. Table 
8.3 gives details of the total sales of sesame at Gedaref auction 
For details see Appendix F31 Appendix 
and Appendix F5 
MA See Appendix F3 for the quantities of sesame purchased locally 
by merchants at Gedaref auction market during October and 
November 1974. 
I 
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Figure 8.2 
Lorenz Curve 
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market for this latter year together with figures for the four 
previous years. It will be noted that sales fluctuate from year 
to year presumably because of the variations in the annual output 
of the crop. It will also be seen that there is a steady rise in 
prices. Table 8.4 gives similar details for sales of sesame at 
El Obeid market in Kordofan Province a major production area. It 
is difficult to estimate the actual supply of sesame from Kordofan 
and other Western Provinces. Consequently one cannot assess with 
any degree of accuracy the total percentage of the crop which goes 
through the primary markets. most of the crop is produced by the 
traditional sector. Much of the sesame however is consumed locally, 
being pressed in traditional camel mills. 
Table 8.5 gives details of the quantities of sesame passing 
through the major primary markets in 1966-1971. This table is 
inserted here to demonstrate the relative importance of markets 
in the three major producing provinces. Unfortunately up to date 
figures for the Blue Nile Province are not available mainly due to 
changes in the provincial boundary. More recent figures for Kassala 
and Kordofan Provinces are given in Table 8.3 and Table 8.4. It 
will be seen from Table 8.5 that the markets of Xasaal4Province accounted 
for nearly 64 percent of the total sales in the three Provinces in 
1966/67. This share however declined to just under 50 percent in 
1970/71. Kordofan Province is responsible for around 36 percent in 
the earliest year and for about 43 percent in the last year shown 
in the table. The Blue Nile has only a small share compared with the 
other two Provinces. 
(114) 
The total sesame salesvary from year to year 
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Table 8.3 
Sesame Sale at Cedaref Auction market (Kassala Province) 
for 1970/71 - 1974/75 
Year Quantity (Kanters) Average price per kantar 
Is - m/ms 
1970/71 691,691 2.534 
1971/472 1-, 081,393 2.603 
1972/73 1,614,774 3.107 
1973/74 1,026,579 3.836 
1974/75 675,071 5,016 
Source: Gedaref Auction market 
Table 8.4 
Sesame Sale at El Obeid Auction Market (Kordofan Irovince) 
for 1970/71 - 1974/75 
Year Quantity Kanters 
1970/71 265,775 
1971/72 377,218 
1972/73 531v631 
1973/74 386,000 
1974/75 412,317 
Source: El Obeid Auction Market 
Average Price per IZantar L` 
2.6 89 
2.714 
2.924 
4.133 
5.186 
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Table 8.5 
Sesame Sales in major markets 1966/7 to 1970/i (KantarS) 
Province 1966/7 1967/8 1968/9 1969/70 1970/1 
Blue Nile 
Singe 70260 79376 76881 63994 33735 
Other marke tc, 23594 152649 67280 58340 120775 
Total 93854 232025 144161 122334 154510 
(5.2%) (10.8%) (7%) (6,4%)" (7.3%) 
Kassala 
Gedaref 621768 541626 763363 703070 691691 
Other marke 340233 375594 518044 494111 370828 
Total 962001 917220 1278407 1197181 1061519 
(63.9%) (46.7%) (62.5%) (62.4%) (49.8%) 
Kordofan 
El Obeid 113616 237685 198077 169397 265775 
Um Ruaba 25983 383503 288422 267785 407706 
Other markets 309543 194088 136746 162369 240757 
Total 449142 815277 623245 599551 914238 
(36%) (41.5%) (30.5%) (31.4%) (42., 9%) 
Grand Total 1504997 1964522 2045810 1919066 2130267 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Department of Statistics. 
-- 209 - 
according to the size of the local production. There is 
insufficient evidence in Table 8.5 of any underlining trend for 
anyone province to increase or decrease its market share. 
8.5 The Wholesale Price of Sesame 
The discussion of wholesale prices should start with those 
prevailing in the Cedaref market. The first in the present analysis 
is to investigate possible underling price trends , over 
"inne. 1ý 
correlation had been carried out using yearly average prices data 
for the period 1968 to 1975 (8 years) for Gedaref auction market 
The results obtained and shown in Appendix F6 indicate a strong 
relationship between prices and time. * The period covers the 
change over from the private to the public sector and of course on 
the international market the period covers the great 
explosion in commodity prices. The fixed floor -prices have to some 
extent reflected the upward movement in world prices. But as has 
been mentioned earlier the entire benefit of these prices has not 
been passed on to the producers. ** Figure 8.3 shows the linear 
projection and the actual observed prices in Gedare? market. The 
linear equation gives a figure of approximately 36 piasters rise for 
a kantar every year. A similar exercise ores carried out using 
annual data for the same period of time. for El Obeied market in 
KQrdafan Province. It was hoped that similar analysis could be 
made for other leading markets in the Sudan but unfortunately data 
*A relationship more significant than that observed for dura. 
**See page 19 8. 
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was unavailable. The results for El Obeid auction market are 
given in full in Appendix' F?. Again there is a similar significant 
relationship between the prices and time and the linear equation 
gives a figure of 39 piasters per kantar, for the average price 
increase per year - very similar to the 36 piasters returned by 
the Gederef sample. 
Figure. 8.4 illustrates the calculated and observed prices 
for E1-Obeid. The shape of the observed curve and its position as 
regards the calculated linear projection line are very similar to 
those relating to Gedaref (see figure 8.2). 
Table 8.6 and Table 8.7 give the data used in these statistical 
analysQS together with the monthly average pricesfrom January 1968 
to December 1975. It will be seen from Table 8.6 July, August 
and September are dead months in El Obeid and more or less dead 
months as regards Gedaref. These three months act' as a division 
between one crop year and another. Analysis of the monthly prices 
for 6 crop years (1968-1974) shows that in Gedaref the lowest as 
would have been expected, are in the harvest month October to 
December and over the period studied no particular month emerges 
as that with the lowest prices. High prices are returned for may 
and June s'a-sea sons 1 distribution which shows a price rise from the 
harvest peak to the end of season depletion of stock. If a farmer 
managed to retain his crop from harvest time (November) to may he 
would in these six years figures obtain an average price increase 
of 25-33 percent. 
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A similar analysis for the. El Obeid prices shows 
A 
that again the lowest prices occurred in the harvest month with 
November as the lowest individual month in three out of the six 
years concerned. Surprisingly the highest price months were January 
and February with January the highest in four out of six years. 
The writer ascribes the January peak to two factors, the 
preoccupation of farmers with dura harvest and the rush to complete 
the buying of supplies by local oil mills. 
N 
4 
4 
- 216 - 
CHAPTER 9 
World Production and Trade in Oilseeds 
9.1 Introduction 
The writer's subject is sesame production and marketing but sesame 
is one of the major oilseeds in world trade and the demand and supply 
situation is very much affected by those relating to other oilseeds, 
many, of which have similar usages to sesame seed. For this reason 
the writer found that it is incomplete to discuss world trade in 
terms of sesame only; the other oilseeds have to be taken into 
consideration as well. 
The major oilseed is soya bean and the soya bean situation has 
its repercussions on the ' world prices. Soya beans represented 
80 percent of the oilseeds entering world trade against only one 
percent for sesame in 1975 (see Table 9.1). Two countries, the 
United States and Brazil dominate the production of soya beans 
which can be grown both in temperate and tropical countries, while 
the remaining oilseeds are largely produced by developing countries. 
Production in the LDC's however is concentrated in 16 countries 
who between them account for 70 percent of LDC's total . Of 
the oilseeds other than soya beans the United States is a major 
producer of groundnuts, cottonseed and safflower seed. 
(115) 
These 
together with the American predominance in soya beans mean', a 
developed country has a decisive influence on the world supply position. 
The wider range of climatic conditions under which oilseeds 
can be grown and the relative ease with which one can be substituted 
for another in "-- manufacturing has major implications 
for the producers of individual oilseeds crops grown in LDC's. 
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All this as has been mentioned earlier has a repercussion on 
prices. 
World production of oilseeds has increased substantially in 
recent years showing an increase of some 43 percent over the 
decade 1965 - 19751, (the latest available ten year 
pe iod) " The actual increase is from 123.2 million 
metric tons in 1965 to 175.9 million metric tons in 1975. Table 9.2 
illustrates the levels of production and the relative shares of the 
major oilseeds(. 
116) 
No major changes have occurred on the ranking 
of individual oilseeds in the last decade despite the fact that 
some have recorded larger proportionate increases in production 
than others. The highest rate of production is returned by oil 
palm and soya beans. In the case of the former the bulk of 
increase comes from Malaysia where the Government had a highly 
effective policy of increasing the area under oil palm. With 
the less important oilseeds, rapeseed expanded by 33 percent. 
The latter is a temperate crop and the area grown in Western 
Europe has increased significantly. Safflower, the lowest 
ranking (see Table 9.2) with less than 1 percent share in world 
production in 1975, has also doubled its output between 1965 and 
1975 because of increased production in India and Mexico. The 
demand for safflower oil in some developed countries has been 
influenced by the growth in health food shops. -44 
Cottonseed production of course is a by-product of co' on 
production and the latter has not increased significantly largely 
Rapeseed offers a conventient cash crop in crop rotation5. and is 
easily n! echanised. 
-A-( Safflower oil is less likely to cause heart disease than sonic other 
vegetable oils. 
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because of competition from artificial fibres. Groundnuts recorded 
only relatively small increase in production and its share of world 
total consequently fell slightly but its ranking remained unchanged. 
Sesame seed which has been mentioned earlier is of minor 
importance in the overAll oilseeds position and like groundnuts 
(118) 
suffered a slight fall in its percentage share of world production. 
It is of significance of course that the major increase in output is 
that of soya beans and the extra quantity is over 15 times that of 
the total sesame seed produced in 1975. 
Production of oilseeds is comparatively concentrated geographically. 
Figure 9.1 indicates the position as regards the principal oilseeds 
producing countries subdivided between developed, developing and 
centrally planned economies. In aggregate some twenty four countries, 
of which sixteen are developing economies account for over 80 
percent of world oilseeds production. Also other developing 
countries may still have a potential for expanding and upgrading 
their oilseeds processing industries. . 
World trade in unprocessed oilseeds iS relatively small in 
comparison with total production. In 1975 some 11 percent of global 
production entered international markets in the raw form. The 
predominant feature of oilseed trading is its dominance by soya bean 
which accounted (as shown in Table 9.1) for 80 percent of the total 
volume of all oilseeds traded in 1975. Although the total volume of 
all oilseeds traded has risen from 12.0 million tons in 1965 to almost 
21.0 million tons in 1975, the difference is almost entirely due to 
the growth of soya beans exports. The volume of other oilseeds has 
-221- 
Figure 9.1 
Type of 
Oilseed 
Principal Producing Countries of Oilseeds 
Developed Developing Centrally 
economy economy planned 
economy 
Soyabeans United States Brazil China 
Coconuts India, 
Indonesia, 
Philippines, 
Sri Lanka 
Cottonseed United States Argentina, China, USSR 
India, Pakistan, 
Peru, Turkey 
Groundnuts United States India, Nigeria, China 
Senegal, Sudan 
Sunflower Argentina, Bulgaria, Romania 
Turkey USSR 
Oil palm Indonesia, 
Ivory. Coast, 
Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Zaire 
Palm Kernels Brazil, 
Malaysia, 
Nigeria, Zaire 
Rapeseed Canada, France India China, Poland 
Sesame Ethiopia, India China 
mexico, Sudan 
Safflower United States India, mexico 
Sources extracted by the writer from FAO Production Yearbook 
- 222 - 
either declined or remained comparatively stable. *(119) 
9.2 World Exports of Sesame Seed 
As has been mentioned early only a very limited proportion of 
sesame seed production enters international trade. The developing 
countries comprise the major exporters of sesame seed, lu= lio r- a11y 
account for well over 90 percent of all supplies. Sudan and Ethiopia 
are the largest exporters with 55 percent of the present market. 
flexico and Thailand, both minor exporters have increased their share 
of total world exports from less than 3 percent of the market in 
1965 to over 8 percent in 1975. Leading producing countries such as 
India, China, Venezuela and Burma export only small amounts of sesame 
seed, instead they utilize their sesame for oil production for both 
their home consumption and export. 
Figure 9.2 indicates the world production, world exports and 
Sudan exports from 1960 to 1974. Sudan exports represent about 39 
percent of total world exports and Ethiopia about 16 percent. Figure 
9.3 shows sesame seed exports from major exporting countries and 
estimated world total exports during the some period. 
In 1975 despite a decline in volume compared with 1970, Japan 
maintained its role as leading importer but was closely followed by 
Italy, U. S. A. and Egypt. Greece, Israel, Lebanon and U. S. S. R. all 
continued to import significant quantities and in 1975 accounted for 
*Production of oilseeds 1965-1975 by major producing countries are 
shown in Appendices GI, G2, G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, G8, G9 and G10. 
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17 percent of all imports. Figure 9.4 indicates sesame seed imports 
into major importing countries for 1966-1974. Japanese imports 
increased from 39,682 metric tons in 1967 to 56,040 metric tons 
in 1973 at an average annual rate of approximately four percent. 
Egypt's imports have increased from 71397 metric tons in 1966 
to 15,000 metric tons in 1974 at an annual average rate of 9.3 
Percent. United States iniports have also increased at an annual 
average rate of 6 percent since 1966. 
The major importers of Sudanese sesame seed are Italy, Japan 
Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. The U. S. S. R. and U. S. a are relatively 
small buyers since most of their imports are used in bakery and 
confectionery items which demand larger Latin American seeds. The 
African sesame seeds are smaller and better utilized in producing 
oil. Japan and Italy import sesame mainly to produce oil. Table 9.3 
shows exports of sesame seed by principal producing countries while 
Table 9.4 indicates imports of sesame by principal importing 
countries for 1960-1975. 
(120) 
9.3 Exports of Sesame Seed from Sudan 
Sudan is the largest world exporter of sesame seed. As has 
been mentioned earlier Sudan is responsible for about 39 percent of 
total world exports (Table 9.3). Sudan exports sesame to nearby 
Arab countries as well as to Western Europe and Japan. Table 9.5 
shows Sudan's sesame exports by country in terms of values and 
quantities for 1976. It will be seen from the table that 
Egypt is the 
largest importer of Sudanese seed followed by Japan, Italy and Sy, ria. 
4 
For the previous years Japan and Italy are the largest 
in--porters 
(see Table 9.4). 
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Table 9.5 
Country 
Sudan Sesame Seed Exports and Value by Country 
Year '1976 
Quantity MT 
Egypt 27,685 
Japan 23,199 
Italy 17,276 
Syria 5,923 
China P. R. 59970 
Greece 4,415 
Jordan 4,301 
Kwait 2,214 
China Taiwan 1,218 
Libya 1,9085 
Poland 518 
Lebanon 1,541 
"P. R, of 
S. Yemen 987 
Tunisia 740 
German F. R. 994 
Netherlands 1,9000 
Saudi Arabia 245 
Algeria 326 
Denmark 500 
Belgium 100 
USSR 2,441 
1% 
Value LS 
5,304,527 
4,318,596 
3,026,162 
1,144,894 
1,059,845 
840,617 
798,999 
416,043 
233,822 
202,231 
103j522 
308,685 
192j, 933 
144,837 
128,633 
53,760 
49,296 
60,464 
27,000 
21 , 500 
453,641 
I 
T 
Source: Foreign Trade Statistics 
Ministry of National Planning - Department of Statistics 
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The writer studies export trends over time, for the Sudan, Figure 9.5 
indicates exports from 1960 to 1975 (see Table 9.6) and 
illustrates the point made earlier about the wide fluctuations 
in the quantity exported between one year and another. The 
writer carried out a regression analysis between time and the 
quantity exported, and discovered? that there is a trend for 
exports to rise over time. A similar exercise was performed 
with the total value of exports and time. Total value of 
exports is determined by the physical volume and export prices 
both of which fluctuate widely from year to year. 
There is a positive relationship between value of exports 
and time. Figure 9.6 indicates the movements in the value of 
exports from 1960 -1975. The linear equation gives a figure 
of %583.657 rise every year. Figure 9.7 shows the increase in 
the price per metric ton of sesame seed from the year 1960 - 1975 
together with the calculated linear regression line showing the 
relation between time and price. The R2 is 0.64 suggesting that 
64 percent of the change in the price per ton of sesame is due 
to time. It will be seen that the trend line has a positive 
shape and the linear equation gives a figure US O 12.997 dollars 
* (121 increase every year. 
The detailed calculations for Figures 9.5,9.6 and 9.7 are- 
given in Appendices G11, G12 and G13. 
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Table 9.6 
Quantity, value and price per ton of sesame exports from Sudan 1960 - 1975 
Year Quantity m. T. Price Per m. Tons 
0 
Value 
1960 76,400 182 13,904,800 
1961 62,500 206 t2,875,000 
1962 77,200 226 17,447,200 
1963 69,600 212 14,755,200 
1964 101 , 400 189 19,164,600 
1965 70,600 209 14,755,400 
1966 73,700 244 17,982,800 
1967 75,900 272 20,644,800 
1968 84,700 225 19,057,500 
1969 112,600 231 26,010,600 
1970 81 , 900 283 23,177,700 
1971 86,200 288 24,854,400 
1972 865,002 203 17,559,500 
1973 924,002 390 36,036,000 
1974 107,852 392 42,277,984 
1975 57,000 430 24,510,000 
Source: F. A. 0. Trade Yearbook 1960-1975 
- 232 - 
Quantities 00 M Tone 
Eiq. 9.5 Quantity of Sesame Seed Ex orte from The Suden p Ye=re 1960-1975L inear Trend 
Source Appendix Cii 
Ii 0c 
11.0` 
Ito c 
1-0,0 
0 quo 
gý0 
70 
60 
500 
1400 
300 
N_ M 
143 -D NO --i- u-% 
141 Qb 
C --£x 10 -0 -P _Q L- t: - Z- r Cý r- O- Q- O' Icr- Q- a'- -_ Q- P- Q- 
J 
- 233 - 
I 
Value (000, $) 
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9.4 Exports of Sesame Oil from the Sudan 
Oil -, is extracted by means of the primitive camel driven 
presses (Assaras) as well as by large oil mills. As has been 
mentioned in Chapter 7. large private oil mills were constructed 
in different parts of the country especially in the areas producing 
sesame and groundnuts. In the production areas the oil and oil 
cake are mainly for domestic use. The production of oil and cake 
from the large Port Sudan oil mill is mainly for export. Table 9.7 
indicates Sudan's exports of sesame oil by volume and value for 
1960 - 1975. The exports of sesame oil fluctuate from year to 
year according to the amount of sesame available for pressing, 
and the demand for sesame oil by the major importing countries 
together with the trade in other vegetable oils especially soya 
bean and palm. It will be seen from Table 9.7 that the quantities 
of oil exported from the Sudan increased from 3179 metric tons in 
1962 to 59260 metric tons in 1973 and fell to just 26 metric tons 
in 1974. 
The writer studied export trends over time by using a simple 
linear' regression equation and the data in Table 9.7 and discovered 
that there was a tendency of rising exports of sesame oil over time. 
Figure 9.8 indicates exports of sesame oil from 1960 to 1975.122) 
A similar exercise gras carried out between the F. O. B. price 
of sesame oil per ton at Port Sudan and time. There is a positive 
relationship between price and time. The linear equation gives a 
figure 
of LS 6.326 rise every year. The k2 obtained is 0.53 suggesting 
that 
-236- 
T2 ble9.7 
Sudan, Exports of Sesame Oil and Value of Exports 
1960 - 1975 
Season Quantity IY1. T. Price per, ton LS Value of Export LS 
1960 817 122 99,674 
1961 972 143 138,996 
1962 2179 158 344,282 
1963 781 142 110,902 
1964 786 127 99,822 
1965 616 153 94,248 
1966 720 163 117,360 
1967 607 173 1®5,011 
1968 182 146 26,572 
1969 190 154 29,260 
1970 41 195 7,990 
1971 50 173 8,650 
1972 176 145 25p520 
1973 5260 168 883,680 
1974 26 257 6,682 
1975 1608 269 432,552 
Source: Department of Statistics, Khartoum, Sudan, 1975 
ti 
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53 percent of the change in price per ton., of sesame oil is due to 
time*. Figure 9.9 shows F. 0.8o price of sesame oil for the years 
1960 - 1975, 
The relationship between the value of sesame oil exports from 
the Sudan and time is not signif icant. The annual values are plotted 
on figure 9.10 where it will be seen that the annual export f figures 
fluctuate rather erratically. 
9.5 Exports of Sesame meal -Prom the Sudan 
The bulk of the oil cake produced in the Sudan is used in the 
country for stock feeding while the residue is exported. Table 
9.8 indicates the volume and value of sesame oil cake e-; ports for 1960-1975 
It will be noted from the table that exports of sesame cake fluctuates 
from year to year according to the amount of sesame seed produced 
in the Sudan. For example the amount exported in 1960 was 1,2939 metric 
tons while it was only 5547 metric tons in 1975. This was due to 
the increase in the amount consumed locally. Sudan exports only a 
small amount of sesame cake compared with those countries which are 
major exporters of vegetable oil cakes. 
(122) 
The Sudan is only a minor world exporter of vegetable oil cakes 
and meals. Table 9.9 gives details of the world trade in selected 
vegetable oil cakes 
(123) 
0 It will be seen that the predominant 
commodity is soya bean products accounting for 68.8 percent of the 
overall total. The Sudan of course does not grow soyabean while the 
*The detailed calculations of figures 9.8,9.9 and 9.10 are shown 
in Appendices G14, G15 and G16. 
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-igure 9.9 
F. 0. B. Price of Sesame Oil for 1960-1975 Linear Trend 
Sources Appendix'C15 
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Table 9.8 
Sudan Exports of Sesame meal and value of exports 
1960 - 1975 
Season Quantity M. T. Price/Ton LS Total value 
of exports LS 
1960 12939 29 375s231 
1961 33278 26 865,228 
1962 17285 29 501j, 265 
1963 13550 32 433,600 
1964 22336 34 759,424 
1965 24256 33 800,448 
1966 25199 30 755'2970 
1967 10110 31 313#410 
1968 12127 32 388,064 
1969 28841 28 807,548 
1970 16631 32 532,192 
1971 15881 35 55. t835 
J972 14699 31, 455#669 
1973 11605 32 371,360 
J974 14196 72 1,022,112 
1975 5547 32 177,504 
Sources Department of Statistics, Khartoum, 1975. 
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amounts of sesame cake and meals are too insiönificant to be shown 
in the table. Figure 9.11 indicates the volume of exports from 
1960 - 1976, and it will be seen there are wide fluctuations from 
year to year. Although the relationship between volume and time 
is not significant that between price and time is. A linear 
regression gives an R2 of 0.69 percent indicating that 69 percent 
of the chance in price per ton of sesame cake is due to time. 
The linear equation suggests a rise in price of LS 1.34 per ton 
each year. * Figure 9.12 shows F. 0.8. price of sesame cake per ton 
for 1960 - 1975. 
9.6 Profit margins 
As has been mentioned in Chapter 7 the Sudan Oilseeds Company 
Limited is given the complete monopoly of trading in oilseeds from the 
Sudan. The company does not deal directly with the producers but 
operates through wholesalers who in theory obtain their supplies 
from auction markets. The export trade is completely under the 
control of the Company, and the merchants are primarily concerned 
with assembling the local produce for export. They have to pay 
for delivery to the Oilseed. Company warehouses at Port Sudan. 
Merchants also have to bear the risk of losses on the journey and 
the possibility that the produce is not up to the prescribed grade. 
On delivery at the Company warehouses the consignment of each seller 
is first inspected for the presence of impurities and then for the 
percentage of oil contierit. Deductions are then made for consignments 
*The detailed calculations of Figures 9.11 and 9.12 are given in 
Appendices G17 and GIB. 
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Fla. 9.12 
f. 0. B. Price of sesame meal per ton in The Sudan 
1960 - 1975 Linear Trend - 
Sources Appendix C18 
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which are below standard. The selling policy of the Company, as 
has been mentioned in Chapter 8. is based on specified grades 
which are then offered to foreign buyers. The bids received are 
then considered in relation to the Company's minimum selling prices, 
and the Company's judgement of world prices. As has been mentioned 
on page 190 the bureaucratic procedure of the Company often- results 
in either penalty clauses being enforced for non delivery to foreign 
buyers by the specified time or long delays at Port Sudan through 
failure to find a buyer. Both of these of course lead to financial 
losses. As has also been mentioned before in Chapter 7 page' 172 
the former major exporter of oilseeds before nationalisation 
moved to London and is still actively dealing with oilseeds even 
those from the Sudan. It is alleged that. this Company has obtained 
supplies through various devious ways including, it is said, 
corruption. 
The writer was ab')-, e to obtain the profit and loss accounts 
for the Sudan Oilseeds Company for the years ending September 30th, 
1977. It will be seen from Table 9.10 that the total value of the 
Company's sales of groundnuts and sesame in the fiscal year 1975/76 
was LS. 71 ,, 686,978, double that of the previous year. 
Expenditure for the later year totalled LS 66ý5811354 with 
an increase of LS. 29,570,926 over the previous year. The increase&- 
expenditure arises out of the greater volume of produce handled, 
the increased export tax on sesame which was raised from 5 percent 
to 8 percent and the development tax which also was increased 
in the 
later year from 3 percent to 5 percent ad valorem. The 
Company 
-247- 
Table 9.10 Sudan Oilseed Company, Ltd 
Trading, Profit and Loss Account for the Year ending September 
30,1977 
197 5 
LS 
35,331,565 
a 
47,621,319 
47,621,319 
18,127,954 
29,493,365 
40,600 
36,961 
29,570,926 
5,760,926 
428,703 
6,189,342 
935,936 
5,253,406 
13,200 
1? 7,110 
367 
815 
3,050 
12,074 
206,616 
14,758 
13,802 
15,069 
4,035 
24,903 
5x956 
509 
7,626 
9,601 
1,217 
3,167 
1,807 
1,512 
" 22,870 
3,000 
336,448 
4,916,958 
2,949,000 
1,967,958 
) 
Sales 
Less: goods in stock 
L3 
- Opening date 18,127,954 
Purchases 73,017,538 
91,145,492 
Less: goods, closing date 24,747,778 
66,397,714 
Plus inventory and dues 95,657 
Insurance 87,983 
r 
Other revenues 
Less: Finance charges (Bank -interest) 
Gross profit 
LESS: ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES AND 
Remuneration for Directors 
Wages and salaries 
Uniforms for labour 
medical expenses 
Lease of office premises 
Bank charges 
Grants and donations 
mail, cables and telephones 
Printed- matter and stationery 
Repairs and maintenance 
Business travel abroad 
motor vehicle expenses 
Litigation fees 
Establishment expenses (1/3) 
Subscriptions and advertising 
Stamp duty 
Electricity and water 
Hospitality and gratuities 
Sundry expenses 
Depreciation of fixed assets 
Auditors' honorarium 
OVERHEADS 
16,404 
384,656 
1,628 
4,060 
8,700 
19,954 
435,452 
197 6 
U 
71,018,543 
66,581,354 
4,437,189 
791,055 
5,228,244 
2,843,676 
2,384,568 
2,384,568 
25,734 
18,637 
19,643 
15,769 
15,211 
11 , 220 
11 , 100 
7,626 
7,311 
1,824 
1,201) 
sic. Tr. ) 3,694) 
2,490 
101,373 
3,500 
681,785 
Annual profits before taxes 
Less business profits tax 
Less Doubtful debts 
1,967,958 Net profit carried over to distribution 
-------. -- of Prof its and Loss Account 
Source: Sudan OilseedsCompany Ltd. 
J., 702,783 
1ý 111 , 683 
591,100 
300,000 
291,100 
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made a gross trading profit of LS 494379189 which rose to 
IS. 5,228,244 with the addition of other income. After 
deducting bank interest, administrative overheads, taxes and 
doubtful debts, net profit is only LS. 291,000. When the writer 
asked the manager why the overheads and administrative expenses 
rose from IS. 336,448 in 1974/75 to LS. 6819785 in 1975/76, the 
manager's answer was that the company had extended its activities 
and so increased costs of items such as salaries, wages and travelling 
expenses. Also salaries and wages increased by 15 percent as a 
result of the recommendations of a committee sei up to review 
employment in the public sector in response to demaºids by 
trade unions. 
Table 9.10 makes it possible to gain some impression of the 
efficiency of the Company from the figures given. The first relate 
to the carry over of stocks from one financial year to another. 
The end of the Company accounting year the 30th September does not 
coincide with the marketing of the current year's crops. Hence 
one can assume that the bulk of the stocks in hand refer to the 
previous year's harvest. The figure for bank interest of nearly 
3 million in 1976/77 refers mostly to the financing of holding the 
stocks. As has been n'entioned earlier merchants receive payments 
on delivery to the Company's warehouses in Port Sudan. 
The high 
carry over of stocks from one year to another together with 
the 
high interest rates incurred on the money borrowed 
to finance 
the carrying of these stocks suggest that delays must occur 
in 
selling. This is confirmed by the writer's fieldwork 
in which 
he (i scovered that on average, oilseeds remained 
in Port Sudan 
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for over three months before being shipped abroad. 
Storing oilseeds for long periods leads to the decrease in 
their oil content beside the presence of large unsold stocks of 
oilseeds in a major producing country tends to depress the world 
prices. It is very obvious to the writer that the Company should 
look to its marketing practices and ensure that excessive stocks 
are not held on the one hand and penalties for non-, delivery are 
not incurred on the other. 
Table 9.10 also shows the loss to the producer of the proceeds 
of oilseed crops which are paid to the Government both in taxes and 
the Oilseeds Company's profits (despite the latter's inefficiency). 
The Company is of course a monopoly. In 1975/76 LS 2.9 millions 
went to the Government in the form of business profits, tax and 
nearly LS 2 millions was distributed to the shareholders m 'nly to 
the Government which owned 75 percent of the equity. It is also 
interesting to note that the Government owns the banks in the Sudan 
and the interest c'_iarges of nearly 3 millions help to prop up the 
banking system. If some of this money could be saved and a higher 
price paid to producers, a major incentive mould be provided to 
(124) 
increase production. 
9.7 Oilseeds other than sesame exported by the Sudan and their 
importance in the Sudanese economy. 
Sesame is only one of three major oilseeds exported by the 
Sudan and no account of sesame marketing is complete in the writer's 
opinion without some reference to the other two major oilseeds 
(groundnuts and cottonseed). The first of course is a crop in its 
-250- 
own right and the second is a by-product of the major export earner 
of the country. Oilseeds, of course, are easily substituted one for 
another in the manufacture of vegetable oil products and in the 
Sudan are all subject to the parastatal Sudanese Oilseeds Company 
which the writer has criticised in the previous section. 
A discussion of alternative oilseeds such as- groundnuts and 
cottonseed should start with a brief account of their position in 
international trade. A decade ago as shown in Table 9.11 the 
international trade in groundnuts ran at over one million metric tons 
annually, but in the last few years the total volume of trade has 
declined well below the million tons level because of the decline 
in the production of certain West African countries. It will be 
seen from 9.11 that Nigeria had 38.2 percent of the world exports 
of groundnuts in 1965, this fell to 29.4 percent in 1970 and by 
1975 Nigeria had only 0.2 percent. This dramatic fall is due to one 
main factor,, the Sahel drought in the early 1970s. Groundnuts are 
the principal cash crop of the savannah areas which were adversely 
affected not only in'Nigeria but in neighbouring countries like 
Senegal, and Niger. Another factor which affected Nigeria 
especially was the Af 1 a--toain scare around 1970. 
*. What was bad 
for West Africa was good for the Sudan. The Sahel drought did 
not have any major effect 4n groundnuts production in the Sudan 
nor were Sudanese groundnuts affected by Af1a-toxin. 
Afla-toxin is a poisonous substance which can kill livestock fed 
on groundnut. - cakes and meals. 
It is derived from a fun, s which 
can affect groundnuts under wet harvest conditions. Livestock 
died in Europe from Alfa-toxin poisoning and the prese: i,.; e of this 
substance was traced back to a consignment from Nigeria. The 
publicity given to the case adversely affected compounders 
demand for Nigerian produce. 
I 
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Table 9.11 
Groundnuts - major Exoorters for 1965,1970,1975 
1965 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity Percentage Quantity Percentage Quantity Percentage 
'00WMIT of total 1000°M-T of total '000JV-T of total 
Nigeria 520.0 38.2 291.2 29.4 2.0 0.2 
Senegal 216.8 15.9 51.4 5.2 17.4 2.0 
Sudan 152.2 11.2 63.9 6.4 203.0 22.9 
Niger 86.4 6.3 131.9 13.3 - - 
U. S. A. 78.4 5.8 51.2 5.2 237.4 26.8 
China 46.4 3.4 16.2 1.6 22.7 2.6 
Gambia 33.8 2.5 38.1 3.8 51.0 5.7 
Mali 22.2 1.6 17.6 1.8 13.0 1.5 
Malawi 18.9 1.4 22.5 2.3 26.0 2.9 
South Afric a 18.8 1.4 70.3 7.1 70.0 7.9 
Brazil 18.4 - 1.3 53.5 5.4 54.0 6.1 
Cameroon-' 10.6 0.8 13.4 1.4 18.0 2.0 
India 0.2 - 25.8 2.6 
70.0 7.9 
Others 140.0 10.3 144.1 14.5 101.9 11.5 
World 1363.0 100.0 991.1 100.0 886.4 100.0 
Source: F. A. 0. Trade Yearbook 1965-1975 
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Consequently the Sudanese were able to replace Nigeria as a major 
exporter and by 1975 Sudan was second only! -to 
the United States as 
the leading exporting country with a 22.9 percent share of the market 
compared with only 6.4 percent in 1970. 
There are a number of smaller suppliers who have a significant 
share of the trade like Brazil, Cameroon, India and South Africa. 1hey 
account for almost a quarter of the world market, whereas in 1965 
their exports as a group were insignificant. It may well be that 
over the next few years this group of countries will consolidate 
their position in the world groundnut market and their share could well 
be increased if production in West Africa does not recover to its 
former levels. * 
In similar fashion to exports, groundnut imports have declined 
since 1965. Nevertheless, the broad picture as regards the principal 
importers has remained remarkably stable. Western Europe is still 
the major outlet, taking about 70 percent of the total. The Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom are the 
major importers. The other major importers are Canada and Japan. 
Canada's imports, contrary to the overall trend, have almost doubled 
since 1965. Table 9.12 indicates groundnut major importers for the 
years 1965,1970 and 1975. 
A little over one percent of world cottonseed production enters 
international trade and even this proportion has tended to decline 
*See Table 9.11 for groundnut major exporters for 1965,1970,1975. 
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Table 9.12 
Groundnuts - major Importers for 1955,1970,1975 
Countries 
France 
Italy 
Portugal 
U. K. 
Switzerland 
Fed. Rep. of 
Germany 
Canada 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Japan 
Others 
1965 1970 
Quantity % of Quantity 
'000ton total '000#1-ton 
504.2 38.4 314.3 
103.0 7.8 116.1 
92.0 7.0 48.0 
91.8 7.0 61.6 
70.6 5.4 80.9 
of 
total 
30.0 
11.1 
4.6 
5.9 
7.7 
1975 
Quantity % of 
'0004nton total 
198.6 
75.6 
5 9.1 
71.5 
50.1 
22.5 
8.6 
6.7 
8.1 
5.7 
56.3 4.3 89.2 8.5 53.2 6.0 
49.1 3.7 49.0 4.7 90.9 10.2 
42.2 3.2 42.4 4.0 55.5 6.3 
28.6 2.2 26.7 2.5 20.0 2.3 
25.1 1.9 58.9 5.6 X51.0 5.8 
250.9 19.1 161.2 15.4 157.8 17.9 
World " 11313.8 100.0 11048.3 100.0 1 883.3 100.0 
Source: F. A. 0. Trade Yearbook 1965-1975 
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over the past decade. A considerable number of countries export 
cottonseed, but only two countries exported as much as 30,000 tons 
in 1975, these were the Ivory Coast and USSR. However trade in 
cottonseed has tended to fluctuate geographically. In 1970, for 
example, Nicaragua exported only 17,000 tons compared to 138,000 
tons in 1965 and 47,000 tons in 1974. The overall impression 
remains one of an export trade which is subject to major annual 
fluctuations in the amounts supplied by as many as a dozen countries. 
Japan is the principal importer of cottonseed. The only other 
importers of any note are Lebanon, which has consistently imported 
r 
from 10 - 12 percent of traded cottonseed5and Greece- which likewise 
has been a consistent importer. Mexico built up its cottonseed 
imports from 1,000 tons in 1965 to over 35,000 tons in 1974, but 
imported very little in 1975. Table 9.13 shows the major exporters 
of cottonseed while Table 9.14 indicates the major importers of 
cottonseed for the years 1965-1975. 
(123) 
9.8 Major importers of oilseeds 
The EEC is the major importer of oilseeds as the local 
production of oilseeds and oil cakes is small. This means that the 
community depends heavily on imports from non-member countries to 
satisfy its needs. Table 9.15 gives biennial averages from 
1962-1964 to 1971-1973. It will be seen that the EEC self-sufficiency 
in the major vegetable oil did not exceed 26 percent during the whole 
period. It will be noted that the highest individual percentages 
returned are for olive, palm and coconut oil. Tre latter two are 
surprising since they are tropical products, but the reason is simple. 
Certain islands in the former French colonial empire count as Departments 
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Table 9.13 
Cottonseed - major Exporters for 1965,1970,1975 
Countries 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Sudan 
Thailand 
Uganda 
Ivory Coast 
U. S. A. 
Afganistan 
Benin 
Israel 
USSR 
Others 
1965 1970 
Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'000,4 total '000: 'M.. ;J total 
138.5 30.3 17.2 3.6 
71.3 15.6 96.0 19.9 
65.3 14.3 69.2 14.3 
8.9 1.9 23.7 4.9 
- - 8.1 1.7 
4.9 1.1 15.6 3.2 
4.8 1.0 22.1 4.6 
4.3 0.9 5.2 1.1 
1.0 0.2 8.2 1.7 
2.1 0.5 19.1 4.0 
- - 39.5 8.2 
156.5 34.2 156.9 32.5 
197 5 
Quantity % of 
'000 &T total 
23.0 
5.0 
11.0 
10.6 
, 15.0 
29.0 
7.0 
10.0 
5.0 
30.0 
57.0 
I 
11.4 
2.5 
5.5 
5.0 
7.4 
14.3 
3.5 
5.0 
2.5 
14.9 
2 8.2 
World 1457.6 100.0 1482.6 100.0 1202.0 100.0 
I 
Source: F. A. 0. Trade Yearbook 1965-1975 
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Table 9.14 
Cottonseed - Major Importers for 1965,1970,1975 
1965 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'00Qstton total '00D+Lton total '000'ton total 
Japan 217.1 47.4 296.6 60.1 116.0 Eß5.1 
Lebanon 49.8 10.9 49.3 10.1 20.0 11.2 
Greece 28.4 6.2 48.5 9.8 25.0 14.0 
Czechoslo- 
vakis 24.5 5.3 12.0 2.4 - - 
Portugal 7.7 1.7 21.7 4.4. 4.0 2.2 
Honduras 2.1 0.5 0.3 0.1 - - 
Kenya 1.9 0.4 8.4 1.7 1.0 0.5 
Spain 1.6 0.3 1.5 0.3 1.0 0.5 
Mexico 1.0 0.2 32.4 6.6 3.0 1.7 
Costa Rica - - 4.1 0.8 7.0 4.0 
Others 124.3 27.1 18.4 3.7 1.0 0.5 
World 458.4 100.00 493.2 100.0 178.0 100.0 
Sources F. A. 0. Trade Yearbook 1965-1975 
Percentages computed by the writer 
D 
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Table 9.15 
Estimated net available supplies of the major vegetable oils in the 
EEC (The Nine) 
Average 1962-64 Average 1965--67 Average 1968-70 Average 1971-73 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
1000 mt. 1000 mt. 1000 mt. 1000 mt. 
Groundnut oil, 344 14 445 15 415 13 298 11 
Soyabean oil 226 9 268 9 342 11 428 11 
Cottonseed oil 95 4 81 3 53 2 59 2 
Rapeseed oil 108 4 216 8 332 10 441 12 
Sunflower of 105 4 216 8 373 12 333 9 
Olive oil 534 21 556 19 582 19 729 20, 
Coconut oil 268 19 504 17 380 12 488 13 
Palm Kernel oil 274 11 244 8 213 7 230 6 
Palm oil 365 14 382 13 428 14 600 16 
Total 2519 100 2912 100 3118 100 3706 100 
Oil prod. for 
domestic see 548 22 659 23 753 24 965 26 
Oil prod.. for 
imported seed 1157 46 1251 43 1110 36 136,7 37 
Net imports 
of oil 814 32 1002 34 1255 40 1374 37 
Source: U. N. F. A. O. Production Yearbook 1952 - 1974 inclusive and 
U. N. F. A. 0. Trade Yearbook 1952-1974 
- 258 - 
of France and as such are in the EEC. 
The variety of different vegetable oils and fats available 
in the EEC Prom both home production and imports is much greater 
than in many of the producing countries especially if they are less 
IQss 
developed countries who are /likely to import substitutes for the 
vegetable oils they produce themselves. Consequently the demand 
for vegetable oil in the EEC is very much affected by the prices of 
the different types which can be readily substituted for one another. 
This in turn of course affects the demand for a particular oil. In 
the LDC's such wide possibilities of substitutions are not as 
important as regards the internal trade within the country. Export 
prices of course will be affected by the trends in principal overseas 
markets. 
Table 9.16 refers to the oilcakes situation in the EEC and covers 
the same period of time. It will be noted that except for soyabeen 
cakes where the EEC is 50 percent self-sufficient, the degree of self- 
sufficiency in the other major oilcakes is very low, not exceeding 
8 percent for any individual commodity. 'the EEC consumption of 
cake increased from 6.5 million tons in 1960/61 - 1961/62 to 13.6 
million tons in 1970/71 - 1971/72. This increase is due to the 
expansion in animal production and the higher consumption of concentrates 
per animal unit. 
(126) 
; U. N. F. 4.00 Approaches to I nternational A ction on World Trade on 
Oilseeds, Oils and Fa is 1971, pp. 57-73. 
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Table 9.16 
Estimated net available supplies of the major oilcakes in the EEC 
( The Nine) 
Average 1962-64 Average 1965-67 Average 1968-70 Average 1971-73 
Quantity Percent Quantity Percent Quantity Percent Quantity Percent 
Groundnuts 1136 17 1033 13 841 10 903 8 
Soyabean 1995 30 3104 38 3830 44 5545 50 
Cottonseed 887 14 956 12 920 10 870 8 
Rapeseed 261 4 426 5 524 6 868 8 
Sunflower 352 5 531 7 627 7 422 4 
Lineseed 824 13 765 9 708 8 749 7 
Copra 496 8 644 8 598 7 844 7 
Palmnut dý 
Kernals 407 6 391 5 324 4 348 3 
Others 197 3 264 3 396 4 581 5 
Total 6555 100 8114 100 8768 100 11130 100 
Oilcake from 
domestic seed 263 4 330 4 422 5 
594 5 
Oilcakes from 
imported seed 2130 33 2370 29 2634 30 
3528 32 
Net imports of 
o ilcakes 4162 63 5414 67 5712 65 
7008 63 
Source: 
Computed by the author using data from U. N. F. A. 0. Production 
Yearbook 1952-74 
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Meat production increased from 11.7 million metric tons in 
1960/61 - 1961/62 to 16.4 million metric tons in 1970/71 - 1971/72. 
Production of milk increased from 84.6 million metric tons to 93.0 
million metric tons and of eggs from 2.8 million tons to 3.7 million 
tons over the same period. Meanwhile the output of compound feeding 
stuffs of which oilseed cake is a major component, increased in the 
enlarged community from an average 23.2 million metric tons in 1960/61 
- 1961/62 to 50.9 million metric tons in 1970/71 - 1971/72 giving an 
increase of about 119 percent as compared to an increase of about 
40 percent in the production of meat, indicating a higher consumption 
of feeding stuff per unit. 
As has been mentioned earlier that the major oilcake consumed 
in the community is soyabean cake. This is due to favourable prices 
as well as the increased world production of soyabean cake which rose 
from an annual average of 17.3 million metric tons in 1971 to 
32.8 
million metric tons in 1973. 
9.9. Sudanese exports of oilseeds to the EEC 
The Sudan unlike other African less developed countries associated 
in the past with the British colonial empire, has not as yet entered into 
any form of association with the EEC. Consequently it does not 
enjoy trading advantages such as lower or zero tariff on specific 
exports to the EEC nor has it signed the Lome Convention of 1975 under 
which it would receive certain guarantees as regards the stabilisation 
of exports earnings from specific agricultural commodities. * 
(127) 
Although Sudan kept out of any agreement with the community, many of 
its principal competitors did not. These included the , West Africa 
*Five years relationship agreement to be known as Lome Convention 
(after 
thb capital of Togo) covera trade, aia and co-operation links between the 
Nine and 46 developing countries in Africa, the Cýribhe-n and 
the Pacific. 
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oilseeds exporting states who, as a consequence, enjoy preferential 
terms compared with the Sudan. 
The EEC has been considered one of the major -markets for Sudan's 
export of oilseeds and oilseed products. In 1975 the EEC purchased 
41.2 percent of the Sudan's exports. 
(128) 
It is realistic to predict that the exports of oilseeds to 
the EEC from Sudan will decline, partly because of non-association 
with the Market and partly because of greater self-sufficiency 
in the EEC itself following the expansion of so; Tabean and rapeseed 
production, and finally because of competition from other oilseeds 
entering the world market notably soyabean which has lower prices 
than groundnuts and sesame seed in the world market. 
Table 9.17 shows the average annual European wholesale prices 
for major oilseeds. It will be noted that sesame enjoys a price 
advantage,, this is partly due to its high oil content and partly 
as a result of its quality of yielding a colourless oil 
(from 
white sesame only) and its use in the confectionary trade. 
Table 9.18 indicates prices of selected fats and oils C. I. F. 
Europe for 1960-1976. It will be noted that soyabean oil is 
also highly competitive together with rapeseed, palm and coconut oil. 
Sudan has to initiate new policies and programmes 
in the field of production and exports of oilseeds. Co-operation 
is needed with other major oilseed exporting countries to 
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Table 9.17 
Average annual European wholesale prices for major oilseeds 
(%U. S. a ton, co i. f. Europe) 
Type of oilseed 1960 1965 1970 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Copra f) 207 225 223 141 351 670 256 
Groundnut a) 198 206 232 326 543 604 462 
Palm Kernel g) 164 179 179 124 260 463 204 
Rapeseed e) 128 124 148 132 254 374 293 
Sunflower d) 104 124 208 164 235 481 473 
Cottonseed b) 97 104 105 106 153 230 219 
6oyabean c) 92 117 128 140 290 274 222 
Sesame h) - - 288 323 387 617 647 
Source: F. A. 0. 
a) Nigerian, shelled 
b) Sudanese, bulk 
c) United States No. 2 yellow 
d) East African, pure 
e) Canadian, 40% bulk 
f) Straits 
g) Nigerian 
h) Sudanese 
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Table 9.18 
Prices of selected fats and oilsa) c. i. f. Europe 1960-1976 
(%U. S. per ton) 
Year Soyabean Sun 
flower 
Cotton 
seed 
Ground 
nut 
Rape 
seed 
Olive Palm Coconut Palm 
kernel 
1960 225 243 235 326 219 585 228 312 317 
1961 287 311 305 331 280 561 232 254 263 
1962 227 246 266 275 221 631 216 251 255 
1963 223 236 243 268 215 871 222 286 287 
1964 205 255 250 315 252 586 246 297 299 
1965 270 294 278 324 263 663 273 348 353 
1966 261 263 333 296 244 661 236 324 271 
1967 216 212 378 283 206 690 224 328 249 
1968 178 172 305 271 161 681 169 399 367 
1969 228 213 291 332 200 666 181 361 306 
1970 307 331 354 379 293 699 260 397 429 
1971 323 375 392 441 295 727 261 371 335 
1972 270 326 324 426 232 916 217 234 244 
1973 465 480 500 546 395 1399 378 513 491 
1974 795 983 939 1077 745 2174 669 998 1010 
1975 619 739 726 857 551 2436 433 393 439 
1976 376 600 645 675 390 2350 370 340 360 
a) Descriptions: 
Soyabean oil: crude, United States, c. i. f. Rotterdam 
Sunflower oil: any origin, ex-tank Rotterdam 
Cottonseed oil: United States, c. i. f. Rotterdam 
Groundnut oil: Nigerian/Gabian, any origin, c. i. f. Europe 
Rapeseed oil: Dutch f. o. b. ex-mill 
Olive oil: Spanish, edible, i% drums 
Palm oil: (vlalaysia, 5öc. i. f. U. K. 
Coconut oil: Philippines/Indonesia, 
Palm Kernel oil: West African c. i. f. 
bulk c. i. f. Rotterdam 
U. K. 
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negotiate trade policies with the EIEC with the objective of increasing 
the Con unity's imno its of oilseeds and their products,. oil, 
meal and cake. Sudan also should undertake major market promotional 
activities in the EEC in order to increase its share of the market. 
This should go together with plans for improved qualities, better 
grade and more competitive prices. ' 
9.10 market and potential markets for sesame seed 
As has been mentioned earlier in Chapter 6 sesame is utilized 
in three major ways: 
1. Sesame seed 
2. Sesame oil 
3. Sesame cakes and meals. 
Sesame seeds are used directly for bakery goods and as ingredients 
for confectionery. This market is relatively small and exists 
primarily in U. S. A. Approximately 24,000 metric tons are imported 
annually into the US. A. with 75 percent for the bakery industry, - the 
other 25 percent is used in candy and other sweets. The U: S. A. market 
is growing at about six percent per year. The main competition for 
this market comes from Latin America. 
most sesame is used for oil pressing with cakes and meals as by- 
products. Figure 9.13 indicates the market and potential markets for 
sesame seed. Sesame seed is 48. percent oil with an average yield of 
80 percent refined oil (by weight) or 40 percent yield on gross weight. 
The remainder of the crushed seed (: 50 percent) makes a 44 percent 
protein meal "A smaller market exists for sesame oil as speciality 
*For further details about trade in oilseeds, vegetao-Le oil anQ Uli rituals 
1965-1975 by major trading countries, see Appendices G19,20,21,22,23, 
24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38 and 39. 
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oil used in pharmaceutical and cosmetics manufacture and in blending 
to extend olive oil; sesame oil is also sold as a health food. 
The primary future market for the oil is a medium cost 
i 
premium quality edible oil. Industrial sources indicate that at 
similar prices sesame oil will be preferred to groundnut oil. 
The groundnut oil market is large; world production is about 
3,000,000 metric tons annually. Sesame oil has another major 
advantage beside the health aspects, in that it enjoys very good 
keeping qualitiey. and does not cloud with age.; hence its value 
as a blender with other cooking oils to improve shelf-life both 
in the shop and the home. Sesame oil is now used for blending with 
both groundnut and olive oil. The former is the primary vegetable 
oil used for cooking and sesame oil is unlikely at present to 
supplant groundnut oil given comparative production costs and prices. 
In the writer's opinion it would be well worthwhile to sell sesame 
oil at a discounted price for a limited period of time to some of the 
principal cooking oil manufacturers to introduce them to the virtues 
of sesame oil. Such a policy might well encourage them to use a higher 
proportion of sesame oil in the blends which would of course increase 
the quality of their products, both from a health and from shelf-life 
aspects. The consumer may well be prepared to pay more for a better 
product and so the manufacturers could afford to move away Prom the 
concept of the "least cost mix" in which one type of oil is substituted 
for another as market prices change. 
With the increasing shortages of protein focusing attention 
on the prospects of substituting protein of vegetables origin for 
- 267 - 
animal protein, there must be a large potential market for sesame 
meals with their 14J4 percent protein content. Such meals should find 
a ready market in the manufacture of artificial meat products. 
Such products are already manufactured on a limited scale mainly 
for the catering industry, and experiments are in process to improve 
the appearance and palatability of these products. There is also 
a potential market for less sophisticated forms of animal protein 
substitute in the animal feed compounding industry. The shortage 
and high prices of fish meals are causing compounders to look elsewhere 
for proteins. Such meals of course are vital for growing dairy 
stocks and laying hens. 
The writer visited the scientists of the Tropical Products 
Institute in London, and discussed the present position as regards 
research and the implementation of research findings into new uses 
and markets for sesame meal. Considerable research is being carriedou. 4 
at the present time (1978) into vegetable oil, cakes and meals as a 
source of protein for incorporating into both products for direct 
human consumption and for feeding to livestock in the fort of compounded 
feeds. As far as human consumption is concerned research has 
concentrated on using vegetable oil meals in the production of "milk 
products" such as milk powder substitute, ' ice cream, cheese spreads 
and yoghurts. With animal feeding little additional research is 
'For example a popular product is the Carnation Food Company's 
Coffe-te, which does not contain any dairy products at all but instead 
has a high vegetable oil base. 
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necessary on oilseeds meals. 
A 
eal s. '* Beside using a straight sesame 
meal in animal protein substitutes, there is also a possibility 
of blending it with other vegetable oil meals, especially soya. 
Sesame meal contains certain amino acids not found in soya meal 
and blending the two together should be advantageous. The blend 
might range from 1: 1 to 2: 1 soya concentrates sesame meal. World 
consumption of soya concentrate is running at 309000,000 lbs 
annually, but expansion at a rapid rate is expected. Obviously 
this is a market with a future and the sesame producing countries 
like the Sudan should study this potential in order to exploit 
the new opportunities. According to the writer's information 
little work is being done on sesame itself. "Most work is 
concentrated on soya". The neglect of sesame is said to be due 
to the unfamiliarity and unavailability of sesame meal and also 
the high price of sesame seed compared to other oilseeds. This in 
the writer's opinion is a mistake in view of the high amino acid 
content of sesame meal and perhaps sesame exporters should contact 
research workers and provide suitable facilities for obtaining 
sesame products. A very important facet in marketing is to find 
new uses for a product, hence it is vital that sesame exporters 
should be knowledgeable about possible developments in this field. 
(129) 
From the point of future competition, quite a lot of scit-ntific 
work is in progress for the production of protein from organisms 
feeding on such media as straws. Such work is being carried 
out at Reading by the Tate and Lyle Company. 
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CHAPTER 10 
Problems of Production and Marketing of 
Dura and Sesame in the Sudan 
A: Obstacles to Production 
10.1 Introduction 
The climate in the main dura and sesame production areas is 
semi arid and,, under rain farming conditions, crop yields in any 
one year are partly determined by the annual rainfall. This in semi 
arid areas fluctuates widely from year to year with the inherent 
risk of drought. '' The condition of the soil of course is another 
main factor influencing crop yields and little has been said so far 
about the soils of the Central Rainlands and the deleterious effects 
on them OJ the bad farming practices of many Sudanese mechanised 
farmers which encourage soil erosion. Farm land of great potential 
value has . been and is being 
lost to the Sudans farmers'profits are 
falling and will vanish if they allow this land to become eroded. 
In other words soil fertility falls unless plant nutrients are added 
to the soil. This can be done by fallowing, by including a 
legui, iinous break in the rotation, by following a mixed farming 
system incorporating animals with crops or by other well tried 
farming practices. Chemical-, fertilizers . are not 
readily available 
in the Sudan, all are imported and the great distances inside the 
country mean that transport costs would be prohibitive at present. 
The prevalence of poor farming has led to the rapid fall 
in crop 
yields after land had been in cultivation for a few years only. 
In the 
first two 'years crop yields from new land provided that 
the rainfall 
is favourable, are high. The fertility of the virgin 
land 
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; gas been increased by the ashes left from burns :g the 
former vegetative cover of forest trees and bushes as well 
as humus from the disintegrating roots. But after a few 
years -the productivity declines noticeably and after 8- 10 years of 
cultivation many farmers want to shift to new virgin land. From 
the fa, rrrer}point of view, it is the only option open to him under 
the present farming system, since with low crop yields continuous 
cultivation on the same piece of land is financially unviable. From 
the Sudan's pointbF view however the social costs are very high. 
Nomadic and traditional farming systems have been disrupted 
" `1 Y-ý _ The tree cover has 
been cleared with the consequent loss of forest products such as char- 
coal and timber and the valuable gum arabic tree i have also been lost. 
Added to these losses of production are the unknown costs of erosion 
and desert creep. The latter proved decisive factorSin the 
World Bank refusal to give the Sudan a major loan for extending the 
rainfed mechanised sector in 1978. 
Beside these adverse effects a system of large scale mechanised 
farming adds to both transport and infrastructure costs. The 
development of the mechanised farming system in the rainfed areas 
has seen a movement southwards and westwards, so lengthening the 
LO '11, e. 
lines of communications from the urban markets M4 main export port. 
The fact that farmers are on the move. acts as a constraint 'o, n the 
provision of such infrastructure as roads, water supplies, electricity, 
schools, clinics and other services. As a consequence of the lack 
of infrastructure few large farmers live on their farms and- so do not 
become attached to a particular neighbourhood. Consequently they and 
their families have few qualms about i-ovinö on. 
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In theory a farmer is, bound by his lease from the Mechanised 
Farming Corporation (MFC) to observe the farming practices which are 
to be specified by the Corporation, otherwise he forfceits the lease 
without compensation. In practice however little is done to enforce 
good husbandry, perhaps the main cbnstraint is the lack of resources 
of the ?. U'C. 
A The failure of the WC to control the situation has also 
resulted in the unauthorised cultivation of large tracts of land which 
sometimes,, because of the contours led to serious erosion problems. 
The present problem is to change the farming system and so 
ensure the permanent cultivation of the land. The World Bank Mission 
of 1977 suggested the initiation of an applied research prograirine to 
identify and test alternative systems in the field. As yet no 
specifications ate available of possible alternative systems. 
The writer however who is an agricultural graduate with 
considerable field experience in the Sudan would suggest the following 
possible alternatives for consideration. The first obvious step 
is to enforce fallowing, this would enable the soil to be rested 
and so give micro-organism5and organic decomposition a chance to 
release minerals. Fallowing will also control weeds and $e&ts. 
Leguminous plants distinguished by the presence of nitrogen fixing. 
bacteria in their root systems, release nitrogenous compounds to the 
soil and provide an excellent fertilizing effectMltA$o 5htolLIc( 
be 
inelucýecý ýM t4 rotcttions 4 
The UFC functions at a loss mainly because it is responsible for the 
highly unprofitable state farms. The losses at the latter ran at LS 
2 million in 1976. 
The '. IFC is resnonsibl e for allocating the land which belongs to the 
state. It is also charged with a supervisory and an extension role. 
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10.2 Plant Breeding 
The research- and experimental programmes have had a minor 
effect on the system of production especially in the rainlands area 
of the Sudan. The reasons for this lack of take up of research 
results lies in the ineffectiveness of the extension service and the 
physical isolation of the research stations. * Research and 
applied experimental trials have tended to be concentrated on weed 
control, the mechanisation of sesame harvesting and the evaluation 
of fertilizers. Plant breeding has been confined to dura, and even 
the new varieties produced have failed to týL V satisfaction to 
the consumer and have little resistance against Jura diseases. 
One of the troubles of some newly introduced locally bred varieties 
is that they have a low protein content which d_PPectc ` the flavour 
of the bread made from the grain. Also some of the new varieties 
have coloured grains which did not give the white flour favoured 
by the consumer. These two disadvantages meant that the prices 
received for dura grains from these new varieties were lower than 
those commonly grown, and that the extra output if any from the new 
varieties did not compensate for the lower prices. The obvious moral 
's 
of this that the plant breeder should concentrate in the qualities 
that the market requires. 
In the U. S. A. hybrid sorghum haS, been very successful and 
crop yields greatly improved. These hybrids are now being introduced 
'For example the World Bank mission in 1977 was unable to visit a 
research station because the dirt road was closed by mud. The writer 
visited the same research station in the course of his fieldwork and 
gathered from the directorthat few visitors let alone extension workers 
and farmers came to see the station. 
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to many other sorghum growing countries including India. Hybrid 
sorghum there has proved to be partially resistant to drought and 
in one very dry year crop yields of over one metric ton per feddan 
were obtained. (Compare with Sudan national yield of 0.4 metric ton 
per feddan in -i yearswhey rainfall conditions were favourable). 
Work on hybrid dura in the Sudan was stopped - inexplicably in 
1962 and only resumed again in 1973 and little details are available 
since. * In the Argentine in the semi-arid areas, in one province 
only over 2,000,000 metric tons of sorghum were produced with an 
average yield of over 4,000 kgs a hectare using entirely hybrid 
varieties. 
10.3 Problems of weeds, pests and diseases 
Weeds infested every farm visited by the writer in the central 
clay plain of the Sudan. Weeds rob the main crop of water, and 
mineral nutrients, absorb sunshine and compete for space. In some 
dura crops, one could hardly distinguish between the real crop and 
weeds. Weed populations buili up over time with the first one or two 
years being relatively weed free. It is weeds which are a major factor 
A 
in reducing crop yields to uneconomic levels in less than ten years of 
cultivations. Farmers often abandoned heavily weed infested crops 
There is no central -coordinating system for compiling anna41 research 
reports of the individual stations. Records are badly kept and often 
stored under unsuitable conditions where', they deteriorate. The 
consequence is that many research findings are lost. 
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not even attempting to tvetd them let alone harvest them. The weeds 
then multiply further and the strong winds of the central plains 
carry the seeds over a wider area. The problem then is how to 
control weeds economically and then ensure that the farmer adopts 
improved weed control practices. In the United States for example 
sorghum is sown in rows wide enough to allow mechanical inter-row 
cultivations. Whereas in the Sudan dura is sown in narrow rows 
and hand weeded; an operation which is expensive and often farmers 
are unwilling to incur the expense of weeding a poor crop. In the 
United States also herbicides are used if necessary. 
K Most farmers 
in the Sudan have never heard of herbicides let alone used them. 
A major complaint of farmers is about pests. The wholesale clearance 
of the savannahs for mechanised cultivation has upset the natural 
balance. Discing for exaniple has killed the snakes which previously 
kept down the rats and mice, and the result is major crop losses. 
There has also been a bird population explosion following the great 
increase in available food supplies and the provision of water by the 
excavation of hafirs. One of the worst pests is the Ouelea aethiopica 
which has now been declared a national pest. An expensive aerial spraying 
campaign has been undertaken to destroy the young in their nests. As with 
pests, diseases have multiplied. Both dura and sesame are members of the 
same botanical families as many of the wild plants of the region. 
United States agriculture spends about %2.5 billion annually on 
chemical spraying against some 600 kinds of such infesting plants 
and yet the loss in yield on this account is estimated at about the 
same sum, making the total annual costs on the weed account reach 
ý5 
billion. 
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t, 
These are hosts to disease and pests which promptly transfer the; Y' 
attention to the plentiful food supply afforded by the new crops. 
Farmers interviewed by the writer did not use any method of plant 
protection, relying on the services of the Plant Protection Department 
of the ministry of Agriculture which is both understaffed and lacks 
effective equipment. 
(133) 
10.4 labour problems 
The shortage and the consequent high costs of labour are a 
major problem that hinders increased production in the rainfed areas 
of the Sudan. Labour for agricultural production is highly seasonal. # 
with a high demand for labour during the weeding and harvesting 
periods. Weeding is extremely labour intensive. This operation to 
be effective has to be done within a given period beyond which there 
is damage to crop yields. Harvesting is also labour intensive. 
Sesame yields are greatly influenced by timeliness in harvesting and 
if the crop is not cut within a Few days of ripeningmuch. seed is lost 
through shattering. Casual workers are well aware of the farmers' 
predicament and bid up their charges. Farmers also as has been mentioned 
in Chapter 2,, have to provide transport, food, water and shelter for 
their casual workers, and often in the bargaining process workers demand 
extras including free cigarettes. This shortage of labour is a result 
of great employment opportunities resulting from the opening up of new 
agricultural development. schemes in the rainlands and irrigated areas. 
As this shortage of labour will continue for some time) it becomes 
obvious that if agricultural production has to be increased the processes 
should be mechanised. 
p 
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10.5 Problems of mechanisation 
t 
When the writer was doing fieldwork in the Sudan, he found that 
(farmers 
complained bitterly about lack of spare parts and servicing. 
13ýý 
During the cultivation season timeliness in agricultural operations is 
vital if output is to reach satisfactory levels. It is therefore 
essential that the machine operates as efficiently as possible. The 
peak cultivation period coincides with the rainy season when the roads 
are generally impassable, so if a tractor breaks down the results may 
be disastrous. 
. Rome of the problems result 
from the nationalisation 
of all companies dealing in the importation of agricultural machinery. 
After nationalisation these companies became one state owned Company 
known as the State Trading Corporation. The old private companies 
were held in high regard by their farmer customers for the reliability 
of their services and for the honesty of their staff. They were well 
managed and the morale and discipline of their managers, storekeepers 
and workers were high. After nationalisation all this deteriorated 
and the Corporation ran into cash flow difficulties. The stocks of 
spare parts were cut down drastically and small workshops in production 
areas were run down and some finally closed down. 
(135) 
The neglect of tractor maintenance means that the working life 
of a tractor is shorter 'than it would otherwise have been. An engineer 
from the Ministry of Agriculture told the writer that this potential 
was cut by at least 50 percent through this facto ry this of course 
means that tractors have to be replaced earlier than they would 
otherwise have been, a drain both to the country's foreign exchan; e and 
the financial resources of farmers. The engineer also pointed out that 
-277- 
machinery in the Sudan needs extra care because of the rough roads, 
heat and uneven ground in the field. 
A further complication which affects mechanisation is that the 
Government, faced by foreign exchange shortages, entered into trading 
arrangements with a variety of the Comunist Bloc countries. The 
results of these agreements were an importation of a whole collection 
of different makes and models of tractors and other machines most of 
which had not been previously tried out under working conditions in 
the Sudan, with poor or no local service facilities . The 
Eastern Bloc machines are, cheaper to buy than the corresponding 
Western types. The former''s high repair and spare parts costs more 
than offset this initial saving. The writer in his fieldwork saw 
many abandoned Eastern European tractors for which spares were not 
available. A fleet of Russian combines purchased for the state farm 
at Agadi were out of coirplission in 1977 after only a few seasons 
work, the Government who had fallen out with Russia by then, were 
desperately trying to obtain spare parts from Iraq and Algeria. 
Another problem is the total lack of trained drivers and 
mechanics. The Government operated a training centre for drivers and 
mechanics at Tozi. The Tozi centre was established in 1963 with 
assistance from USA and from 1963 to May 1976 a total of 602 people 
have been trained. Tozi centre has a 1500 feddan farm attached 
that can be used for training purposes. Financial assistance 
is 
no-,,, r provided from IDA funds which will continue to 1978. 
The 
Course is long, over one year, and the few graduates of the 
course easily found non-farm jobs especially in road haulage. 
Some even anent to Saudi Arabia and other rich oil states. 
Farmers 
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complained of inadequate care in driving and ma inta inence of 
tractors in the absence of suitable local staff. 
The culmination of all these troubles was the failure both to 
achieve time limits in sawing crops and sometimes the inability to 
cultivate the whole area of the farm. All this of course adversely 
affected output. Most farms have only one tractor and during the 
cultivation season which coincides with the rainy season, are isolated 
by impassable dirt roads. This means that it is vital for the farmers 
to start the season with a tractor in good working order and to have 
on hand an adequate stock of spare parts and staff with sufficient 
mechanical knowledge to keep the tractor working. These 
requirements are of ten impossible to ensure under Sudanese conditions. 
Even if the maintainence and personnel problems were solved, the 
lack of adequate fuel supplies would remain a major constraint. The 
main problem is the difficulties in rail transport as a result of 
shortage of locomotives and tanker rolling stock and a permanent way 
in poor condition resulting in strict speed limits on many sections 
of the line. Managerial problems also arise and allegations of 
corruption to secure priority use are common. Bribery or no bribery, 
theare often critical shortages of tractor fuel during the cultivation 
season and it is common for farmers to resort to the black market for 
supplies at double the cost. The situation has got worse in the last 
'The writer heard that sometimes bribes were paid even to delay delivery 
in order to create local shortages which would be of financial benefit 
to black market operatorso 
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two years since there is a shortage of petroleum products in the 
country because of the lack of foreign exchange. 
10.6 The Ministry of Agriculture's Role in the Production of Sesame and Dura 
The Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the MFC, 
agriculture extension, seed propagation, plant protection and agricultural 
engineering. These many activities of the ministry affect the smooth 
running of the mechanised farming sector. Some of these activities 
have of course already been touched on briefly before in the thesis and 
all that remains here is to give a brief summary and critique. 
The mFC is responsible for the operations of the mechanised farming 
sector both under public and private farming units. It has neglected 
it activities as regards the private sector because of preoccupation 
with state farms. Unfortunately these run at a loss and the accumulated 
debts exceeded two millions. Consequently the IFC is somewhat demoralized 
and short of both staff and f inence resources. In the writer's opinion 
the nFC should be relieved of the burden of state farms and concentrate 
on its supervisory and advisory role as regards the private sector which 
accounts for over 90 percent of the area under mechanised 
durs and sesame 
production. 
The extension department of the ministry of Agriculture 
has been 
k1 2) (133) 
criticised by both a Ford Foundation Report and by the World 
Bank. 
The gist of the criticism is that the extension service exists 
on paper 
but not in practice. Shortage of. financial resources and staff appear 
to be the main reasons. The organisation has itsheadquarters staff 
in 
Khartoum, but is forced to curtail its activities in the provinces 
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because it has neither the staff, the housing for the staff, nor the 
vehicles essential for the staff to visit the field. In such 
circumstances it is not surprising that all the farmers visited 
by the writer had never seen an extension worker nor had one 
visited the research station which the writer visited himself. 
The Seed Propogation Department's duty is to supply improved 
seed to farmers. Unfortunately farmers do not consider the improved 
seeds superior in yield to the present local seeds. They maintained 
that the market preference is for the local varieties not the improved 
varieties made available to them especially for dura. 
There is no seed propogation service in the Western Provinces. 
As these are the areas of concentration of traditional farmers they 
have no access to improved seeds of any kind. 
The Crop Protection Department also suffers from similar problems 
of staff, transport and housing. Consequently it is not able to cover 
all the agricultural areas sufficiently. In the Damazine area one of the 
principal regions for dura and sesame, the Crop Protection Department 
has not even a local office and has to bring its personnel and equipment 
from Sennar, about 200 Km away over dirt roads. Further complications 
are that the telephone service (another parastatal organisation) suffers 
from long delays and it is often difficult to irake long distance calls. 
It is not therefore surprising that one * farmer remarked to the writer 
that the pests had eaten the crop before the Department sprayers had 
arrived. 
The Agricultural Engineering Department of the I'. tinistry of 
Agriculture which is responsible for the testing of n'achines and 
advising the Government regarding farm mooc4inery is also understaffed and C) i 
situated in Khartoum. It has no branches whatý; o. wer in agricultural areas. 
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There is little farm mechanisation research being carried out 
in the Sudan, inspite of the importance of farm mechanisation in 
the expansion of cultivation in the rainfed areas and the role of 
machinery to compensate for a rapidly growing shortage of labour. 
B: Obstaci es to Marketing 
10.7 Transport 
A main constraint on the faster expansion of commercialised 
modern agriculture is transportation especially in the rural areas. 
Delays in moving produce from the farm to the town or the export 
port add to the costs and to the risk of damage e The Universal 
dirt roads found in the rural areas are the main factor to blame 
together with the overloaded network of Sudan Railways. 
Sudan is the largest African country covering an area of 
2.5 million square Km. In addition the country's main access 
to foreign markets, Port Sudan, is located in the Upper North 
East desert corner of the country. The main agricultural production 
areas, even in the East of the country, are far removed from Port 
Sudan while the agricultural areas of the West and South of the 
country are well over 1000 miles from the Port to which they are 
connected by an overloaded railway. There are no tarmac roads 
from these areas to the more accessible parts of the country. 
The 
remoteness of these western areas is the main constraint in 
their development especially as regards the growth of a n: echaz&ised 
export oriented agriculture since the costs of bringing in 
necessary inputs and moving the outputs for export, would be 
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prohiäitive under existing conditions. The Sudan has depended 
on railways, roads came rather later' and as yet there is no 
national network of tarmac roads. The rural areas, as has been 
previously mentioned, rely on dirt roads which are impassable 
during the rainy season - three to four months a year. These 
dirt roads either act as feeder roads to the railways system if 
there is a railway system in the vicinity or else link the country 
with a local market town. 
Trunk roads come under the supervision of the Department of 
Roads in Khartoum which has a budget of less than LS. 50,000 per 
year for maintenance, less than LS. 10 per kilometer for the roads 
they maintain. This sum is completely inadequate and the trunk 
roads are deteriorating in condition especially as drainage culverts 
are not repaired when broken so increasing the possibility of heavy 
rain sweeping away road surfaces. The local roads are the 
responsibility of the local authorities which in turn lack the 
money to maintain them. The usual treatment is to scrape the 
earth surface every two to three years, a process which over time 
lovers the surface of the roads, so that in the wet season they 
get flooded. Obviously a major investment in road improvement is 
a pre-requisite for agricultural development in the Sudan Rainlands. 
The problem of course is where the money is to cone from, not only 
for their construction but also for maintenance. The national 
lorry 
fleet consists of about 509000 vehicles and the average age 
is high. 
These trucks suffer from wear and tear from operating on dirt roads 
and the risk of overturning is high. During the -wet Season they also 
are liable to be bogged down in mud. In the dry season dust gets 
into 
working surfaces and breakdowns are cor, nlonplace. The poor state of 
the 
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roads also means that travelling speeds are reduced. 
lorries suffer from shortages of spare parts and fuel. 
Litre tractors, 
The writer during the course of his fieldwork heard many 
complaints about the inadequacy and h iph costs of transport. Farmers 
complained of the poor state of the roads and of the high costs of 
moving materials to the farm and removing their produce from the farm 
to the market. Merchants centred their complaints on the inadequacies 
of the railway system and complained bitterly that delays often either 
lost them contracts or subjected them to penalty clauses, as a result 
of the non-fulfilment of contract delivery dates. 
To ensure a steady f low of crops throughout the Sudan the 
transportation system must be efficient enough to get these crops to 
consuming areas and to the port in good time at minimum costs and 
with little wastage. 
10.8 Stoff 
Storage is an essential part of- the marketing processq crops 
are harvested at relatively short Periods of the year and the demand 
by consumers is fairly constant throughout the year. Hence 
the need for an efficient storage system. Normally farmers 
are faced with cash flow problems and want to dispose of their crops 
as soon as possible even if they obtain lower prices by doing so. 
The Sudanese farmer has one great advantage as regard farm storage 
in that no buildings are required to house grains during the long dry season. 
'In Damazine area for example sesame is harvested in October - November 
and dura from January to February. It will not rain from these months 
until may. Once the torrential thunderstorms of the rainy season start 
any crop in the open will be lost. 
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The risk of crop damage is limited to ±nsects, rodents, other pests 
and theft. A traditional peasant farmer stores grain for his own 
domestic use, these stores range from small pits ;n the ground 
(hiatmora) to beehive structures made from mud and straw and standing 
on stilts. Grain stored by these traditional methods can be stored 
for quite a long period of time. 
Off the farm, grain is stored by mercha: tts and banks. As has 
been mentioned earlier in Chapter 39 some merchants in Gedaref use 
large pits (Matmoras) besides sheds and open yards. Fa ers and 
merchants in debt to banks are supposed to deliver their produce 
as security for loans. Commercial banks at Gedaref and Damazine 
tended to store in open yards with the grain and oilseeds piled 
in sacks. The yar(Is will be surrounded by high wire fences and a 
watchman is employed. The only large scale modern silos in the 
country belong to ABS. 
The ABS manages two silos, one at (sedaref for bulk handling 
and storage with a capacity of 100,000 tons, the other in Port 
Sudan with a capacity of 50,000 tons. The major objectives of the 
silos are twofold, to carry reserve stocks from year to year in 
order to cope with years of scarcity caused by droughts, and within 
a given year, to help to stabilise prices and ensure a smooth flow 
of grains to the consumers. Without an adequate storage provision, 
prices fluctuate widely to the detriment of both the consumers and 
producers. These objectives are of course conmiendabl e. Excessively 
large price fluctuations are undesirable while the holding of reserve 
stocks not only helps to ensure the supply of basic foodstuffs, 
but 
also helps the country to take advantage of any sudden price rises 
in 
the international market. 
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The Port Sudan silo is situated in the only port of the 
country through which all the imports and exports of food grains have 
It, 
to pass. Unaudited accounts show that during the period 1971 to 
1975 this silo operated for four years at a profit and for one 
year at a loss. The main headache for the bank is the larger 
Gedaref silo which stores mainly dura and sesame. From 1969 to 1975 
the annual intake fluctuated between 32,000 and 51,000 metric tons 
in spite of a total capacity of 100,000 metric tons. The silo was 
only fully utilised in 1970/71, when there was record production. 
Table 10.1 gives the unaudited silo accounts'at 31st December 1975. 
It will be seen that the accumulated losses at the two silos 
were over IS 1.2 million while nearly another LS 0.5 million was 
unaccounted for. The gross revenue for the smaller Port Sudan silo 
exceeded that of the larger Gedaref one, the difference in 1975 being 
nearly LS 0.2 million. The revenue per metric ton of storage capacity 
was LS 5.7 at Port Sudan against the very low figure of LS 0.87 
for the Gedaref silo. The Gedaref silo operating costs ran at LS 1.4 
per ton of storage capacity. The Port Sudan silo cleared its operating 
cost at LS 3.7 per ton of storage capacity but was brought into the red 
by heavy depreciation and interest charges. As has been mentioned 
earlier in Chapter 39 merchants and farmers are reluctant to incur the 
high costs of storing produce in the silos. These costs are not merely 
During the 1971-1975 years wheat and wheat flour represented the 
biggest import tonnage fluctuating annually between 110,000 and 
160,000 tons. With the increase in Sudanese wheat production 
this item is expected to diminish. Some wheat and flour was 
stored at the Port Sudan silo. 
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the higher charges for using. the silo but also include the indirect 
costs of weight losses through dehydration. Grains stored in pits 
in the ground do not suffer such a degree of weight loss. The 
writer would question the future viability of the Port Sudan silo 
if the Sudan Government policy of self sufficiency in wheat materializes. 
From his visit to the silo it seems very obvious it is imported 
wheat which keeps the silo from making too great a loss. Perhaps 
the ABS should consider ways and means of attracting farmers and 
merchants to use the silo more intensively. The private sector 
could not afford to under-utilize such an expensive capital asset 
as the Gedaref silo. More flexibility is necessary to meet the 
requirements of users. 
Beside the two silos discussed above the ABS either own or 
rent another 117,250 metric tons of storage capacity situated in 
different parts of the country. This includes a further . 
10,000 metric 
tons rented capacity at Gedaref despite the fact that its silo there 
is under-utilized. Another 30,000 metric tons storage capacity is owned 
at Port Sudan again in addition to the silo. These warehouses are 
mainly used to store produce in sacks which has been delivered to 
the bank as security for loans. Table 10.2 indicates the existing 
ABS storage capacity other than the silos. 
The history of the silos produce a cautionary example of the 
rather superficial tendency for people to recommend ttVL increase Ln the 
Provision. of modern storage facilities as a panacea for some marketing 
constraints. It is obviously of little use to incur the high costs 
of constructing and maintaining modern plant which does not meet the 
needs of the community. Traditional methods of storage were not 
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Table 10.2 The Agricultural Bank of Sudan) Existing ABS 
Storage Capacity 
Location Capacity 
tons 
Warehouses Owned 
Sennar 25,000 
Kosti 25,000 
Port Sudan 30,000 
Total 80,000 
Warehouses Rented 
Gedaref 10,000 
Senna r 10,000 
Kosti 4,000 
Dilling (Debeibat) 10,000 
Shendi 400 
Dongola 1,000 
Atbara 1,200 
Wad medani 150 
New Haifa 500 
Total 37,250 
Source: Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
0 
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superseded and presumably these met the needs of the trade at more 
reasonable costs. 
10.9 Quality of produce and the need for grading 
One of the purposes of grading is to enable buyers to purchase 
on description only) without having to examine each consignment 
individually. This of course facilitfi. t trade especially in the 
international market, and cuts do' n cost. From the sellers point of 
view grading enables him to enjoy the advantages of price differentials 
in that he will get higher prices for better quality. Whereas if 
he sold produce ungraded the chances are that the prices would be 
depressed by the presence of impurities and poorer quality produce 
of mixed quality. 
Farr-. Ers sell their dura and sesame ungraded-When produce is sold 
in the auction markets, it can be inspected by prospective buyers before 
sale. To inspect all the sacks offered for sale would be a tedious 
task and usually according to the writer's experience a prospective 
buyer only samples a small proportion of the produce on offer. The 
chances are that they will make conservative price bids for the bulk 
of produce ufiich of course they have not seen. If the produce has 
been graded before sale then the farmer would in all probability 
have obtained a higher price for graded quality produce. 
The writer inspected farmers consignments for sale at Gedaref 
auction market (the largest in the country for dura and sesame) and 
found that the great majority of consignments contained a high percentage 
of trash and other foreign materials. With sesame the consignments 
usually contained seed of different colours, another 
factor which will 
reduce their price. White seeds unlike coloured seed produce a colourless 
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oil which commands a price premium since it can be used for blending 
with other vegetable oils. Likewise dura consignments often 
contained a mixture of grains of different colours and sizes. This 
in turn depresses prices. Produce is normally cleaned by the buyer 
after sale and he bears the cost of this operation both direct and 
indirect. 
Most marketing experts argue that quality improvements begin 
on the farm with the caveat that farmers will not improve quality 
unless they receive an increased benefit from doing so. Hence the 
writer would argue that produce should be graded before sale by an 
impartial inspector. This will help to secure payments on quality 
and does provide incentives to farmers to produce better produce. 
Eventually the improvements would make an impact on the world market 
and the Sudan would be expected to benefit from this better image. ** 
At present as has been mentioned in Chapter 4 dura is exported 
entirely by the private sector who make their own arrangements. 
Oilseeds however t the responsibility of the Sudan Oilseed5Company 
Limited who have been trying to improve the quality of the exported 
Produce by inspection at Port Sudan. 
*He pays the actual costs of the operation and bears the cost of weight 
losses from the removal of dirt and trash and undersized grain which fall 
through ttie sieve. For these reasons he discounts the price he pays for 
produce J, i has not inspected before sale. 
**A senior official of the ministry of Commerce, Khartoum, commented that 
produce of some other African countries which compete with Sudan in the 
world market enjoys a price premium over Sudan produce since the 
latter 
has an international reputation for poorer quality-for those commodities 
which are not sold on grades. 
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But as yet the system is not. working effectively. * Improving the 
quality of the crop is essential in a programme aimed at substantial 
increase-Sin export earnings. Sudanese dura and sesame seeds can be 
upgraded through more ePf icient cleaning. - Therefore, an orderly 
efficient marketing system for export of sesame and dura for the Sudan 
requires more attention and control to improve the overall quality 
of export crops. 
10.10 Packaging the crop 
Dura and sesame seed are normally packed in sacks. imported 
from India and Bangladesh. The average net weight per sack is about 
75 Kgs for sesame and 92 - 100 Kgs for dura according to variety. 
Farmers normally buy their own socks for marketing the crop and 
sesame invariably is placed in new sacks because of the danger of 
leakage. The seed are very small so it is imperative that the sack 
has no holes and is in a condition to stand rough handling. Dura 
which has much larger seeds is often marketed in secondhand sacks. 
On purchase the buyer normally resacks the crop äf ter cleaning and all 
produce for exports is put in brand new sacks. 
The use of sacks has two major disadvantage s. The first is the 
cost of the importing of new sacks. Total sacks imports ran at a cost 
of LS. 8,582,000 in the year 1975, the latest year. for -which figures are 
*See page 175 and Appendix F1 
The basic trouble is the lack of suitably trained staff while allegations 
of bribery are commonplace. 
i 
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available. This heavy cost is in foreign exchange which has it V(r y 
high opportunity cost in the Sudan. The second is the failure 
to exploit the cost savings potential of bulk handling., * much of 
the rainfed dura is combined directly but bagged in sacks and even 
if combined by a tanker combine is then put in sacks. When it comes 
to storage as has been mentioned earlier, the Cedaref 'silo is equipped 
for bulk handling, but again sacks are emptied on arrival, the produce 
stored in bulk but again resacked on taking out of storage. The reason 
given for this resacking process is that Sudan railways will not accept 
bulk consignments, but instead require produce in sacks. At the time 
the silo was built the railway purchased some imported bulk grain 
carrying wagons, but these. proved to be too long for the existing railway 
tracks with their many bends. 
10.11 Processing 
Oilseeds and grain processers play an important role in the overall 
marketing situation. For example sesame seed is an edible oilseed 
which is used commercially both in its natural seed form and also a raw 
material for the manufacture of edible oil. The oil is extracted from 
*The Sudan Government established a Kenaf planatrt&ivand factory to 
produce Kenaf sacks as a substitute for the imported jute type. 
Unfortunately the sacks were too large and heavy to be handled easily 
by manual labour. Consequently farmers and merchants are reluctant to 
buy them with the consequence that the whole kenaf operation has run at 
a loss which might well had been avoided if the factoLy had done a little 
primary market research to discover what type of sack was demanded. 
The factory however continues to produce the wrong type of sacks because 
it is tooled up with the machinery which makes large sacks, the machines 
cQncerned have been imported from Europe where mechanical not manual 
handling is normal practice. 
- 293 - 
the seeds commercially by various processes. In the Sudan camel 
driven mills (Assaras) are still used. A considerable number of 
mechanised oil mills have been established in the Sudan which press 
large quantities of oilseeds and produce a surplus of oil for 
exports. - .--_'= 
(see Appendix EI), 
Most of the countries producing sesame prefer to industrialize C: P 
their sesame seed. Only Sudan and Ethiopia still export raw 
sesame in any quantity. 
As. regards dura,, the demand for dura based manufactured 
products such as starch, and glucose is increasing at a rapid 
rate because of the expansion of industries such as textiles, 
sweets and fruit canning. Dura grain and plants are in great 
de Lnd as animal concentrates and forage feeds in the expanding 
livestock and poultry industries. Both the industrial and 
agricultural demands for dura are likely to increase. 
10.12 Finance and agricultural credit 
A major complaint of farmers is the lack of institutional 
credit facilities which forces them to money lenders and m, rchants 
for credit. As has been irentioned in Chapter 4 the notorious sheil 
system is spreading all over the country especially into new areas 
when they are open, =id up for agricultural development. This system 
which ensures that farmers sell their crops at a greatly discounted 
price, in turn acts as a major constraint on both production and 
nnr! ceting. 
Institutional credit in the Sudan is only available to those 
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farmers who are credit worthy, mainly by the provision of adequate 
security for loans. The latter stipulation debars both the traditional 
small farmer and the struggling larger mechanised farmer in the 
rainfed dura and sesame production areas. These two categories 
have no other alternative but to resort to sheil. A recent study 
shows that prices received for dura and sesame under the sheil - 
system average about 2/3 of the prices which would have been 
obtained if the crops had been sold at harvest in the nor-al way. 
Harvest time already is the period of the seasonal low in crop prices. 
So under sheil farmers tend to get a discount on the seasonal low 
price. Such a situation acts both as a disincentive and starves 
the farmer of capital which he could use to improve both the 
quantity a-Jtd quality of his produce. 
Successive Sudanese governments have been well aware of the 
constraints of the sheil system. Marketing and credit co-operatives 
have been tried but their record is very discouraging. One institution 
however has survived, this is the Agricultural Bank of the Sudan 
(ABS) and its activities will be discussed in the next paragraph. 
ABS besides being a credit institution is also concerned in 
marketing. It was established in 1959 and had at first as its 
major objective, the financing of cotton schemes. This accounted for 
nearly 60 percent of the total credit advanced by the ABS during 
its 
earlier years. After the government nationalised the private cotton 
schemes in 1970 the ABS was instructed to cut down its loans 
to the 
rest of'the private cotton sector. The bank first got involved 
in 
the financing of irechanised rainfed dura and sesau-: e production 
in 
1960 when it was instructed by the government to move 
into the 
Gedaref area and prevent a major cash flow problem halting 
the 
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harvesting of the current crops (see page 93 ). From this date the 
bank has played an active role in both the production and marketing 
sides of the mechanised farming sector. 
On the production side the bank provides medium term loans (up 
to five years) for land clearance and machinery purchase. Short term 
loans (for a maximum period of 15 months) are granted to meet the 
farmers' production, harvesting and marketing expenditure while the 
long term loans which are for the maximum period of 10 years, are 
granted on projects which bring returns on capital after a long 
period of time. Short term loans are advanced at an interest rate of 
7 percent per annum while other loans pay 9 per cent per annum. 
Farmers availing themselves of short term credit facilities are 
' : iupposed to deliver their crops to the bank stores at harvest. The 
bank either sells the crop directly and then deducts the loans from the 
proceeds or will store the crop at a charge until prices rise, and then 
it sells the crop, retaining whatever is due and pays over the balance 
to the borrower. Farmers resent these charges and many have little 
scruples about cheating when they can. This usually takes the form 
of the non delivery of the entire crop to the bank stores. The bank 
in order to monitor the size of the farmers' crop5has now started to 
harvest borrowers' crops with its own combines, operated in the areas 
of its branches. The writer is of the opinion that this is only a 
partial solution to the problem since some big farn; ers will bribe 
the combine crews. 
Table 10.3 gives 
details of the short term, ivedium and long term 
loans dispensed by the ABS for 1971-1075. It will be noted that the 
ntiount s of short term loans rise ranidly (luring the short pcrio(l, 
Navin? broadly , iwu1runledl I etween 1U71-1U75, partly as a re , ult of 
. 
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inflation and partly because of the rapid spread of the mechanised 
farming sector into new areas. The amount advanced for medium and 
long term loans however are Irore erratic from year to year. 
Table 10.3 
Year 
1971 
1975 
1973 
1974 
1975 
Source: 
The Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
Loan A disbursed during 1971 to 1975 
Short--term loans 
LS 
1,228,909 
1,775,233 
292139951 
3,031,346 
5,007,447 
Medium & long-term loans 
LS 
19 227 9 815 
544,492 
21,176,948 
761,058 
2,7159166 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
Table 10.4 gives the detailed break-down according to the 
regional offices of the ABS of short, medium and long, -term loans 
advanced in 1975. It will be noted as far as -. short-term loan5'ci* 
concerned the Gedaref and Sennar offices are responsible for 
approximately half the total. The Sennar office administer loans to 
the Damazine area which together with Gedaref are the major 
mechanised dura and sesame production regions. With rnediurr-term loans 
the high fib res retained by Sennar and Kosti are partly due to new 
mechanised farming developments at Dgmazine and Renk respectively. 
Detailed examination of the ABS records of 1975 show that the great 
majority of loan applications were successful. 
0 
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Table 10.4 
Branches 
Atbara 
Dilling 
Dongo la 
Gedaref 
Khartoum 
North 
Kosti 
medani 
New Halfa 
Sennar 
Shendi 
Za1ingi 
Headquarters 
Total 
The Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
Amount of loans advanced durino 1975 
Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
loans loans loans 
Us LýS. LS 
434,509 48,535 6,327 
375,258 109,277 - 
29,494 74,394 603 
1,221,410 262,369 - 
96,569 
677,143 
72,754 
248,826 
1,299,308 
139,519 
18,264 
394,390 
5,007,444 
129,895 
672,804 
523,329 
83,711 
751,709 
31,552 
12,574 
2,700,149 
6,356 
1,731 
15,017 
Source: Agricultural Bank of SLidan 
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The ABS is supposed to give priority to loan applications from 
co-operative societies. The rate of interest charged on such loans 
is one percent below that charged to other borrowers. From January 
1971 to July 1976 nearly LS 2 million were lent to 110 co-operatives 
societies. Approximately a third of these were situated in the 
rainfed mechanised farming areas. A high proportion of the money 
lent to mechanised farming co-operatives must have been lost since 
the majority of the societies had collapsed by 1977, through lack of 
support by members -rho were largely absentees, production difficulties & 
bad management. The ABS has not published statistics relating to the 
defaulting rate of co-operatives. 
Table 10.5 gives a summary of short, medium and long-term loans 
outstanding as of 31 December 1975. It will be seen that the amounts 
involved exceeded LS 8 million. Detailed examination of the records 
suggest that some of this money has been overdue for a long time. 
For example the sums shown under the heading of headquarters in the 
table refers mainly to the bad debts carried over from the old private 
pump schemes. which were nationalised in 1970. Similarly the large 
total shown for Atbara refers to pump irrigation schemes. 
One of the major cotton schemes near Atbara was the Zedab scheme 
and perhaps some of the outstanding debts refer to this scheme. 
Similarly Dongola and Shendi also in the Sahara Desert had private cotton 
schemes and accumulated debts could well refer to some of these. 
Given that private cotton schemes have been nationalised, it is unlikely 
that these debts will be recovered. Another area with largely outstanding 
''Atbara is in the Sahara Desert and the only agriculture possible is 
that irrigated from the Nile. 
0 
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Table 10.5 Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
Short, Medium and Long-term loans outstanding at 
31 December 1975 
Branches Short-term Medium-term Long-term 
LS. L -S' LS . -. 
Atbara 1 , 319,058 25,728 40,630 
Dilling 152,864 164,120 - 
Dongola 27,440 80,671 106,637 
Cedaref 659,733 229,849 - 
Khartoum 305,327 442,999 - 
Kosti 3332397 701 , 818 - 
Medani 51,557 637,875 - 
New Halfa 410,585 85,818 - 
Sinnar 787,575 673,082 - 
Shendi 202,837 125,556 55,726 
Zalingi 14,272 56,802 11,054 
Headquarters 638,594 17,781 12,855 
Total 4,903,239 3,242,099 226,902 
Grand Total all loans = 8,372,240. 
Source: Agricultural Bank of Sudan 
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debts is New Half a., where di? f iculties have been encountered in the 
development of the major scheme at Kheshm El Girba. It is again 
probable that most of this money is lost. The outstanding debts of 
the mechanised farming sector are covered by the returns from Gedaref, 
Dilling and Sennar off ices. 
Another activity of the ABS which is said to he run profitably 
is the importation of agricultural machinery and agricultural inputs 
like fertilizers, insecticides and Wicks and selling these to farmers 
on a hireepurchase basis. The decision for the ABS to enter the 
agricultural input trade was taken on the ground of costs saving. 
The authorities felt that by doing so the ABS would save paying a high 
margin charge to importers. It would seem however from the prices 
charged to farmers by the bank that this cost saving was not passed to 
farmers. 
It is worth mentioning that the traditional farmers who account 
for over 50 percent of the cultivated area aie scattered over all the 
country, the ABS has not been able to reach them. This is partly because 
of lack of infrastructure and partly because the bank is gcossly 
understaffed. If ABS is to succeed it needs to be strengthened with 
both financial and technical assistance. This will help it to meet the 
, 
demand for credit for farmers during the next six years plan when 
large scale agricultural developments are expected to be started. 
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CHAPTER T1 
Summary and Conclusions 
11.1 Area, r, roduction and average yield for dura and sesame 
The study shows there has been great increase in the area 
and production of dura and sesame during the last two decades. These 
increases are mainly due to the opening up of new areas in the Central 
:; ainlands for the mechanised production of dura and sesame. Unfortunately, 
after the initial euphoria* these developments proved very 
disappointing and the financial viability of the whole mechanised 
farming sector is in doubt. The trouble is twofold, crop yields 
fall quickly of ter the first three years of cultivation and secondly 
the input/output price ratios are deteriorating rapidly due to 
inflation and the prices of inputs which are not compensated for by 
similar rises in produce prices. 
The input/output price relationships are beyond the control of 
Producers and are largely beyond the control of the country itself. 
Rising costs of oil and machinery are world wide phenomena while the 
very precarious state of the Sudan balance of payments which leads to 
import licencing and local scarcities does not help producers who 
often resort to the high price black market to obtain essential fuel 
and spare parts. 
Crop yields however are more under the control of farmers, 
research and extension workers in the Sudan itself. Unfortunately 
crop yields have been disappointing. The explanations given range from 
'Sudanese politicians were claiming that the Sudan was the potential 
bread-basket of Africa and Middle East. 
0 
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bad farming practices) and . frequent droughts resulting from climatic 
changes to the exhaustion of the humus of the soil. ' The need 
to raise crop yields was recognised by the World Bank who granted a 
loan of $16 million in 1978 to carry out adaptive trials to test 
possible new farming systems and machinery. Money was also included 
in that loan for other research and for the strengthening of the 
extension services. ** The problem however is that by the time new farming 
systems have been tested and found to be technically and economically 
Feasible, and then the new practices adopted by the great majority 
of Farmers, many years w; LL have elapsed and in the meantime given 
the continuation of the present unfavourable situation, many farmers 
will have given up. Consequently the remaining producers will be hard 
put to meet the growing demands for dura and sesame from the growing 
population, let alone providing a surplus for export. Only one 
redeeming feature as regards the farmers9 interest can be seen. Growing 
internal shortages will force up farmgate prices, provided that the 
Sudan does not resort to importing more grains to meet its internal 
deficiencies. Given the present chronic shortage of foreign exchange, 
this does not seem very likely. The Government however is coming under 
increasing public criticism because of the escalating cost of living. 
11.2 Cost of production of dura and sesame 
Costsof production of both dura and sesame are increasing rapidly 
and the figures quoted in Table 2.4 and 2.5 for dura and Table 6.5 and 
*See Table 2.1 for the area, production and average yield of dura for 
1952-1975 and Table 6.1 for area, production and average yield of sesame 
for the same years, 
*Announcement in the press. 
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I 
6.6 for sesame are now out of date. The latest* prices available 
at the time of writing show that in the Damazine district there 
is an overall increase in input costs of 24 percent between 
December 1976 and December 1977, while the prices for dura and 
sesame increased only by 6 percent. The term of trade continue 
to move against the farmers, a tendency which must eventually 
be halted by growing internal shortages of dura and sesame. 
The de: 1and for dura is rising because of the natural 
growth of the ponulation9 growing urbanization and the influx 
of nearly one million refugees from Eritria. Dura is the staple 
grain of the country and it is unlikely in periods whet 
real per capita incomes are not rising, that there will be . any 
major switch from dura to the higher priced and largely imported 
wheat and rice. Sudan is already a net importer of grains and 
, given the continuance of the precarious balance of payments 
position, no major imports of grains are likely. Consequently 
given all this, prices of dura should rise in the Sudan. 
The saue argument applies to a lesser extent to sesame. To 
a lesser extent because other vegetable oils notably groundnut can 
be substituted. The prospects of internal shortage does not hold out an 
1 December 1977 is the last harvest period at the time of writing. 
Given the depres.. ed state of Sudan's econoncy real per capita 
incomes are unlikely to rise in the immediate future. 
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optimistic outlook for export. . 
The writer's opinion on export 
surplus requires first the solution of the problem of falling crop 
yields for both dura and sesame, hence priority 
given to this factor. 
11.3 Marketing cost for dura and sesame 
should be 
The costs of marketing for dura have increased faster than the 
Parmgate prices received by the producers: This is shown by 
comparison given in Table 3.6 inhere the F. C. B. price per ton at Port 
Sudan had increased by an average Ls. 16.6 between 1970/73 and 
1974. This increase is largely due to rises in transport, 
storage and handling costs, which have continued to rise since 1974. 
Increases in Ushur and Gibana and other taxes have also added to 
costs. 
Similarly the marketing costs OF sesame have also gone up (see 
Tables 7.2 and 7.3). For example railway freight charges rose from 
LS. 6.72 per ton in 1973 to LS. 16.25 per ton in 197576, and the 
rates continue to rise. 
`fie ý, t cj sacks which are used for both dura and sesame haS ~ risen 
from LS 2.67 per 11 sacks In 1973 to LS. 4.39 in 1975/76, a 64 
percent rise. In December 1977 farmers at Gedaref claimed that there 
was a shortage of sacks due to restrictions on imports to save foreign 
'For more details about tha cost of production for dura and sesame 
see Appendices 87,08,89,810,811,912 for dura and Appendices E8, 
E9, E10, Ell, E12 for sesame. 
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exchange. Consequently a black market had developed. Farmers 
also complained that the costs of hiring lorries to deliver the 
inputs to the farms and take away the outputs, had doubled in 
the last few years. In fact they claimed that 25 percent 
of their total costs were accounted for transport charges. 
At the time of writing (September 1978) a chronic shortage 
of petrol and diesel oil in Gedaref has led to further major 
increases in the costs of transport, since many contractors 
are forced to obtain supplies from the black market where petrol 
is said to be L. -S. 
2.50 a gallon. In other words inflation in 
costs has affected marketing as well as production:. 
11.4 Wholesalers of dura and sesame 
There are only five big wholesalers of dura in the Gedaref 
region. It will be seen of the wholesalers who handled over 
50 thousand sacks a year of dura, three handled over 
500 thousand and accounting for 87 percent of the total 
handled. The largest merchants obtained their supply 
mainly from the auction market in Gedaref and also 
Evidence submitted by GedarEf Farmer's Union to a 'World 
Bank Mission. 
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on a very limited scale from the actual producer mainly those from 
mechanised crop schemes. It is interesting to know that all the 
large merchants of dura have their own schemes and naturally market 
their crop together with the produce of their relatives and friends. 
The writer found the larger wholesalers who are in a better financial 
positionjheld on to the grain for a longer period of time than did the 
smaller wholesalers. The small wholesalers resold their grain often after 
a week or two. 
For the sesame crop the writer found just over 8 percent of the 
merchants purchased 40 percent of the total produce sold. The eight 
merchants sold mainly to the Oilseeds Company at Port Sudan. The 
88 smaller merchants were responsible for about 60 percent of the 
quantity and either bought to resell to the Oilseeds Company or for 
the modern oil mills throughout the country. (See Lorenz curve 
Chapter 8 page 205) 
As has been mentioned earlier that wholesalers provide credits 
to both producers and retailers who cannot obtain credit% on much 
cheaper terms from Banks. The former include both 
the small producers who cannot provide adequate security and the large 
farmers who because of falling yields and escalating costs have defaulted 
in part or full on their previous loans.: This latter category is 
increasing rapidly and many of these have had to use sheil. The 
consequence of all this is that ABS is losing money, the farmers are 
incurring heavy disguised interest charges which add further to their 
financial predicament. and must hasten the time when they are forced out 
of business unless some dramatic improvement occurs in the level of 
returns. 
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The sheil price is in reality a discounted version of the 
estimated wholesale price at the time of the next harvest. The 
estimated base, the next harvest wholesale price)is of course very 
conservative and unlikely to include any allowances for expected 
major price rises, in other words it is based on past experience 
I 
rather than anticipated Future levels. The wholesalers haveavested 
interest in underpaying farmers especially in the time of inflation. 
The farmer usually is in a bad bargaining position as he needs the 
money urgently for weeding and harvesting his crop. Consequently 
the wholesale prices cannot be equated with Farmgate prices uuhere 
the sheil system is in operation. In Damazine in 1977 this discount 
amounted to 1/3 of the harvest price. 
With this caveat a short summary now follows about fluctuations 
in wholesale prices. These vary between years, between months in 
the same crop year in a particular market (temporal variations) and 
between markets at the same point of time (spatial variations). 
The writer's statistical analysis is described in Chapter 4 for 
dura. The conclusions reached suggest that for particular markets 
there was a significant relationship between time and wholesale prices, 
but the differences between spatial prices were greater than the costs 
of transport between the low and high price markets. Also the 
differences between wholesale prices at different points of time at 
the same crop year appear to be greater than the costs of storage. 
These temporal and spatial factors indicate imperfections in the 
marketing system. In that dura is under the control of the private 
sector and that one exporting company is responsible for the great 
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bulk of the country's exports, suggests the presence of a marketing 
system where collusion is feasible and greatly to the interest of the 
wholesalers concerned. As has been mentioned earlier -= -. a few large 
GedareP merchants dominate the internal'-dura trade and have an incentive 
I 
to increase profits by collusion `,., and are all xelI known to one 
another socially and in some cases are related. There is a little 
doubt that in the past these merchants did very well financially. 
Some of their private fortun-.. 9 , are said to exceed LS one million f 
The marketing of sesame is organised by the parastatal Sudan 
Oilseeds Company. A floor price is fixed which up to 1977 was alleged 
by farmers to be a maximum price, in that prices seldom went over this 
level. The producers sold to private merchants usually by auction 
and the merchants in turn delivered the crop to the Oilseed4 Company 
warehouses in Port Sudan if it was for export, otherwise it was sold to 
oil pressers in the Sudan. By 1978 local shortages of vegetable oils 
led to auction market prices exceeding the minimum floor prices on a 
significant scale. ** 
11.5 Exports of dura and sesame 
The total exports of Jura from the Sudan fluctuate widely from 
year to year mainly due to the amount of dura available inside Sudan 
for export. *** Usually when grain stocks are low, the Sudan Government 
*Reported to the writer by the manager of a commercial bank in Cedaref. 
"The writer is indebted to a member of a leading wholesale family for 
this current information. 
***See Table 5.8 and Figure 5.1 
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will move in to safeguard internal food supplies by banning exports. 
An export ban was in operation during the writer's visit to Gedaref 1975. 
This was lifted in December 1975 during the writer's stay, much to the 
relief of local merchants. Exports were allowed then until June 1977 
whir. another ban was imposed which is still in operation in September 
1978. All these regulations of course applied to the official trade cttRou$k 
smuggling is said to continue, but made more difficult because of the 
Civil War in Ethiopia. These bans are resented both by the farmers who 
blame the low farmgate prices partly on government interference and by 
the merchants who find it difficult to operate under these "stop go 
conditions", which inhibit the f ulfilmehtof contracts. The latest 
available U. N. trade statistic(1975)shows that, the Sudan was then the 
largest exporter of sorghum in the world, a position which has now been 
lost and others have moved in to exploit the vacuitm. 
The Sudan OilseedsCompany has the complete monopoly of exporting 
sesame. The buying policy of the Company has been described in Chapter 7 
where a critique was made of the company's operations. Its inefficiency 
was considered to be a factor which both added to the costs of marketing 
and detracted from the prices received in the world market. This unhappy 
position partly rose from the inexplicable delays in shipping sesar.; e from 
Port Sudan, delays which resulted in increased storage and bank charges 
on the one hand and the imposition of penalty clauses in export contracts 
for failure to meet deadline date . Since the Sudan is the largest 
exporter of sesame in the world, these inefficiencies are a serious matter 
in the very competitive environments of international marketing. The 
fact that the second largest supplier Ethiopia was and continues to be 
*For example sorghum production in the Argentine has been expanding rapidly 
and in 1978 the exports of sorghum to Japan (a former customer of the Sudan) 
were said to be running over two million metric tons. 
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to the throes of a civil war has probably saved the `3udan's position as 
the leading sesame exporter. 
Beside exporting sesame seed the Sudan exports sesame oil so 
benefiting from the value added to the raw material by processine. The 
writer's analysis shows that there is an upward trend to substitute oil 
exports for those of sesame, unlike the raw material the export of 
sesame oil is in the hand of the private sector. The by-productg of 
local oil pressinjg sesame oil cakes and meals are also exported in 
small quantities. 
* 
11.6 Illegal marketing of dura and sesame 
Illegal marketing covers the evasion of local produce taxes, 
export duties and in the case of dura exporting when a ban is in 
operation. In the case of sesame illegal marketing could cover Paying 
the producer bo1ow the minirni,, floor price and e xportiitg the crop by 
means other than the monopoly of the Sudan CilseeaCompany. 
Farmers resent ha-ring to pay produce taxas especially when 
they are doing badly. Local produce taxes go to the local councils who 
like other government bodies in the Sudan are desperately short of 
money to meet the aspirations of the local people as regards education, 
health, clean water and other facilities. Consequently local authorities 
tend to be unmoved by the Farriers Union's pleas about possible tax 
reductions while the farmers in their turn grumble about the 
facilities provided by the local councils in general and 
the state 
of the roads in particular. 
'k See Table 9.6 and Figure 9.5 for sesame seed exports from the 
Sudan 
also see Table 9.7 and Figure 9.8 for exports of sesame oil 
from 
the Sudan. 
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Farmers therefore have . little scruples about evading taxes 
and the local authorities have little sympathy for the farming 
community. The situation has developed rather into a battle of wits 
between the farmer and the tax collector. Since the local authorities 
suffer from a chronic cash shortage they are unable to employ enough 
personnel to control the situation and these personnel who they do , 
employ faced by low salaries and rising living costs are subject to 
corruption. Consequently it woulc$ seem that the farmers especially 
the large successful farmers are in a position to avoid the full 
rigors of the taxation system. 
voluntary element. 
For them taxation has a strong 
Another feature demonstrating the lack of effective control on 
the part of the authorities is the smuggling trade which at present 
is of diminishing importance not because of any improved control 
measures on the part of the Sudanese authorities, but because of the 
civil war in Ethiopia. Even then however some of the large operators 
in the smuggling trade have succeeded in "incentive payments" to the 
border guards of both sides to keep the trade going. 
Illegal movements of grain both to avoid local taxation and 
for 
smuggling to Ethiopia, is normally done at night in lorries hired by 
the merchants. Roadblocks set up by the police or army are easily evaded 
and in the comparatively rare occasions when a lorry 
is caught, bribes 
can help evade conviction. When the writer was doing his fieldwork 
in Gedaref he heard several accounts of smuggling exploits. 
In 
Damazine he met the son of a former police superintendant at 
Gedaref 
who also supplied him with information about the extent of 
the smuggling 
trade, and the inability of the authorities 
both in the Condominiumard 
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in the independence period to cope with the situation. 
The reason for the smuggling trade in that dura and sesame prices 
are higher in the Ethiooian side of the border than on the Sudanese 
side. There is also a lucrative returns cargo in the form of these 
commodities which may be in short supply in the Sudan and also easily 
transportable. As far as producers are concerned the existence of 
the widescale smuggling trade helps to keep up farmgate prices. 
11.? Co-operative marketing in Gedarer and Damazine 
Co-operativesare often advocated as a possible solution to farmers 
marketing problems. In the Central Itainlands of the Sudan co-operatives 
were started for marketing and other societies for production. 
Unfortunately these have largely collapsed after a few years of 
operation, due mainly to " inefficiency and the lack of loyalty öf 
their members. If they are more efficient perhaps the members might 
support them better. Like other organisations the ministry of 
Co-operatives lacks sufficient money to supervise the societies effectively. 
11.8 marketing services 
Transport, storage, grading purchasing and financing are all 
inadequate throughout the Sudan. For example lack of transport is the 
main constraint in the free flow of goods between surplus regions and 
results in high prices in the deficit regions and depressed prices in the 
surplus regions. The poor transport facilities result 
in the partial 
isolation of farmers from markets and one region of the 
Sudan from 
another especially in the rainy season when most of 
the roads are 
impassstble. Allied to the poor transport infrastructure the equally 
defective teleohones and mail systems. It is difficult in the 
light 
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of all this for merchants to obtain precise information on the current 
market position in different parts of the country let alone move 
produce quickly from low price to high price areas - one of the basic 
requirements of a competitive market. In fact if a merchant hears 
that prices are far lower in a particular town compared to another, 
and decides to move produce, he faces the high risk that his consign-- 
ment will be delayed by transport bottlenecks so that by the time the 
consignment arrives, the prices may have fallen. This situation 
further discourages the free movement of goods. 
The same difficulties of conrunication prevent farmers from 
gaining an adequate knowledge of present market conditions and 
possible future trends. Consequently being conservative they continue 
to sow similar areas of the same crops year after year. 
« Because of 
cash flow problems they also tend to sell the crops at the same 
time every year, directly at harvest. 
Storage facilities on the farm are very limited since in the 
past and doubtless in the foreseable future; farmers because of 
shortage of money sell their crops immediately at harvest retaining 
only the proportion needed for next year's seed and a few sacks for 
home consumption. -* 
At the wholesale level the usual practice is to store in sacks 
either in fenced open yards or in pits in the ground or occasionally 
-E Examination of farmer's cropping records in both the Gedaref and 
Damazine show that farmers) crop rotations remained very constant 
from year to year despite changes in market prices. Variations in 
the farm area sown to dura and sesame respectively were due to 
climatic conditions rather than price f+)uctuations. Very few farmers 
ever attempted a new crop. 
A* This study has been concerned with '; he larger farmers who operated 
commercially and provide the great bulk of the dura and sesame sold 
both for internal use and export. 
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in sheds or warehouses. Because of the long dry season it is 
possible to keep grain and oilseeds in the open for several months 
after harvest. The crops of course must be housed before the next 
rainy season starts. 
Specialised storage facilities largely belong to the ABS which 
owns two large silos together with warehouses in the major production 
areas, and the major port of the country. Because of high storage 
costs (beside the actual charge, loss of weight occurs through dehydration) 
these stores are largely under-utilized and on the silos alone the 
ABS has a total accumulative deficit of over LS 1 .2 million at the 
time of the writer's fieldwork. 
Cleaning is another marketing function which tends to be neglccted. 
In the export market the Sudan suffers from a poor reputation for 
quality compared with some of its competitors a reputation which 
discounts the values of good samples. Dura is sold according to 
variety and not the quality of the consignment. Sesame for export is 
subject to more sophisticated grading regulatiors but these are 
not effectively enforced. The deficiencies in grading handicap the 
marketing of the produce overseas. Foreign traders prefer to buy 
according to recognised grades (without inspecting each consignment). 
Consequently they would rather buy from a country with an effective 
grading system and if they buy from Sudan they would tend to pay less in 
order to cover the risks of low quality. 
Credit is a major constraint both as regards enabling farmers 
to increase crop. yields by adopting better farming practices and also 
lack of credit forces, them to sell at the most disadvantageous time of 
the year directly at harvest. Hence unit cost of production 
tend to 
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be higher than they would have otherwise been, and the prices obtained 
lower. The larger commercially oriented farmers could obtain credit 
from ABS provided they have not defaulted on previous loans. Many 
had5 ýý so had, to resort together with the smaller farmers to the 
notorious sheil system, with a consequence that the prices they received 
were at the time of the writer's fieldwork, around 2/3 of the prices 
prevailing at harvest time. 
The ABS charges a higher rate of interest than the commercial 
banks who normally were reluctant to lend to agricultural producers 
unless they have adequate security and few have. The ABS was 
established to help remedy the problem, but as Chapter 10 shows the 
bank has accumulated large losses over the years mainly as a result of 
defaulting debtors and the unprofitable operations of its storage 
activities. The ABS is in urgent need of fresh capital in order to 
maintain its present scale of operations let alone expand. 
The Commercial banks however finance the larger merchants, all of 
whom have adequate security usually in the form of urban properties. 
In fact a Gedaref bank manager told the writer that he would lend 
large 
sums to particular merchants at a day or so notice because he knew then 
personally and was fully aware of their financial standing and business 
reputation. Consequently he has no fear of not getting his money 
back. 
The large merchant therefore had adequate access to capital and 
his 
borrowing facilities were very flexible, so he was able to come 
to 
quick decisions regarding the operation of his business 
transactions. 
In the writer's opinion if the communications systems 
in the Sudan 
were more satisfactory, many of these merchants would 
be quick to take 
the opportunities öf moving produce from low to 
high price areas and 
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so improving the competitiveness of the market. 
The large merchants advantage as regards access to capital as 
opposed to the farmer's disadvantages in this respect, puts the 
wholesaler in a stronger bargaining position than the producer. The 
merchants are well aware of this and quite naturally make the most 
of their bargaining strength. The fact that the Gedaref area as far 
as marketing is concerned is dominated by a small group of merchants 
(all interviewed by the writer) meant that the conditions for 
collusion are present and there is little doubt that the merchants 
exploited the situation, and imperfect competition resulted. 
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11.9 The relative efficiency of the Private and Public Sectors. 
The present studies give a good comparison of marketing 
efficiency between the private and public sectors. The fact 
that dura is handled by the private and sesame by the public 
arises from political rather than economic decisions. Sesame 
and other oilseeds were in the past le rgely in the hands of 
three companies (see chapter 7 page '173) w ., o were nationalised 
by the Government in 1970. This action dislocated the system 
at the time and further re-organisation was necessary 
when the parastatal Oilseeds Company was established. The 
effects of all these changes are still being felt and have had 
a depressing influence on the efficiency of sesame marketing. 
In the past large private entrepreneurs played a vital role 
in the development of the Sudan's economy. They provided scarce 
risk capital, managerial quality of high efficiency and introduced 
new technologies into the country. The writer is of the opinion 
that this was done at a lower cost to the community than if 
undertaken either directly or indirectly by the state, whether 
under the colonial regime or in the independence era. The large 
profits alleged to be made by the private secto rt are often cited 
as a reason for nationalisation. If in fact the private 
sector made excessive profits .., the surpluses accumulated were 
largely invested inside the Sudan, especially in the growing 
industrial sector - agro industries (oil mills, cotton spinning, 
textiles, fruits and vegetable canning and so on). Other 
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enterprises included import substitution commodities, (tobacco, 
wood products, clothing, leather goods and others). All these 
activities contributed both to foreign exchange earnings and 
foreign exchange savings. The risks on these industrial ventures 
weteborn¢by the private sector and profits where earned were 
subject to company taxation. Consequently the state bore ito 
risks and benefited both from revenue collected in taxes and 
from the contributions to the balance of payments. 
The private sector has another major advantage as regards 
decision making. This is much more flexible because of the 
shorter chain of consultation and command. State enterprise 
all over the world is subject to bureaucratic procedures which 
lead to great delays in decision making. This of course is a 
major constraint on efficiency. Too often parastatal organisations 
are started in a hurry with scant regard to whether they are the 
most appropriate form of organisation- to tackle production and 
marketing problems. The efficient implementation of these 
organisations usually falls below the initial expectations. The 
consequences are that many incur large losses which have to be 
born by the community as a whole. Capital is a very scarce 
commodity in c''eveloping countries, and large scale losses may 
well set back the growth of an economy. At present 
(1978) the 
Sudan is going through a major financial crisis and excess 
government expenditure has been blamed for the situation. 
A 
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moratorium has been imposed on the establishment of new government 
commercial enterprises, following the failure of many major 
projects. 
Dura and sesame production and marketing prove a good example 
of the contrast between the public and private sectors. The state 
farms have incurred massive accumulated losses. The NffU which 
was set up to control and supervise the whole mechanised farming 
sector and in particular to run the State farms, is in a state of 
bankruptcy. A chronic shortage of money constrains its activities 
especially as regards providing technical services to the private 
sector. The result of this in the newer development areas is 
land abandonment after only a decade or so of the initial land 
clearance. Farmers who desert their land easily obtain fresh 
virgin land so practising a system of shifting mechanised 
cultivation which both destroys the eco-system and heightens the 
risk of wind and water erosion. Some alarm has been expressed 
especially after the International Conference - on Desertification - 
at Nairobi in 1977. The Professor of Geography at the University of 
Khartoum xarntdthat the Sudan Government is in danger of turning the 
Central Rainlands into a dustbowl. 
The private sector has been accused of strip mining the soil 
to snatch a quick profit. The Mechanised Farming Corporation 
(MIFC) 
has the legal powers to prevent the exploitation of the soil, 
these 
should be enforced and a strong soil conservation programme operated. 
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Credit also presents an adverse comparison as regards the 
public sector. Before the banking system was nationalised, managers 
were able to use their judgement about who they lent to and could 
grant loans quickly. The main criteria for lending was the business 
reputation of their client, and his repayment record. The 
nationalisation of banking took away much of the decision making 
role of the local manager, and long hureaucratic delays followed 
The State Agricultural Bank which now is the body responsible for 
the agricultural sector is criticised by farmers for delays in granting 
credits which lead to losses of farm output since timeliness is very 
important in farming operations. In addition the Bank has a bad 
record in -recovering loans (about 50 percent of loans advanced are 
said to be overdue in 1977). A formal request has been made to the 
World Bank for a loan to restore the financial position of the 
Agricultural Bank. 
In fact the record of the various parastatal organisations 
concerned with the production aspects of mechanised farming is very 
depressing and large losses have been incurred, while the support 
given to the private sector is not effective. Obviously something 
is radically wrong. In the writer's opinion this is largely due to 
inept management. The private sector could not carry such 'osses 
so in order to survive would have to make drastic improvements to 
managerial efficiency. 
In comparison there is a successful large scale private sector of 
dura and sesame producers in the Gedaref area. In theory a person 
is only supposed to have 1000 to 1500 feddans each, but in practice 
these successful Gedaref operato ; "s have multiple holdings and some 
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farm uip to 25,000 feddans. This practice is considered inequitable, 
but the standards of farming are high and the land is kept in more 
or less permanent cultivation. Hence it would be desirable to 
encourage, not prohibit, successful private farmers expcirrAinytheir 
activities. They would not only make a significant impact on the 
level of output, but also act as unofficial demonstration arms 
which would di. fuse good managerial and technical practices in their 
neighbourhood. 
As regards varketing, the deficiencies of the State enterprises 
are reflected again. The losses on the Gedaref and Port Sudan silos 
add to the financial difficulties of the Agricultural Bank. By the 
year 1975 the outstanding debt-- on silos amounted to Ls 1.2 million. 
- 
Erz ` 
The main reason for the losses is that silos capacities were not 
utilised to the full. In fact the writer wonders why the Bank did 
not make more efforts to attract customers, possibly by reducing 
R 
its charges. Most of the cost of silos -15 fixed, consequently it 
is sensible to secure a high rate of utilisation. Another marketing 
function performed by the Bank is a by-product of its banking 
activities. Farmers in debt are supposed to deliver their crops at 
harvest to the Bank, which sells the crops on their behali'y then 
deducts the money owing together with storage charges and other 
expenses. Farmers complained bitterly about delays in selling and 
in receiving payments. One comn-on complaint is that when sales are 
delayed., the Bank charges storage costs and interest for 
the extra 
period concerned. FarL, ers allege that these delays are 
due to the 
incompetence of the Bank. 
V, 
The Bank is also concerned with the n)arlcei; ing of 
inputs to the 
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agricultural sector. These inputs are farm machinery and spare parts. 
This trading enterprise was the only division of the Bank to operate 
at a profit in 1977, but the Farmer's Union argues that this profit 
is gained as a result of economising on after sale service; the high 
mark up of 25 percent on machinery sales is supposed to cover carrying 
a large range of spare parts, but it is alleged that the 25 percent 
margin largely went to cover the running expenses of the whole 
organisation. It is worth mentioning in this context that when it 
was proposed to transfer the machinery division to another 
organisation, the bank's officials argued that to do so would 
deprive the Bank of a very useful addition to its income, which 
weAlt towards the costs of running its branches and head offices. 
On the other hand farmers found it very difficult to obtain spare 
parts for their machinery,, and output fell as a result of breakdowns 
and delays. A recent World Bank recommendation was that the ABS 
should concentrate on banking activities and give up dealing in 
machinery and spare parts. 
The general impression gained by the writer was that when 
imachinery and spare parts were in the hands of the private banking 
sector., the operation concerned went more smoothly. 
The inadequacies of the public sector are a major constraint 
on transport. Sudan Railways Corporation is ,,, unsuccessful in 
maintaining running schedules and the delays in transportation are 
a major source of complaints. Road transport is 
in private hands 
0 
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and has a much higher reputation for the reliability of its 
services despite the adverse conditions of the roads which impose 
excessive wear and tear on vehicles. The railways have a smooth 
track so giving better service condition than the roads. Yet not 
do 
only? trains fail, to maintain their timetables, but the number 
of engines and wagons out of order at the same time excessively 
high. It is doubtful whether the private road transport sector has 
such a high proportion of vehicles out of order at the same time. 
, sudan Railways has a cash flow problem and is actively seeking 
foreign loans for the purchase of spare parts for locomotives and 
rolling stock. The private road sector on the other hand is said 
to be very profitable and is attracting new entrants including 
several large Arab/Sudanese companies. 
To turn to the actual marketing process the record of the 
parastatal Oilseeds Company is not very impressive. There is 
strong evidence of excessive marketing costs and the profits that 
are made go largely to the Government not in the form of higher 
prices paid to producers. In fact it seems that the producer has to 
bear both the incidence of excessive marketing costs and the 
Government's share of profits. Farm gate prices are lower as a 
consequence and so act as a disincentive to producers. When the 
world prices of sesame increased significantly i: n the primary 
commodities world price boom in the early 1970'sß the Sudanese 
producers did not benefit much. 
Inefficiencies in the sesame marketing process include long 
delays in fulfilling export orders so incurring penalty clauses and 
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excessive interest and storage costs. Examination of the Company's 
accounts show high charges incurred by failure to move crops 
quickly to the export markets. A comuwn excuse given is that 
transport delays on Sudan Railways constrain the fulfilment of 
delivery contracts with the Company's customers. Another 
indication of the inefficiencies of the Company is shown 
by the ability of a rival private firm (Osman Salih Company) to 
deny markets and even on one occasion to secure the bulk of 
Sudanese oilseeds exports and then market them. 
A comparison now follows between State and private marketing 
organisations. Dura marketing is dominated by a few large 
merchants and one firm in particular is responsible for 80 
percent of exports, while at Gedaref a few large merchants were 
responsible for handling a major proportion of the crop (see 
Table 3.2). Taking the figures on page 142 and a F. O. B. world 
price at Port Sudan of LS 70 per m. ton, the distribution margins 
are in the region of 40 percent, a figure which because of its 
magnitude suggests very successful oligopolistic marketing 
practices. A study of the market prices both at Gedaref and F. O. B 
Port Sudan show that the rises in world prices in the period 1973 
have not been passed on to the producer to any marked extent. 
Internally also there are other indications of imperfect competition. 
The spatial and temporal price differences are greater than would be 
expected under conditions of perfect competition. Perhaps the more 
dramatic evidence of this is given by some 1977 figures collected 
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for the World Bank. Producers at Damazine were receiving in the 
region of LS 27.5 per m. ton at harvest time while consumers in 
Khartoum were paying the equivalent of LS 93.5 a m. ton. Assuming 
LS 6 for transport cost, the distribution margins are approximately 
LS 60 a m. ton; a profit margin of nearly 180 percent. This great 
profit resulted from a severe shortage of grain in Khartoum, partly 
because of a misjudgement of the size of the harvest and ptL rtly 
because of transport bottlenecks. When the writer revisited 
Khartoum in 1979, the retail price of dura was still high and-grain 
was in short supply. Given these facts by which the private sector 
through oligopoly reaped excessive profits, it might be expected 
that the state with a monopoly organisation would do better if it 
wished to acquire a large profit from marketing. 
From trade statistics and the profits and trading accounts 
of the Sudan Oilseeds Company, it is possible to gain some impression 
of underpayments of sesame producers. Taking a producer price of 
LS 107 per m. ton, (see Table 7.4). it ui ll be seen from the same 
ev. 7 Table that costs of distribution excluding taxis amounted to LS 71 
a in. ton. This however includes LS 41 approximately, for cost at 
Port Sudan, caused largely by delays in shipping so incurring 
additional storage charges. Against this must be set' the very 
low charge of LS 4 per in. ton for dura incurred at Port Sudan. 
0 
This would suggest that the private sector moves its produce quickly 
to overseas markets. 
Another indication of inefficiency is given by the comparison 
of export prices given in Table 9.6 and the corresponding import 
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prices in Europe. The export prices 
and the import prices in Table 9.17. 
are given in Table 9.6 
It will be noted that 
there is a considerable gap between the F. O. B. price Port Sudan 
and the C. I. F. price Western Europe. A gap which to the writer 
widens very significantly after the nationalisation of oilseeds 
exports in 1970. By 1975 the export price of Sudanese sesame 
F. O. B. Port Sudan was LS 215 while the import price in W. Europe 
was LS 323 a very wide margin which must exceed its transfer 
costs. Some of the margins are due to penalty ctrtuses and the 
Writer suspects that often the officials responsible for the sale 
of the crop are fully aware of market possibilities. 
iw '; tom 
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The gap between 
the export and import price is approximately LS 108, assuming 
that transport and insurance to Europe cannot account for a third 
of this, then the loss to the Sudan is considerable. Finally it 
is necessary to make an estimate of the excessive costs incurred 
by the Oilseeds Marketing Company in terms of the costs to the 
producer reflected in lower farm gate prices. Taking a farmgate 
price of LS 107 and taking only conservative allowances for extra 
storage costs incurred at Port Sudan and a los ,, 3 of potential prices 
to bs earned in Europe, this would have amounted to LS 56 a m. tons. 
fF The gap between F. O. B. Port Sudan and-C. I. F. Western Europe is 
approximately I3108 a in. ton on the figure given on the Table, 
assuming that of this represents C. I. F. charges, th: -n the 
remaining one third is assumed to be accounted for in di ff rence 
in compiling the trade statistics and the residual one third is 
then as: iumed to, originate from the inefficiency of the Sudan 
Oil sects Company. To this is then added LS 20 a m. ton the 
approximately I the access storage costs at the Port caused 
by 
delays in forwarding. 
i 
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As regards dura it has been seen that the profits of the 
marketing system estimated at LS 24 a m. ton 'rcre only slightly 
smaller than LS 30 per m. ton received by the producer while 
the actual costs of marketing were considerably smaller at LS 16 
a in. ton. Consequently it could be argued from these figures that 
the private sector performed the actual marketing process at not 
too great a cost but that profits were excessively high. Assuming 
that the profits were cut by half, this would have allowed another 
LS 12 a m. ton to the producer giving a farmgate price of LS 42 
a m. ton. This represents a loss of 40 percent over the sale price 
he would have otherwise, given these assumptions. 
The interesting point is that if the producer had received 
the higher prices estimated for Jura and sesame, the whole 
mechanised farming in the Sudan would be in a much healthier 
financial position. Part of this plight can obviously be blamed 
on marketing. The private sector has exploited the producer by 
excessive profit, but it would seem that nationalisation has made 
the situation worse as regards the underpayment of producers since 
they have now to bear the heavy costs of the parastatal companies' 
inefficiencies. With both private oligopoly and state monopoly 
the producer loses and his consequent loss in incentives threatens 
the economy of the country. Competition in marketing is perhaps 
the answer both as regards the reduction in costs and profit margins. 
0 
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Appendix Al 
Cotton: Area, Production and Average Yield by Production Centres and 
by Varieties 
Final Estimates 1975/76 & Provisional 1976/77 
Production/ Type of 
Centre Cotton 
Area Prod. Aver. Area Prod. Aver. 
(Fed. ) M. T. yield (Fed. ) M. T. yield 
Kg/F Kg/f 
Gezira & Egyptian 380,711 148,096 389 484,893 250,000 517 
Marsagil 
Kosti 82,742 35,082 424 67,475 23,000 341 
E. Duiem ýý 44,103 12,481 283 26,610 12,000 451 
Blue Nile 88,786 42,608 480 70,334 37,000 526 
Private Pump " 
Scheme White Nile) 6,145 2,609 425 10,000 5,000 500 
Upper Nile it 20,000 3,380 169 21,000 7,000 333 
TOTAL (A) E gyptian 622,469 2L[4,256 392 680,312 334,000 491 
New Halfa Acala 81,290 20,322 250 109,105 56,000 513 
Tokar " 64,199 10,400 162 11,700 350 30 
Gash " - - - 13,142 3,000 228 
surd " 37,000 22,237 601 38,510 36,000 935 
Guneid " 14,914 6,338 425 15,000 7,000 467 
Zeitlab 6,616 3,868 603 6,616 3,650 552 
TOTAL (B) Acala 204,019 63,165 310 194,073 106,000 546 
Nuba Mountains American, 118,837 18,657 157 115,660 16,000 138 
Kassala (Gedaref) "- 15,000 2,025 135 14,000 4,000 286 
Blue Nile " 11,184 1,510 135 10,475 2,000 191 
South Kordofan " 3,326 665 200 3,000 300 100 
Equatoria 16,000 1,760 110 12,000 1,500 125 
TOTAL (C) American 164,347 24,617 150 155,135 23,800 153 
Grand Total All 
(A+B+C) Varieties 990,835 332,038 335 1,029,529 463,000 442 
Notes: Egyptian and Acala types are grown under irrigation except in Tokar and Gash, where Acala is grown on flooded land. American cotton is all 
rainfed. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics, Khartoum, 
Sudan. 
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Appendix A2 
Sorghum (Duna): Area, Production & Average Yield 
1975/76_ (Final & 1976/77 (Provisional) 
Production 
A 
-I--- 
1975/76 1976/77 
Lenzre Av. Ave 
Area Prod. 
. 
Yield Area Prod. Yield 
(f eddan) (m. T. ) (kg/Pd) (feddan) (m. T) (Kg/Pd) 
Northern Province 18,499 84,170 455 15,000 6,000 460 
Nile Province 68,664 30,512 444 25,000 10,000 400 
Khartoum Province 7.9510 1,126 150 109000 2,000 200 
Gedaref (Mechn. ) 2,000,000 706,000 352 1,910,000 522,000 273 
Cash 50,000 12,500 250 19,000 4,000 211 
Toker 28,000 80456 302 4,000 600 150 
Gezira & manegil 341,257 204,754 600 324,000 174,000 542 
Gezira (trad. ) 90,000 22,500 250 70,000 16,000 229 
Blue Nile (trad. ) 535,000 105,400 310 300,000 72,000 240 
Blue Nile (mech. ) 499,361 153,803 308 524,000 180,000 344 
Blue Nile (irrig. ) 56,046 12,442 222 48,000 8,000 167 
White Nile (trad. ) 288,000 86,400 300 180,000 45,000 250 
White Nile (mech. ) 51,020 32,467 636 140,000 42,000 300 
Duiem (irrig. ) 46,416 10,258 221 21 , 000 44,000 190 
Konti (irrig. ) 21 , 060 3,180 151 9,000 1,400 155 
South Kordofan (mech. )182,440 69,330 380 193,000 86,000 445 
South Kordofan (trad. )376,351 101,614 270 356,000 130,000 365 
North Kordofan (trad. )328,869 53,960 164 631,9000 91,000 144 
South Darfur (mechn. ) 5,700 695 120 7,000 800 114 
South Darfur (trad. ) 338,150 88p940 263 3009000 900000 300 
North Daff ur (trad. ) 54j, 500 11 , 556 212 12,000 49020 190 
Upper Nile (mech. ) 316p805 135,788 428 258,000 , 
84,000 326 
Upper Nile (trad. ) 200,000 42,000 210 175,000 30,000 171 
Bahr El Gazal (trad. ) 200,000 32,000 160 225,000 45,000 200 
Equatoria (trad. ) 210,000 58,5800 180 230,000 58,000 252 
TOTAL 6,313,648 2,068,651 328 6,016,000 1,749,800 291 
Soui ce; ministry of Agriculture 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Khartoum, Sudan. 
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Appendix A3 
Sesame: Area, Production & Average Yield 
19? 5/76 (Final) & 1976/77 (Provisional) 
Production 
Centre 
1975/76 1976/77 
Av. Av 
Area Prod. Yield Area Prod. Yield 
Fed. M. T. Kg/f Fed. M., T. Kg/f 
Gedaref (blech) 346,630 33,600 97 400,000 59,000 152 
Blue Nile (mech) 142,835 13,700 96 117,000 16,000 137 
Blue Nile (Trod) 150,000 15,000 100 75,000 11,000 140 
White Nile (Trod) 122,260 22,200 182 80,000 10,000 220 
North Kordofan 
(Trod) 950,520 71,300 75 900,000 63,000 70 
S. Kordofan (meth) 12,105 950 77 35,000 - 135 
S. Kordof an (Trod) 135,940 182,350 135 80,000 10,000 125 
South Defur (mech) 400 40 100 1,9000 100 100 
South Darfur (Trod) 175,000 15,750 90 175,000 17,000 - 
North Darfur (Trod) 16,000 1,200 75 15.9000 1.9500 100 
Upper Nile (mech) 45,110 4s, 510 100 23,000 2,500 109 
Upper Nile (Trod) 6,000 550 90 5,000 500 100 
Bahr Elghazal (Trod) 75,000 10,500 140 88,000 10,000 110 
Equatoria (Trod) 38,000 9,500 200 60,000 7,000 112 
Total Sudan 2,215,800 217,150 98 2,054,000 2070600 101 
Source : ministry of Agriculture, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Khartoum, Sudan 
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Appendix A4 
Groundnuts: Area, Production & Average Yield 
1975/76 (Final) & 1976/77 (Provisional) 
Production 
Centre 
1975/76 1976P7 
Area Prod Av. Yield Area Prod. Av. Yield 
(fed. ) (m. T. ) Kg/f (fed. ) (m. T. ) Kg/f 
Khartoum 
Nile Province 
Gezira & uranagil 
New Half a 
Blue Nile (Irrig) 
Blue Nile (Trod) 
White Nile (Trod) 
White Nile (Irrig) 
South Kordofan 
(trad) 
South Kordofan 
(mech) 
North Kordof an 
(Tra d) 
. 
South Darfur 
(Trad) 
North Darf ur 
(Trad) 
Upper Nile (Trad) 
Bahr Elghazal 
(Trad) 
Equatoria (trad) 
200 120 600 200 100 500 
1,070 642 600 1,000 500 500 
423,600 325,000 767 250,000 190,000 760 
53,800 31,473 585 38,130 26,000 681 
46,320 32,424 700 45,000 33,000 723 
15,000 4,500 300 15,000 5,000 350 
78,150 28,130 360 80,000 28,000 350 
4,000 3,400 850 13,000 11,000 80 
132,864 47,830 360 59,000 24,000 406 
600 240 400 - - - 
593,947 222,720 375 418,000 115,000 275 
434,790 136,680 314 600,000 198,000 330 
88,000 25,860 294 85,000 24,000 280 
1,500 450 300 1,000 300 300 
50,000 12,500 250 65,000 17,000 260 
115,000 33,000 290 115,000 33,000 290 
Total Sudan 2,038,841 904,969 444 1,785,330 704,900 395 
)Ource i ministry of Agriculture 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Khartoum, Sudan 
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Appendix A5 
Percentage Shares of in Customers 
1971 - 1975 
- Exports - 
Customers 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
E. E. C. 28.8 32.8 36.3 39.5 41.2 
Other West Europe 2.7 4.0 4.8 4.5 5.0 
Peoples Republic 
of China 4.9 10.0 14.9 9.7 8.6 
U. S. S. R. 16.1 0.4 - 1.3 2.4 
Other Socialist 
Countries 7.8 7.7 5.2 3.9 9.7 
Egypt 5.0 5.7 3.8 3.0 7.0 
Japan 7.2 8.1 11.1 3.5 4.3 
U. S. A. 3.3 3.0 1.9 5.7 2.2 
India 10.5 18.4 5.8 3.8 1.5 
Others 9.2 9.9 16.2 25.1 18.1 
Total 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan (based on customs data) 
- 334 - 
Appendix A6 
Percentage Shares of main Supp 
1971 - 1975 
- Imports - 
liers 
Suppliers 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
E. E. C. 29.6 33.5 37.4 30.3 37.6 
Other West Europe 4.4 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.3: 
Japan 4.2 4.0 6.0 5.3 10.1 
U. S. A. 2.5 4.1 7.1 8.9 8.5 
India 19.7 16.0 7.6 11.5 7.3 
Peoples Republic 
of China 6.7 7.5 6.7 9.1 4.5 
U. S. S. R. 6.8 4.5 6.0 1.0 0.4 
Other Socialist 
Countries 9.7 7.7 7.0 4.7 4.7 
Egypt 5.9 4.4 2.4 2.3 1.7 
Others 10.5 14.9 16.2 23.8 21.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Bank of Sudan (based on customs returns) 
- 335 - 
Appendix A7 
Export?, Imports and Visible Balance of Trade 
(1961. -1975 
LS million 
I 
Year Exports 
L'1 
Imports 
Z-2-7 
Surplus (+) 
or 
Deficit (-) 
1961 62.2 82.9 - 20.7 
1962 79.0 89.3 - 10.3 
1963 78.7 97.6 - 18.9 
. 1964 68.6 95*. 5 - 26.9 
1965 67.9 72.2 - 4.3 
1966 70.7 77.4 - 6.7 
1967': ' 74.7 81.2 - 6.5 
1968 81.1 89.7 - 8.6 
1969 86.2 92.5 - 6.3 
1970 102.3 108.3 - 6.0 
1971 114.4 115.4 - 1.0 
1972 124.4 117.9 + 6.5 
1973 152.2 151.8 + 6, lý- 
1974 122.0 247.5 -125.5 
1975 152.5 359.9 -207.4 
Source: Department of Statistics 1961 -1975 
J-1_7 Domestic exports and re-exports : value (FOB) 
Z-2_7 Value (CIF) 
I 
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Appendix AB 
Exports of 1º'C j e- bu61¢ Oils and Oilcakes from Sudan 
1974 - 1975 
1974 1 1975 
Product 
Quantity 
m. tons 
Value 
000LS 
Quantity 
In. tons 
Value 
000LS 
Groundnut oil 5,659 1 , 11 8 6,840 1 ,, 
073 
Groundnut cakes 21,501 1,405 31,776 915 
Cottonseed oil - - 10,523 3,531 
Cottonseed cakes 55,799 1,887 94,504 2,027 
Sesame oil 1,321 340 294 79 
Sesame cakes 3,613 258 30,213 972 
Sources Statistics Section, Department of Agricultural Economics 
CAS. VOL 19 No. 2 June 1976. 
1. 
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Appendix A10 
Imports of Foodgrains into Sudan 
1964 - 1975 
Wheat Wheat Flour Rice 
Year Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
(000 tons)(000LS) (000 tons) (000LS) (000 ton (000Ls) 
1964 55 1,620 52 1,898 6 264 
1965 55 1,677 50 1,527 4 208 
1966 81 820 88 2j, 830 5 270 
1967 49 1,355 123 3,506 7 485 
1968 66 1,427 79 2,138 7 485 
1969 32 716 51 1 , 125 10 706 
1970 195 4,601 25 657 11 677 
1971 176 4,731 7 226 9 486 
1972 225 4,9925 5 164 9 514 
1973 190 8,305 - - 13 819 
1974 94 7,095 16 859 9 1,164 
1975 119 7 4 18C 185 
Source: Statistics Section, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
CAS, VOL. 1 No, 2. 
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Appendix All 
Imports of Agricultural Requisites into Sudan 
1964 - 1975 
Fertilizers Insecticides Agricultural 
Machinery Sacks 
Year Quantity Value Quantit Value Value Value 
(000 tons; (000 LS) (000 tons) (000 Ls) (000 Ls) (000 Ls ) 
1964 56 1 9450 3 909 807 1) 839 
1965 78 29141 6 1,414 609 29539 
1966 74 29 160 6 1)791 1y 243 2, ý 524 
1967 66 29089 6 1ý 937 888 11465 
1968 38 944 7 2,189 11031 15594 
1969 60 1 9397 6 2)134 1 j011 29 409 
1970 79 1 9658 7 2)521 31 135 35 022 
1971 86 1,937 10 35709 1,250 39751 
1972 194 21 496 9 2s 900 29 729 4,560 
1973 189 39 760 9 3) 536 1't 499 5ý 093 
1974 259 7ý 134 10 69 921 21708 79 890 
1975 167 7y 331 12 1 1v 501 51058 89582 
Source: Statistics Section, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
CAS, Vol. 1, No. 2 
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Appendix A12 
Sugar and Sugar 
Preparations 
Year 
Imports of Sugar, Tobacco and Beverages into Sudan 
1964 - 1975 
Tobacco 
Quantity Value 
(000tons) (000LS) 
Tea Coffee 
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
(000 tons) (000 LS ) (000 tons) (000 LS ) (000 tons ) (000 LS 
1964 124 8,918 755 1,204 11 3y643 11 
1965 190 59198 547 11027 10 3y 374 10 
1966 88 39 073 420 778 12 49 072 14 
1967 79 1,767 722 523 10 39087 11 
1968 166 4)422 690 1,109 13 4)013 15 
1969 84 25 899 596 980 10 2) 210 4 
1970 138 59 307 655 11138 19 49 955 14 
1971 205 9,581 714 1,290 14 4,004 12 
1972 138 95 982 836 1,773 18 69 138 14 
1973 206 18ý 341 691 1 1500 17 
5y307 7 
1974 121 299821 876 19955 17 59 857 9 
1975 132 38)288 1 9502 39444 10 
4f 046 8 
Source: Statistics Section, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
CAS. Vol. 1j, No. 2. 
19842 
1,308 
13 930 
11829 
29091 
453 
19909 
15635 
1ý 889 
23004 
2ý 709 
2) 472 
r 
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Appendix 8I 
Coefficient of determination (R square) 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) 
Standard error 
Durbin Watson Test 
Square of variation 
Regression 
Error 
_x 
Seq num 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
0.79790 
0.89325 
= 509.38042 
1.98365 
Analysis of variance 
Sum of square Degree of Freedom Mean square 
21512556.72338 1 21312556.72338 
5448836.75726 21 259468.41701 
Observed Areas Predicted Areas Residual 
1636.000 1823.598 -187.5978 
2075.000 1969.397 105.6028 
1934.000 2115.197 -181.1966 
2135.000 2260.996 -125.9960 
2492.000. 2406.795 85.20455 
2607.000 2552.295 54.40514 
3252.000 2698.394 553.6057 
3251.000 2844.194 406.8063 
3067.000 2989.993 77.00692 
3516.000 3135.792 380.2075 
3517.000 3281.592 235.4081 
3277.000 3427.391 -150.3913 
3158.000 3573.191 -415.1907 
3199. *000 3718.990 -519.9901 
3183.000 3864.790 -681.7895 
4700.000 4010.589 689.4111 
2823.000 4156.388 -1333.388 
4299.000 4302.188 - 3.188 
4894.000 4447.987 446.0128 
4555.000 4593.787 - 38.78656 
4095.000 4739.586 -644.5860 
5301.000 4885.385 415.6146 
5864.000 5031.185 832.8152 
- 342 - 
Appendix 82 
Coefficient of determination (R2) 
RSQ change 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) 
Durbin Watson test 
Standatd error Analysis of variance 
Square of variation 
Regression 
Error 
Sum of squares 
1541046.52249 
1553958.43359 
Z 
z 
272.02577 
Degree of Freedom 
1. 
21. 
0.497 91 
0.49791 
0.70563 
2.27974 
variables in the equation 
variable B Beta Std Error 8 
years 39.02273 
(constant) 740.77075 
F 
Mean Square 
1541046.52249 
0.70563 8.55106 20.826 
'Dependent variable : Production from variable list 1 
regression list 1 
Se num Observed Production 
1 515.0000 
2 635.0000 
3 613.0000 
4 860.0000 
5 1067.0000 
6 1139.0000 
7 1372.0000 
8 1313.0000 
9 1051.0000 
10 1434.0000 
11. 1266.0000 
12 1349.0000 
13- 1137.0000 
. 
14 1095.0000 
. 
15 851.0000 
16 1980.0000 
17 870.0000 
18 1453.0000 
19 1535.0000 
20 1591.0000 
21 1300.0000 
22. 1638.0000 
23 1744.0000 
Predicted Production 
779.7935 
818.8162 
857.8389 
896.8617 
935.8844 
974.9071 
1013.930 
1052.953 
1091.975 
1130.998 
1170.021 
1209.043 
1248.066 
1287.089 
1326.112 
1365.134 
1404.157 
1443.180 
1482.203 
2521.225 
1560.248 
1599.271 
1638.293 
73998.02065 
Residual 
-264x7935 
-183.8162 
-244.8389 
- 36,86166 
131'1156 
164.0929 
358.0702 
260.0474 
- 40.97530 
303.0020 
95.97925 
139.9565 
-111.0662 
-192.0889 
-475.1117 
614.8656 
-534.1.571 
9.820158 
52.79743 
69.77470 
-260.2480 
38.72925 
105.7065 
y= 740.77075 + 39.02273 t 
(272.025) 
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Appendix 83 
Coefficient of determination (R-Square) 
Coefficient of determination adjusted 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) 
Durbin-Watson teat 
Square of variation 
Regression 
Error 
= 0.13890 
= 0.13890 
= 0.37269 
2 1.48444 
Analysis of variance 
Sum, of squares Degree of Freedom 
7785.81917 1 
48267.48518 21 
._ 
Table of Residumis 
Se Horn 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Observed Yield 
315.0000 
306x0000 
317.0000 
403.0000 
428.0000 
437.0000 
422.0000 
404.0000 
343.0000 
408.0000 
360.0000 
412.0000 
360.0000 
342.0000 
267.0000 
421.0000 
308.0000 
344.0000 
314.0000 
3490 0000 
317.0000 
309.0000 
298.0000 
Predicted Yield 
386.3370 
383.5632 
380.7895 
378.0158 
375.2421 
372.4684 
369.6947 
366.9209 
364.1472 
361.3735 
358.5998 
355.8261 
353.0524 
350.2787 
347.5049 
344.7312 
341.9575 
339.1838 
336.4101 
333.6364 
330.8626 
328.0889 
325.3152 
Mean squares 
7785.81917 
2298.45168 
Residual 
-71'33696 
-77.56324 
-63.78953 
24.98419 
52.75791 
64.53162 
52.30534 
37007905 
-21: 147 23 
46.62648 
1.400198 
56.17391 
6.947628 
- 8.278656 
-80.50494 
76.26877 
-33.95751 
4.816206 
-22941008 
j 5.36364 
-13.86265 
-19.08893 
-27.31522 
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Append ix 84 
1974 
Rainfall at Selected 
July-No 
Centres during Production Seasons 
vember 1974 and 1975 
(Rainfall in Millimeters) 
Centre July August September October November Total 
Shendi 64.0 7.0 11.0 - - 82.0 Atbara 14.0 16.8 5.6 TR. - 364.0 Khartoum 55.4 12.0 4.7 TR. - 72.1 Senner 130.5 75.0 94.0 8.0 - 307.5 Sings 102.0 184.0 36.0 40.0 - 362.0 El Roseris 230.0 169.0 151.0 - - 550.0 Gedaref 175.4 273.1 77i. 0 11.3 - 536.9 
El Obeid 208.1 93.0 38.4 0.3 - 339.8 Bare 149.4 27.8 17.3 TR. TR. 194.5 
Um Rwaba 148.0 130.0 51.0 329.0 
Zalinge 137.4 117.3 165.2 1.0 - 420.9 El Gina ins 143.2 179.2 34.0 T4. - 325.9 
Kadugli 168.7 143.3 179.2 89.7 5.2 586.1 
Dilling 166.0 130.0 189.0 as - 485.0 
Melake l 163.0 90.0 270.0 46.0 11.5 580.5 
Renk 131.6 105.5 63.3 36.0 - 336.4 
Ton j 221.0 182.0 154.0 70.0 - 627.0 
Juba 237.2 92.4 131.1 54.0 21.9 536.6 
Yet 183.0 67.5 188.0 94.0 55.0 587.5 
Yambio 115.5 261.5 160.0 126.5 13.5 677.0 
Wau 70.9 233.5 200.7 81.8 4.6 591.5 
1975 
Centre July August September October November Total 
Shendi 12.0 26.0 5.0 - - 43.0 
Atbara 3.5 88.7 TR. 92.2 
Khartoum 0.9 50.1 47.8 - - 98.8 
medani 66.9 230.4 75.8 6.5 - 379.6 
Sennar 120.3 264.7 69.4 Th. 454.4 
Singa 184.0 260.0 59.0 - - 509.0 
El Demazin 198.9 147.1 247.1 12.6 14.4 620.1 
Kosti 60.3 259.4 87.1 - - 406.8 
El Duiem 21.7 181.2 21.0 TR. - 223.9 
Gedaref 125.2 187.1 207.7 1.7 1.3 523.0 
Kassala 36.6 103.2 106.9 TR. - 246.7 
E. Obied 87.2 59.1 42.9 TR. - 189.2 
Rashad 87.1 97.0 279.0 40.0 - 50901 
Zalinge 154.6 135.7 147.3 TR. - 437.6 
El Gina ina 149.5 162.5 36.6 - 348.6 
Nyala 98.2 106.4 66.9 - - 271.5 
Kedugli 170.2 119.4 178.8 44.7 - 513.1 
El Fasher 52.4 52.7 28.3 - - 133.4 
Malakal 210.5 211.2 168.5 83.7 TR. 673.9 
Renk 160.5 87.0 154.0 21.5 4.0 427.0 
Juba 88.4 274.4 112.9 74.2 34.4 584.4 
Wau 109.7 267.7 288.6 132.8 0.6 
799.4 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, 
Khartoum, Sudan 
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Appendix 85 
A. Number and Area of Mechanised Crop Production 
Schemes by Province (As of April 1976) 
Established up to 1969/70 Total to-date 
1968/69 to-date 
Province 
No. of 
Schemes 
Area 
(Fed. ) 
No. of 
Schemes 
Area 
(Fed. ) 
Noe of 
Schemes 
Area 
(Fed. ) 
Kassala 1,245 1,245,000 264 395,500 1,509 1,640,000 
Blue Nile 298 298,000 559 746,000 857 1,044,000 
White Nile - - 117 175,500 117 175,500 
9. Kordofan - - 239 292,500 239 292,500 
Upper Nile 60 120,000 202 303,000 262 423,000 
Total 1 , 603 1,633,000 1,381 1,912,500 2,984 3,575,500 
Be Mechanised State Farms 
Farm Area (f eddan ) 
Samsam 70,000 
Agadi 200,000 
Habila 30,000 
Nertity Um Agaga 70,000 
Goz Rom 30,000 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
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Appendix 86 
The increase and percentage increase 
in the prices of one tractor during 
1971 - 1975 
Type of Tractors Price in 
1971 
LSD 
Price in 
1975 
LSD 
Percentage 
increase 
John Deere 1,9965 6,269 219 
Massey-Ferguson 1.9754 5,663 223 
Ford 1,594 4,837 204 
Nuffield J.. 424 4,300 202 
One Trailer 780 1,140 49.1 
The increases in the prices of gasoline 
Year Price/gallons/m/ms 
1969 95.5 
1971 130.5 
1973 260.5 
1975 360.5 
Source: Mechanised Farming Corporation (rFC) 1975, Khartoum, 
Sudan 
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Appendix 87 
Sorghum: (dura): Average cost of production, peyA- 
Feddan GedareP mechanised Crop Production 
Schemes 1975/76 season 
Agricultural Operations Cost of prod. % Cost of 
peLSed. total cost 
1" Annual depreciation of machines 0.733 7.87 
2. Annual insurance of machines 0.029 . 31 
3. Maintenance and spare parts 0.486 
4. Houses depreciation 0.111 
5. Barrel depreciation 0.057 
6. Permanent labour 0.851 
7. Petroleum products & 1.196 
drinking water 
8. Weeding 1.953 
9. Harvesting 1.617 
10" Transportation 0.768 
11" Materials used 1.514 
5.22 
1.19 
. 61 
9.14 
12.84 
20.96 
l 7o36 
8.25 
16.25 
Total 9.315 100 
Sources Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
i '.. 
I 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
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Appendix B8 
Sorghum dura : Average cost of ý) production/f eddan 
mechanised Crop Production, Schemes 
in Blue Nile Province 1975/76 season 
Operation Average cost fed. 
is 
Prep. of land & sowing: 
Fuel 
Driver's wages 
Greaser's wages 
maintenance and spare parts 
Annual depre of machines 
Seeds 
Weeding 
4 550 
. 525 
. j25 
. 600 
a400 
. 105 
. 881 
Sub-Total 3.186 
Harvesting. - 
Cutting & Collecting 
Threshing by combine 
I. 675 
"719 
Sub-Total 2.394 
Transportation: 
Sacking & porting . 188 
Transport to the market "401 
Labour transportation . 242 
Sub-To to 1 0831 
Materials used: 
Sacks & strings 
Labour food 
. 763 
0 800 
Annual depr. of houses . 020 
Sub-Total 1.583 
Grand Total 7.994 
NB. Average yield/f eddan 5 sacks 
n,.,. 4-1 }u-ire, Department of Agricultural Economics 
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Appendix B9 
Sorghum: Average cost of Production/feddan 
Blue Nile Province 1976/77 season' 
Item LS pPr4 Mda P2 
A. Fixed costs: 
1" Annual deprec. of agricultural 
machines . 887 
2. maintenance and spare parts . 539 
3. Insurance 
. 036 
4. Annual deprec, of local houses . 049 
5. Annual deprec. of barrels - . 067 
6. Land rent 050 
7. Administration costs . 500 
8. Interest on capital 1.244 
9. Permanent labour 
. 958 
Sub-Total 4.330 
8. Running costs: 
1. Petroleum products & drinking 
" water 1,284 
2. Weeding 1.233 
3. Harvesting 1.064 
4. Transportation of crop . 788 
5. meals for labour . 605 
6. Seeds . 067 
7. Sacks and strings . 470 
Sub-Total 5.511 
Grand Total 9.841 
Profit and loss account/leddan 
Average yield .o . sacks... 1.55 
Price/sack LS/m/ms 3.100 
Total return LS/m/ms 4.805 
Total costs LS/m/ms 9.841 
NET -5.036 
Sources Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Khartoum, Sudan. 
1 
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Appendix BIO 
Sorghum: Average cost of production per feddan 
in two Districts of Northern Kordofan 
1976-1977 
Item Eastern Western 
District District 
A" Agricultural operation: is Pev. 9e nit 
1. Cleaning . 780 . 426 
2. Pre-planting weeding - _ 
3. Planting . 640 . 227 
4. 
. Replanting. 
5. First weeding 1.704 1.989 
6. Second weeding 1.010 . 426 
7. Harvesting 2.567 . 742 
8. Sacking & handling . 086 . 255 
9. Transporting the crop . 766 . 085 
Sub-Total 7.553 4.150 
B. Materials & Others: 
1. Seeds . 182 . 227 
2. Sacks 1.299 . 460 
3. Thread - 6014 
4. Meals for labour - . 085 
5. Shelter for labour - - 
Sub-Total 1.481 . 786 
Grand Total 9.034 4.936 
Prof it ofi loss account per feddan: 
Eastern D. Western D. 
I* Yield per feddan ( in sacks ) 
24P Price/sack 
3o Total return 
4o Total cost 
5. Net 
3.9 1.3 
3.633 4.500 
14.169 5.850 
9.034 4.936 
+5.135 +. 914 
Sources Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
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Appendix 811 
Sorghum: Average production cost per fedden 
Southern Kordofan Province 1976/77 season 
Item LS "" . 
nQ p edd an 
As Agricultural operations 
1. Land cleaning . 674 
2. Pre planting weeding . 050 
3. Planting . 604 
4. Re-planting . 061 
5. First weeding 1.427 
6. Second weeding . 750 
7. Harvesting 1.085 
8. Transporting the crop . 331 
Sub-Total 4.982 
Be materiell 
1. Seeds . 348 
2. Sacks . 581 
3. Thread . 023 
4. Meals for labour . 062 
5. Shelter for labour . 015 
Sub-Total 1.029 
Grand Total 6.011 
Total Return: 2,127 sacks ® LS/m1S 4.046 ... 8.606 
Total Cost: 6.011 
NET +2.595 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
.ý 
i 
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Appendix 812 
Sorghums Average cost of production per feddan in two 
districts of Southern Darfur Province 
1976/77 season 
Item Garsella Ad Elganam 
Ao Agricultural operations LS Pei' Fedäc'1 
1. Land cleaning . 800 , 649 
2. Pre planting weeding . 337 
3. Planting . 658 . 487 
4. Re-planting 9294 - 
5. First weeding 1.523 2.841 
6. Second weeding . 811 2o'597 
7. Harvesting 2.289 2.078 
8. Sacking and handling . 173 . 119 
9. Transporting the crop 1.121 : 243 
Sub-Total 8.006 991014 
B. Materials & others: 
1" Seeds . 263 . 162 
2. Sacks 1.613 1: 104 
3. Thread . 054 X075 
4. meals for labour . 740 025 
5. Shelter for labour . 072 - 
Sub-Total 2.742 1.666 
Grand Total 10.748 10.680 
Profit and loss account per Peddan: 
Garsella Adelganam 
1. Yield/feddan (in sacks) 4.67 2.600 
2. Price/sack 4.459 6.000 
3. Tota l return 20.824 15.600 
4. Total cost 10.748 10.680 
5. Net +10.076 + 4.920 
Source: ministry oP Agriculture, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
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Appendix Cl 
Coefficient of determination (R square) = 0.10433 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.32300 
Standard error = 165.80115 
Durbin Watson Test = 2.32802 
Analysis of Variance 
Square of variation Sum of squares Qegree of Freedom Mean Sauare 
Regression 57636.81353 1 57636.81353 
Error 494820.38643 18 57490.02147 
Variable B Beta Std Error B F 
Years 9.30977 0.32300 6.42940 2.097 
(Constant) 460.44737 
Dependent Var iable - price 
Seq num Observed Price Predicted Price Residuals 
1 552.0000 469.7571 82.24286 
2 540.0000 479.0669 60.93308 
3 469.0000 488.3767 -19.37669 
4 614.0000 497.6865 116.3133 
5 533.0000 506.9962 26.00376 
6 289.0000 516.3060 -227.3060 
7 430.0000 525.6158 -95.61579 
8 408.0000 534.9256 -126.9256 
9 523.0000 544.2353 -21.23534 
10 689.0000 553.5451 135.4549 
11 437.0000 562.8549 -125.8549 
12 550.0000 572.1647 .. -22.16466 
13 996.0000 581.4744 414.5256 
14 335.0000 590.7842 -255.7842 
15 381.0000 600.0940 -19.09398 
16 764.0000 609.4038 154.5962 
17 664.0000 618.7135 45.28647 
18 483.0000 628.0233 -145.0233 
19 458.0000 637.3331 -179.3331 
20 849.0000 646.6429 202.3571 
Y= 460.447 + 9.30977 t 
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Appendix C2 
Coefficient of determination (R square) = 0.27149 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.52104 
Standard Error = 263.03147 
Durbin Watson Test = 1.92841 
Analysis of Variance 
5puare of variation Sum of squares Degree of Freedom (dean square 
Regression 464085.7988 1 464085.79887 
Error 1245339.95113 18 69185.55284 
Variable B Beta Std Error BF 
Years 26.41729 0.52104 10.19992 6.708 
(Constant) 526.86842 
Dependent Variable - Price 
Sect num 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Observed Price 
556.0000 
574.0000 
760.0000 
649.0000 
588.0000 
568.0000 
505.0000 
602.0000 
852.0000 
854.0000 
733.0000 
628.0000 
1579.0000 
944.0000 
965.0000 
1343.0000 
700.0000 
600.0000 
732.0000 
1353.0000 
Predicted Price 
553.28 57 
579.7030 
606.1203 
632,5376 
658.9549 
685.3422 
711.7895 
738.2068 
764,6241 
791.0414 
817.4586 
843,8759 
870.2932 
890.7105 
923.1278 
949.5451 
975.9624 
1002.380 
1028.797 
1055,214 
Residual 
2.714286 
-5.703008 
153.8797 
16.46241 
-70.95489 
-117.3722 
-206.7895 
-136.2068 
87.37594 
62.95865 
-84.45865 
-213.8759 
708.7068 
47.28947 
41.87218 
393.4549 
-275.9624 
-402.3797 
-296.7970 
297.7857 
Y 526.8684 + 26.4172 t 
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Appendix C3 
Coefficient of determination (R square') = 0.58732 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.62235 
Standard Error 
= 176.07307 
Durbin Watson Test 
= 1.62578 
Analysis of Variance 
Square of variation Sum of squares Degree of Freedom Mean Square 
Regression 352774.69 512 1 352774.69512 
Error 558031.05489 18 31001.72527 
Variable B Beta Std Error B F 
Years 23.0323 3 0.62235 6.82782 11.37920 
(Constant) 470.41.0 53 
Dependent Variable - Price 
Seq num Observed Price predicted Price Residuals 
1 710.0000 493.4429 216.5571 
2 566.0000 516.4752 49.52481 
3 621.0000 539.5075 81.49248 
4 586.0000 562.5398 23.46015 
5 650.0000 585.5722 64.42782 
6 336.0000 608.6045 -272.6045 
7 419.0000 631.6368 -212.6368 
8 637.0000 654.6692 -17.66917 
9 615.0000 677.7015 -62.70150 
10 836.0000 700.7338 135.2662 
11 600.0000 723.7662 -123.7662 
12 683.0000 746.7985 -63.798 50 
13 710.0000 769.8308 -59.83083 
14 552.0000 792.8632 -240.8632 
15 984.0000 815.8955 168.1045 
16 1118.0000 838.9278 279.0722 
17 985.0000 861.9602 123.0398 
18 800.0000 884.9925 -84.99248 
19 637.0000 908.0248 -271,0248 
20 1200.0000 931.0571 268.9429 
Y= 470.41053 + 23.0323 t 
(6 
. 8278) 
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Appendix D1 
Coefficient of determination (R)2 = 0.02745 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.16569 
Standard error = 42.19921 
Durbin Watson Test = 1.19330 
Analysis of variance 
Square of variation Sum of soua re DF Glean square 
Regression 1156.21231 1 1156.21231 
Error 40957.78769 23 1780.77338 
B Beta 
Years 0.94308 0.16560 
(constant) 40.28308 
'ý 
Seg num 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11- 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Observed Quantit 
10 
24 
55 
72 
8 
18 
55 
12 
73 
171 
93 
76 
74 
61 
112 
79 
1 
55 
2 
2 
37 
56 
46 
98 
48 
Std Error 88 
1.17040 0.649 
t. 
Predicted Quantity Residual 
41.22615 -31.22615 
42.16960 18.16923 
43.11231 11.88769 
44.05538 27.94462 
44.99846 -36,99846 
45.04154 -27.94154 
46,88462 8.115385 
47.82769 -35,82759 
49,77077 24.22923 
49.71383 121.2862 
50,65692 42.34308 
51.60000 24.40000 
52.54308 21.45692 
53,48615 7.513846 
54.42923 57.57077 
55.37231 23.62769 
56.31538 -55,31538 
57,25646 12.258462 
58.20154 -56,20154 
59.14462 -57,14452 
60.08769 -23.08769 
61.03077 -5,030759 
61.97385 -15.97385 
62.91692 35.0a309 
63.86000 -15.86000 
Y= 40.28308 + 0.94308 t 
(1.1704) 
0 
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Appendix D2 
Coefficient of determination (R square) = 0.05060 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.22493 
Standard error = 1057.6690 
Durbin Watson Test - 1.3373 
II 
Analysis of variance 
Square of variation Sum of Squares Degree of Freedom Mean Squares 
Regression 1371160.5073 1 1371160.50732 
Error 25729269.65331 23 1118663.89796 
Seq num Observed Value Predicted Value Residual 
1 175.0000 1322.295 -1147.295 
2 439.0000 1322.056 -883.0555 
3 10750000 1321.816 -246,8162 
4 1136.000 1321.577 -185.5769 
5 1580.000 '1321.338 258.6624 
6 356.0000 1321.698 -965.0982 
7 112.0000 124.2829 -12.28293 
8 29 5.0000 1320.620 -1025.620 
9 1657.000 1320.380 336.6197 
10 2793.000 1320.141 1472.859 
11 1845.000 1319.902 525.0983 
12 1479.000 1319.662 159.3376 
13 1619.000 1319.423 299.5770 
14 1539.000 1319.149 219.8163 
15 1442.000 1318.944 123.0556 
16 1872.000 1318.705 553.2949 
17 1600.000 1318.466 -1302.466 
18 1071.000 1318.226 -247.2265 
19 43.00000 1317.987 -1274.997 
20 61.00000 1317.748 -1256.748 
21 1136.000 1317.509 -181.5085 
22 1619.000 1317.269 301.7308 
23 1246.000 1317.030 -71.02989 
24 4817.000 1316.791 3500.209 
25 2366.000 1316.551 1049.449 
Variable in the Equa tion 
Variable B Beta Std Error BF 
Years -0.23932 -0.2249 0.21616 
1.226 
(Constant) 1322.53414 
Dependent variable value 
n 
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Aooendix El Sesame Oil Mills in The Sudan 
NamE & Owner No. of Origin Age 
of Oil '. ill Place Pressers of press of 
press 
Attaya Oil Mill 
Abou Hassanin Oil 
mill 
Ahmed Koko Oil Mill 
Artalp Oil Mill 
Tandalti Oil Mill 
Mohamed Oil Lill 
Kordofan Oil mill 
The Sun Oil mill 
Kobani Oil Mill 
Osman mohmed Oil 
mill 
Nair Oil Mill 
Mohamed El Hassan 
Oil Mill 
Abdulla Oil mill 
Fadal Oil frill 
Abazeid Oil mill 
El Ranad Oil Mill 
Mussa Oil Mill 
El Watania Oil mills 
Awad Oil Mill 
East Kordofan 
Oil Mill 
The Soap Oil Mill 
El Fadile Oil Mill 
El Hallal Oil Mill 
Ed Due im 
11 11 
Kosti 
Tanda1ti 
Tondalti 
Um Rua ba 
Um Rua ba 
Um Ruaba 
Um Rua ba 
Um Rua ba 
Um Ruaba 
Um Rua ba 
Um Rua ba 
Um Rua ba 
El Rahad 
El Rahad 
El Rahad 
El Obeid 
El Obeid 
El Obeid 
El Obeid 
El One id 
El Obeid 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
3 
2 
3 
2 
1 
1 
8 
2 
1 
5 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
England 
Germany 
England 
India 
Germany 
Germany 
India 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
England 
England 
Germany 
Germany 
England 
India 
England 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
4 
4 
17 
b 
9 
10 
13 
5 
20 
22 
15 
a 
14 
11 
18 
6 
16 
12 
6 
9 
7 
11 
19 
Leoacity 
of the oil 
mill 
Ton 24 hrs. 
1.2 
3.0 
5 
5 
6 
10 
13 
5 
10 
2.2 
15 
19 
6 
9 
20 
5.5 
9 
13 
30 
5 
10 
5 
2 
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Appendix E2 
Coefficient of determination. (R square) 0.80329 
Coefficient of multiple correlation* (R) = 0.89627 
Standard error = 303.05376 
Durbin Watson Test. - = 1.28308 
An alysis of variance 
Square of variation Sum of squares Degree of Freedom Men Sq. 
Regression 7 876048.69940 1 7876048.69940 
Error 1 928673.21347 21 91841.58159 
Seq nun Observed A reas_ Predicted Areas Residuals 
1 326.0000 270.3696 155.6304 
2 422.0000 258.5.889 163.4111 
3 378.0000 346.8083 31.19170 
4 636.0000 435.027? 200.9723 
5 793.0000 523.2470 269.7530 
6 365.0000 611.4664 -246.4664 
7 747.0000 699.6858 47.31423 
8 991.0000 787.9051 203.0949 
9 693.0000 876.1245 -183.1245 
10 981.0000 964.3439 16.65613 
11 776.0000 1052.563 -276.5632 
12 1184.000 1140.783 43.21739 
13 1116.000 1229.002 -113.0020 
14 948.0000 1317.221 -369.2213 
15 924.0000 1405.441 -481.4407 
16 1234.000' 1493.660 -259.6601 
17 1321.000 1581.879 -260.8794 
18 -1359.000 1670.099 -311.0988 
19 1857.000 1758.318 98.68182 
20 1921.000 1846.538 74.46245 
21 2874.000 1934.757 939.2431 
22 2193.000 2022.976 170.0237 
23 2199.000 2111.196 87.80435 
Y= 62.14020 + 88.21937 X 
1. (9.52641) 
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Appendix E3 
Coefficient of determination (R square) = 0.65390 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.80864 
Standard error = 428.31967 
Durbin Watson Test = 1.45851 
Sq. of variation 
Regression 
Error 
Seq num 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of squares Deoree of Freedom 
7278757.18909 
3852612.54944 
1 
21 
Mean sq. 
7278757.1 890 9 
3852612.54944 
Observed Production 
670.0000 
690.0000 
990.0000 
1500.000 
1530.000 
1410.000 
1540.000 
1750.000 
1270.000 
2230.000 
1420.000 
1740.000 
1840.000 
1600.000 
1340.000 
1870.000 
1540.000 
1750.000 
2970.000 
2960.000 
3400.000 
2378.000 
2816.000 
Predicted Production 
858.5870 
943.3953 
1028.204 
1113.0-12 
1197.820 
1282.628 
1367.437 
1452.245 
1537.053 
1621.862 
1706.670 
1791.478 
1876.287 
1961.095 
2045.903 
2130.711 
2215.520 
2300.328 
2385.136 
2469.945 
2554.753 
2639.561 
2724.3.70 
Y= 773.77866 + 84.80830 X 
(13.46411 ) 
Residual 
-188.5870 
-253.3953 
--38.20356 
386.9881 
332.1798 
127.3715 
172.5632 
297.7549 
-267.0534 
608.1383 
-286.6700 
- 51.47826 
- 36.28656 
-361.0949 
-705.9032 
-260.7115 
-675.5198 
-550.3281 
584.8636 
490.0553 
845.2470 
-261.5613 
91.63043 
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Appendix E4 
Coefficient of determination (R2) 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) 
Standard Error 
Durbin Watson Test -' 
Analysis of Variance 
Sq. of variation 
Regression 
Erro r 
=-*0.62444 
=. '0.7 90 21 
= 27.25342 
= 2.05748 
Sum of squeres Degree of Freedom Mean sq. 
25933.92194 1 25933.92194 
15597.73024 21 
Variables in the Equation- 
Variable B Beta Std Error 8 F. 
742.74906 
Years -5.06225 -0.79021 0.85670 34.916 
(Constant) 234.31225 
Dependent Variable: Yield From variable list I 
regression list I 
Seq num Observied Yield Predicted Yield Residual 
1 206.0000 229.2500 - 23.25000 
2 164.0000 224.1877 - 60.18775 
3 262.0000 219.1255 42.87451 
4 236.0000 214.0632 21.93676 
5 193.0000 209.0010 - 16.00099 
6 250.0000 203.9387 46.06126 
7 206.0000 198.8765 7.123518 
8 177.0000 193.8142 - 16.81423 
9 183.0000 188.7520 - 5.751976 
10 238.0000 J83.6897 54.31028 
11 183.0000 178.6275 4.37230 
12 147.0000 173.5652 - 26.56522 
13 165.0000 168.5030 - 3.502964 
14 169.0000 163.4407 5.559289 
15 145.0000 158.3785 - 13.37846 
16 152.0000 153.3162 - 1.316206 
17 117.0000 148.2540 - 31.25395 
18 129.0000 143.1917 - 14.19170 
19 160.0000 138.1294 21.87055 
20 154.0000 133.0672 20.93281 
21 119.0000 128.0049 - 9.004941 
22 109.0000 122.9427 - 13.94269 
23 128.0000 117.8804 ' 10.11957 
Y= 234.3122 - 5.06225 X 
(0.85670) 
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Appendix E7 
Cost of production of sesama 
Year 1.975/76 
Item Cost/200 feddans LS 
Food, water for labour 334 
Seed 26 
Wages 772 
machinery cost 434 
Permanent labour 98 
Nut maintenance and small tools 26 
Sacks and transport to market 58 
Total 1,748 
Cost per feddan 1.748 = LS 8.74 
200 
Labour = 69% of total costs 
Machinery = 25% "0 
Another = 6% 
Total 100 
-365- 
Appendix E8 
Sesame: Average cost of production/feddan Ceder#P Mechanised 
Crop Production Schemes 1975/76 season 
Items average cost 
Peddan/L. S. 
Annual Depreciation of Agric. 
Implements 
Insurance 
maintenance ar 
Annual deprec. 
Annual deprec. 
Land rent 
0,733 
0.029 
d spare parts 0.486 
of local houses 0.111 
of barrels 0.057 
0.050 
Administration cost 0.500 
Interest on capital 1.244 
Sub-Total (a) 3.210 
Permanent labour 0.851 
Petroleum products and drinking water 1o196 
Weeding 2.436 
Harvesting 3.333 
Transporting the crop 0.363 
Other materials used 0.704 
Sub-Total (b) 80 883 
Grand Total (a + b) 12.093 
Profit & loss account/feddan 
Average yield . 135 M. Ti 
Total cost LS m/mS 12.093 
J 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
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Appendix E9 
Sesames Average cost of production/feddan Southern 
Darfur Province 1975`76 season 
Item Cost/Fed. 
A. AQricultural operations 
jo Cleaning 1.063 
2. Weeding bef ore sowing . 481 
3. Sowing . 602 
4. Re-sowing . 060 
5. Weeding (first) 1.358 
6. Weeding (second) . 266 
7. Harvesting 1.013 
8. Sacking and handling . 234 
9. Transportation . 107 
Sub-Total 5.184 
Be. Materials & others 
ý. Seeds . 535 
2. Sacks . 631 
3. Thread . 030 
4. Labour food . 409 
5. Local houses for labour 
Sub-Total 1.605 
Grand Total 6.789 
Profit & loss account per feddan 
Average yield 1110 
Total cost LS/mms 6.789 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economies 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
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Appendix E10 
Sesames Average cost of production/Peddan 
Northern Kordofen Province 1975/76 season 
Item Average cost 
Feddan (mms) 
A. Ag ricultural operations 
1. Cleaning . 275 
2. Weeding before sowing - 
3. Sowing . 231 
4. Re-sowing . 105 
5. First weeding . 807 
6. Second " . 395 
7. Harvesting . 488 
8: Sacking handling . 025 
9. Transportation . 086 
Sub-Total (a) 2.412 
Be Materials & others 
1. Seeds . 249 
2. Sacks . 140 
3. Strings . 029 
4. Labours food . 132 
5. Local houses per labour 
Sub-Total (b) . 550 
Grand Total 2.962 
Profit & loss account 
average yield . 075 m. T: 
Total costs LS/mms 2.962 
Source: ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultu 
t Economics, 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
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Appendix Ell 
Sesame: Average cost of producer per feddan 
in two districts of Northern Kordofan 
Province 1976/77 season 
Items Northern 
District 
Eastern 
District 
A. Ag ricultural operations: 
1. Land cleaning . 977 . 206 
2. Re-planting weeding - - 
3. Planting . 319 . 180 
4. Re-planting . 057 . 016 
5. First weeding 1.555 10364 
6. Second weeding 0.599 . 754 
7. Harvesting . 833 . 559 
8o Sacking and handling - . 009 
9. Transporting the crop 0.081 0108 
Sub-Total 4.421 3.496 
8. Materials and others: 
1. Seeds . 267 . 571 
2. Sacks . 202 . 182 
3. Thread - 
4: meals for labour . 106 
5. Shelter for labour - 
Sub-Total . 575 . 753 
Grand Total 4.996 4.249 
Profit & loss account per feddan: 
19 Yield/Feddan (in sacks) .7 .6- 
2. Price/sack 8.920 9.266 
3. Total return 6.244 5.560 
4o Total cost 4.996 4.249 
5. Nett +1.248 1.311 
A. Me /Sa ids, 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
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Appendix E12 
Sesame: Average cost of product ion/fedden 
Blue Nile Province 1976/77 season 
Item LS/mms 
A. Fixed costs 
1" Annual depreciation of 
Agricultural machines . 887 
2. maintenance and spare parts . 539 
3. Insurance 
. 036 
4. Annual depreciation of local 
houses 
. 049 
5. Annual depreciation of 
barrels 
. 067 
6. Land rent . 050 
7. Administration costs . 500 
Be Interest on capital 1.244 
9. Permanent labour . 958 
Sub-Total 4.330 
B. Runninq costs 
1. Petroleum products and 
drinking water 1.284 
2. Weeding 1.566 
3. Harvesting . 389 
4. Transporting the crop 1.638 
5. meals for labour . 831 
6. Seeds . 234 
7. Sacks and strings . 246 
Sub-Total 6.188 
Grand Total 10.518 
Prof it & loss account/f eddan 
Average yield sacks .8 
Price/sack LS/mms : 7.960 
Total return LS/mms 6.368 
Total cost LS/mms 10.518 
Net LS/mms - 4.150 
Source t ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Khartoum, Sudan. 
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Appendix F1 
First: 
The Sudanese white sesame should contain: 
1.48 percent oil W1-ir4 YK u tiýz 
2.2 percent foreign materials 
3.6 percent humidity 
/1ýº'L Cl ýL` 1 Yvý t, ý Yy 2 
4.3 percent fatty acid 
5.3 percent other colour of sesame. 
Second: 
The Sudanese red sesame should contain: 
1. It should be red or brown 
2.52 percent oil content `VtIV'T 
3.2 percent foreign materials 
4.6 percent humidity 
výeux 
5.3 percent fatty acid 
6.3 percent other colour of sesame. 
Third: 
The mixed Sudanese sesame should have the following specification: 
1. It contains red sesame, white sesame or brown. 
2.50 per cent of oil content Nºti(nýml(Yy 
3.2 percent foreign materials 
4.6 percent humidity 
5.3 percent fatty acid 
ý'c, GL I N-i U W, 
I 
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Appendix F2 
Illustration of how transport costs contribute to the high 
marketing margins obtaining in Sudan. 
Source/ Approx. 
Destination distance Km. Made 
Bag 
Bulk LSD/Ton 
Unit cost 
LSD/ton1kg. 
Gedaref -Port 
Sudan 750 rail bulk 6.71 0.009 
of 750 road bulk 16.50 0.022 
Renk-Kosti 170 road bag 5.50 0.032 
Gedaref - 
Khartoum 480 road bag 7.00 0.015 
Habila-Dilling 80 road bag 3.33 0.042 
Habila-Dibeibat 120 road bag 4.44 OoO37 
Habila-El Obeid 240 road bag 7.78 0.032 
Dilling-El Obeid 160 road bag 5.56 0.035 
Kadugli-El Obeid 300 road beg 11.11 NOV 
Source: I. Me F. Conf idential Report, 1977 
0 
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Apyendix F3 
Quantities of Sesame purchased by local merchants at Gedaref Auction 
market During October and November 1974 
Name 
1. Daniel Rofsel 
2. Mohamed Ahmed Sanhori 
3. muktor Babikir 
4. Abdel rahman Mohamed 
5. Hans Rofse1 
6. Hashim Hassan 
7. Halwiate Seed 
8. El Tehir Talab 
9. Muss Mohamed Abas 
10. Abdel Hadi Ahmed 
11. El Sarief El Hashmi 
12. Daniel Rofeel 
13. Muse Abrah iem 
14. madani Osman 
15. Abdelkariem Mohamed 
16. Cl tom Abdelgadir 
17, moawye Musse 
18. Yussif El Wakni 
19. - Se re lk at im Osman 
20. El Amin El Sayed 
21. mustefe Nasir 
22. Badir El feien Babikir 
23. Gossif Denial 
24. Mustaf a El Sayed 
25. mahmoud Ahmadi 
26. Kofu Nayil 
27. Suliman El mubarak 
28. Mohamed Hassan 
29. Hashim mahmoud 
30. frlahad i Ahmed 
31. Ahmed Gaffer 
quantity/Ksntsr 
33487 
29865 
19499 
18453 
17612 
12930 
11996 
11742 
9087 
8333 
7715 
7657 
7377 
7203 
6424 
6171 
5694 
5486 
5348 
5099 
5017 
5005 
4957 
4763 
4600 
4491 
4357 
4318 
40 25 
3990 
3953 
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f 
32. Sul iman Abrah iem 3841 
33. Hassan Ahmed 3706 
34. Faysal Mustepha 3667 
35. All El Hadarri 3579 
36. Abrahiem Abdel Magid 3526 
37. Amanwiel Henna 3458 
38. Assam Abdelrahman 3449 
39. Baballa El Ta iE b 3380 
40. Babikir Mohamed 3140 
41. motasim El mubarak 3183 
42. Abdelraheim Mohamed 3023 
43. makkewi Hassan 2877 
44. Abdelrahiem Abrahiem 2867 
45. Ahmed E1 Azrak 2794 
46. Yussif Arab 2786 
47. El Sayed Abdelmagid 2752 
48. Ahmed Kubosh is 2701 
49. mahmoud Arab 2461 
50. Georoe Daniel 2391 
51. Mohamed mustapha 2340 
52. Cl Naiema Abdelmagied 2239 
53. Omer Abdelrahman 2187 
54. El Taieb Abdelhaf iz 2185 
55. Mohamed Ahmed 2064 
56. El Amin Ezaeldien 2027 
57. El Teieb Elbashier 1960 
58. Abdel Haf iz Mahmoud 1799 
59. Hassan Assar 1765 
60. Ahmed Omer 1693 
61. Jadat Denial 1599 
62. Elsir Omer 1454 
63c Muamar Abdelrahman 1440 
64. Elamam Abdelle 1425 
65. Abdalle Yussif 1406 
66. Eldirdiri Elmubarak 1362 
-374- 
67. Abbas Elkidir 
68. Abdelgadir Mohamed 
69. Hashim Abdelmagied 
70. Mohamed Hassan 
71. Esmaiel Elsameen 
72. mustaphe Elneiema 
73. Yussif Abou 
74. mustaph makawi 
75. Hylana Awadalle 
76. Hassan Abrahiem 
77. Rahame Mohamed 
78. Rabe ieh Yussif 
79. Abdelrehiem Abbas 
80. Abdelmoniem All 
81. Awadalla Osman 
82. Elhadi Eltahir 
83. mada ni Osman 
84. Sa1ih mustapha 
85. Eltayieb Abrahiem 
86. Eldawi Osman 
87. Ezadien mustaph 
88. Mustapha Mohamed 
89. Abdalls Mohamed 
90. Osman Elkalifa 
91. Eijak Gyllany 
92. Yussif Abdellatief 
93. Abdelmagied Shams 
94. Abrahiem mussa 
95. Mohamed Elhibir 
96. Hydar Mohamed 
1264 
1237 
1122 
1097 
1037 
1026 
956 
917 
900 
832 
831 
825 
739 
716 
637 
584 
460 
424 
330 
317 
313 
239 
226 
198 
197 
156 
144 
138 
91 
22 
f 
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Appendix F4 
Frequency Distribution of No of Merchants Purchasing different 
quantities of Sesame in Gedaref Auction Market in 1974 
Quantity Frequency Total Quantity 
-Under 100 Kantar 2 113 
100 t o 1000 Kantars 22 11079 
1000 to 2000 Kantars 16 22686 
2000 to 3000 Kantars 14 34671 
3000 to 4000 Kantars 13 45895 
4000 to 5000 Kantars 7 31511 
5000 to 6000 Kantars 6 31649 
6000 to 7000 Kantars 2 12595: ' 
7000 to 8000 Kantars 4 29952 
8000 to 9000 Kantars 1 8333 
9000 to 10000 1 9087 
over 10000 Kantars 8 
155584 
Total 96 393155 
Source: Appendix F3 
-76 
Aopendix F5 
The cumulative percentages of number of merchants and the cumulative 
percentages of the quantities of sesame purchased in Cedaref Auction 
Market 
No. of Merchants Total quantities purchased 
No. % Cumulative No. % Cum l. ative 
2 2.1 
. 
2.1 113 0.03 0.0 
22 22.9 25.0 11079 2.9 2.9 
16 16.7 14.7 22686 5.8 8.7 
14 14.6 56.3 34671 8.9 17.6 
13- 13.5 69.8 45895 11.7 29.3 
7 7.3 77.1 31511 8.0 37.3 
6 6.3- 83.4 31649 8.0 45.3 
2 2.1 85.5 12595 3.2 48.5 
4 '4.2 89.7 29952 7.6 56.1 
1 1.0 90.7 8333 2.1 58.2 
1 1.0 91.7 9087 2.3 60.5 
8 8.3 100.0 155584 39.5 100.0 
96 100 393155 100 
Source: Computed by the writer- using data from Appendix F3 
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Appendix F6 
Coefficient of determination(R)2 = 0.80109 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) - 0.89504 
Standard error = 474.11099 
Durbin Watson Test = 0.94684 
Analysis of variance 
Sum of squares DF Mean Square F 
Regression 5431686.09515 1 5431686.09515 24.16432 
Residual 1348687.40486 6 224781.23414 
Variable in the Equation 
variable B Bets STD Error 8 F 
years 359.61905 0.89504 73.15691 24.164 
(constant) 1392.96429 
Dependent variable Price 
Variable enter ed in step number 1 years 
Segnum observed price Predicted Price Residual 
1 2000.000 1752.583 247.4167 
2 2246.000 2112.202 133.7976 
3 2748.000 2471.821 276.1782 
4 2534.000 2831.440 -297.4405 
5 2603.000 3191.060 -588.0595 
6 3107.000 3550.679 -443.6786 
7 3836.000 3910.298 - 74.29762 
8 5016.000 4269.917 746.0833 
Y n* bt () 
Y= 1392.9642 + 359.61905t 
(73.15691) 
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Avpendix F? 
i 
N 
Coefficient of determination (R) 
2=0.79541 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.89186 
Standard Error = 524.89118 
Durbin Watson Test = 0.93101 
Analysis of variance 
Sum of squares DF Mean Square F 
Regression 6426868.33929 1 6426868.33929 23.32711 
Residual 1653064.53571 6 275510.75595 
Variable in the Equation 
Variable B Beta STD Error BF 
years 391.17857 0.89186 80.99247 " 23.327 
(Constant) 1282.82143 
Dependent variable Price 
Variable entered in step number 1 years 
Segnum Observed Price Predicted Price 
1 2167.000 1674.000 
2 2070.000 2065.179 
3 2462.000 2456.357 
4 2689.000 2847.536 
5 2714.000 3238.714 
6 2924.000 3629.893 
7 4133.000 4021.071 
8 5186.000. 4412.250 
Y=a+ bt 
Y= 1282.8214 + 391.1785t 
(80.9924) 
Residual 
493.0000 
4.821429 
5.642857 
-158.5357 
-524.7143 
-705.8929 
111.9286 
773.7500 
() 
- 
r 
1, 
f 
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Appendix Cl 
k 
Production of oilseedSby major producing countries 
for 1965 - 1975 
Production of soyabean 
1965 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity Percentage Quantity Percentage Quantity Percentage 
'000 tons of total '000 tons of total '000 tons of total 
USA 23014 63.0 30675 66.0 41406 60.6 
China 11036 30.4 11645 25.0 12062 17.6 
Brazil 523 1.4 1509 3.2 10200 14.9 
USSR 421 1.2 595 1.2 600 0.9 
Indonesia 410 1.1 498 1.1 560 0.8 
Japan - 230 0.6 126 
0.3 126 0.2 
Canada 219 0.6 283 0.6 367 0.5 
Korea D. P. R. 200 0.6 228 005 263 0.4 
Korea Rep. 174 0.5 232 0.5 320 0.5 
Mexico 58 0.1 215 0.5 545 0.8 
Colombia 50 0.1 96 0.2 168 0.2 
Others 170 0.4 372 0.9 1739 2.5 
World 36505 100.0 46474 100.0 
68356 100.0 
Source: F. A. 0. Produdtion Yearbook 1975 
Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G2 
Production of coconuts 
Countries 
1965 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons tota 
1970 1975 
Quantity ö of Quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons total 
Philippines 7089 26.9 6484 24.7 9069 30.6 
Indonesia 5588 21.2 5413 20.6 6500 21.9 
India 3741 14.2 4514 17.2 4589' 15.5 
Sri Lanka 2017 7.6 1882 7.2 1650 5.6 
Thailand 1217 4.6 967 3.7 820 2.8 
Mexico 1115 4.2 992 3.8 960 3.2 
Malaysia 945 3.6 1071 4.1 794 2.7 
Papua New Guin ea 710 2.7 776 3.0 795 2.7 
Brazil 265 1.0 328 1.2 236 0.8 
Fiji 260 1.0 249 0.9 281 0.9 
New Hebrides 209 0.8 227 0.9 260 0.9 
Ghana 229 0.9 201 0.8 300 1.0 
Mozambique 275 1.0 407 1.5 400 1.3 
Tanzania 274 1.0 321 1.2 300 1.0 
Others 2439 9.2 2443 9.3 2676 9.0 
World 26373 100.0 26275 100.0 29630 100.0 
Source: F. A. 0. Production Yearbook 1975 
Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G3 
Production of cottonseed 
1965 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
U. S. A. 5522 25.0 3690 16.7 3175 13.8 
U. S. S. R. 3725 16.9 4416 19.9 5130 22.3 
China 3298 14.9 3992 18.0 4337 18.9 
India 1994 9.0 1908 8.6 2450 10.7 
Brazil 855 3.9 1277 5.8 1015 4.4 
Mexico 998 4.5 550 2.5 335 1.5 
Egypt 961 4.4 884 4.0 730 3.2 
Pakistan 834 3.8 1114 5.0 1020 4.4 
Turkey 527 2.4 640 2.9 745 3.2 
Syria 296 1.3 234 1.1 240 1.0 
Sudan 289 1.3 467 2.1 432 1.9 
Iran 273 1.2 288 1.3 328 1.4 
Argentina 268 1.2 249 1.1 270 1.2 
Peru 218 1.0 153 0.7 141 0.6 
Nicaragua 207 0.9 112 0.5 200 0.9 
Others 1797 8.1 2181 9.8 2416 10.5 
World 122062 100.0 122155 100.0 122964 100.0 
Source: F. A. 0. Production Yearbook 
Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G4 
Production of groundnuts 
1965 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity % of Quantity % of quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons totall '000 tons total 
India 4263 26.6 6111 33.2 6600 34.5 
China 2426 15.1 2772 15.0 2800 14.6 
Nigeria 1978 12.3 1581 8.6 280 1.5 
Senegal 1121 7.0 583 3.2 1300 6.8 
U. S. A. 1084 698 1351 7.3 1750 9.1 
Brazil 743 4.6 928 5.0 441 2.3 
Indonesia 405 2.5 468 2.5 541 2.8 
Argentina 439 2.7 235 1.3 375 2.0 
South Afric a 19? 1.2 318 1.7 288 1.5 
Cameroon 141 0.9 178 1.0 165 0.9 
Burma 288 1.8 529 2.9 500 2.6 
Niger 277 1.7 220 1.2 100 0.5 
Thailand 131 0.8 190 1.0 260 1.4 
Malawi 157 1.0 190 1.0 165 0.9 
Mali 153 1.0 158 0.9 120 0.6 
Others 2235 13.9 2616 14.2 432 17.9 
World 1 16038 100.0 118428 100.0 119117 100.0 
Sources F. A. 0. Production Yearbook 
Percentage computed by the writer 
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fpoendix C5 
Production of sunflower seed 
1965 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity Jo of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
USSR 5449 68.5 6144 62.0 5000 51.9 
Argentina 757 9.5 1140 11.5 732 7.6 
Turkey 160 2.0 375 3.8 488 5.1 
South Africa 73 0.9 96 1.0 214 2.2 
Bulgaria 357 4.5 407 4.1 420 4.4 
Romania 564 7.1 770 7.8 724 7.5 
Yugoslavia 265 3.3 264 2.7 273 2.8 
Spain 9 0.1 159 1.6 338 3.5 
USA 20 0.3 86 0.9 625 6.5 
Others 303 3.8 476 4.8 826 8.6 
World 7959 100.0 9917 100.0 9640 100.0 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook 
Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G6 
Production of palm oil 
Countries 
Nigeria 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Zaire 
Ivory Coast 
Cameroon 
Ghana 
Angola 
Colombia 
Sierra Leone 
Benin 
Others 
1965 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
574 42.4 
157 11.6 
150 11.1 
120 8.9 
18 1.3 
44 3.2 
37 2.8 
32 2.4 
2 0.1 
39 2.9 
27 2.0 
155 11.4 
1 970 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
488 26.5 
217 11.8 
431 23.4 
180 9.8 
50 2.7 
54 2.9 
60 3.3 
80 4.3 
27 1.5 
48 2.6 
36 2.0 
173 9.4 
1975 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
470 16.1 
370 12.7 
1265 43.3 
165 5.6 
140 4.8 
60 2.1 
24 0.8 
40 1.4 
57 2.0 
55 1.9 
47 1.6 
230 7.9 
World 
11355 100.0 11844 100.0 12923 100.0 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook 
Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G? 
Production of palm kernels 
1965 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Nigeria 462 40.5 295 24.1 295 21.1 
Brazil 186 16.3 235 19.2 245 17.5 
Zaire 75 6.6 132 10.8 74 5.3 
Sierra Leone 54 4.7 65 5.3 52 3.7 
Benin 50 4.4 57 4.6 70 5.0 
Cameroon 48 4.2 56 4.6 60 4.3 
Malaysia 35 3.1 92 7.5 248 17.7 
Indonesia 33 2.9 49 4.0 82 5.9 
Ivory Coast 17 1.5 20 1.6 36 2.6 
Mexico 25 2.2 28 2.3 30 2.1 
Others 156 13.7 1 97 16.1 205 14.7 
World 1141 100.0 1226 100.0 1397 100.0 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook 
Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G8 
Countries 
Production of rapeseed 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
India 1474 28.1 1564 23.4 2211 27.2 
China 1143 21.8 992 14.8 1254 15.4 
Canada 513 9.8 1637 24.5 1635 20.1 
Poland 504 9.6 566 8.5 700 8.6 
France 334 6.4 592 8.9 532 6.6 
Sweden 216 4.1 192 2.9 332 4.1 
Pakistan 215 4.1 250 3.7 248 3.1 
German Dem. 
Repub. 214 
Fed-Repub. 
of Germany 107 
Others 533 
World 5253 
4.1 180 2.7 270 3.3 
2.0 185 2.8 199 2.4 
10.1 531 7.9 740 9.1 
100.0 6689 100.0 8121 100.0 
Sources FAO Production Yearbook 
Percentages computed by the writer 
0 
-387- 
Appendix G9 
Production of sesame seed 
1965 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
India 424 25.0 562 25.7 420 21.1 
China 368 21.7 367 16.8 372 18.7 
Sudan 160 9.4 297 13.6 ?? mot' 13. fr 
Mexico 154 9.1 179 8.2 140 7.0 
Burma 62 3.7 132 6.0 130 6.5 
Nigeria 61 3.6 60 2.7 66 3.3 
Colombia 58 3.4 28 1.3 30 1.5 
Venezuela 54 3.2 125 5.7 60 3.0 
Turkey 34 2.0 36 1.6 35 1.8 
Ethiopia 33 1.9 81 3.7 100 5.0 
Uganda 30 1.8 17 0.8 17 0.8 
Afghanistan 34 2.0 30 1.5 40 2.0 
Egypt 22 1.3 20 0.9 18 0.9 
Bangladesh 24 1.4 27 1.2 29 1.5 
Saudi Arabia 18 1.1 17 0.8 18 0.9 
Thailand 18 1.1 20 0.9 33 1.7 
Others 140 8.3 190 8.7 21-i 10.6 
World 1694 100.0 2188 100.0 1990 100.0 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook 
Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix C10 
Production of safflower seed 
1965 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity o of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
USA 271 57.8 170 25.6 180 18.3 
Mexico 80 17.1 288 43.4 31 54.1 
India 75 16.0 142 21.4 196 20.0 
Ethiopia 28 6.0 36 5.4 25 2.5 
Australia 10 2.0 9 1.4 18 1.8 
USSR 3 0.6 7 1.1 3 0.3 
Israel 1 0.2 - - 2 0.2 
Turkey 1 0.2 1 0.2 1 0.1 
Spain - - 8 1.2 17 1.7 
Others - - 2 0.3 
9 0.9 
World 469 100.0 663 100.0 982 100.0 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook 
Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G11 
Coefficient of determination (Rs ) 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) 
Standard Error 
Durbin Watson Test 
0.09899 
= 0.31462 
= 151.91437 
2.22237 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum- of square DF Mean Square 
Regression 354961.10588 1 35496.10588 
Residual 323091.64412 14 23077.97458 
Variable in the Equation 
Variable B Beta 
Years 10.21765 0.31462 
(Constant) 736.02500 
Dependent variable .... Quantity 
Sp, gnum Observed Quantity 
1 764.0000 
2 625.0000 
3 772.0000 
4 696.0000 
5 1014.000 
6 706.0000 
7 737.0000 
8 759.0000 
9 847.0000 
10 1126.000 
11 819.0000 
12 863.0000 
13 865.0000 
14 924.0000 
15 1079.000 
16 570.0000 
STD Error 8 
8.23871 
F 
1.53809 
F 
1.538 
._,, 
Predicted Quantit 
746.2426 
756.4603 
766.6779 
77 6.8956 
787.1132 
797.3309 
807.5485 
817.7662 
827.9838 
838.2015 
848.4191 
858.6368 
868.8544 
879.0721 
889.2897 
899.5074 
Residual 
17.75735 
-131.4603 
5.322059 
-80.89556 
226.8868 
-91.33088 
-70.54853 
-58.76618 
J9.01 618 
287.7985 
-29.41912 
4.363235 
-3.854412 
44.92794 
189.7103 
-329.5074 
y=z+ bt 
y 736.025 + 10.2176t 
(8.23371) 
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Appendix E12 
Coefficient of determination (R)2 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) 
Standard Error 
Durbin Watson Test 
Square of variation 
Regression 
Error 
Variables 8 Beta STD Error 8 
Years 583.65714 0.46336 558.11749 
(Constant) 13440.86667 
Dependent variable value 
Se num 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Observed value 
13905.00 
12875.00 
17447.00 
14755.00 
19165.00 
14755.00 
17983.00 
20645.00 
19058.00 
26010.00 
2317 8.00 
24854.00 
from variable list 
regression list 
Predicted Value 
14024.52 
14608.18 
15191.84 
15775.50 
16359.15 
16942.81 
17526.47 
18109.26 
18693.78 
19277.44 
19861.09 
20444.75 
17559.00 21028.41 
36036.00 21612.06 
42278.00 221 95.72 
24510.00 22779.38 
y= 13440.866 + 583.6571t 
(558.1174) 
= 0.21470 
0.46336 
= 2334.77297 
= 3.15612 
Analysis of Variance 
Sum of squares DF 
5961474.06030 1 
21804659.28344 14 
Variable in the equation 
Mean Square 
5961474.06030 
5451164.82086 
F 
1.094 
Residual 
-1'9.38 
-1733.181 
2255.162 
-1020.495 
2805.848 
-2187.810 
+456.53 
+2535.74 
+354.22 
+6732.56 
+3316.91 
+4410.25 
+3469.41 
+14423.94 
+20082.28 
+1730.62 
0 
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Appendix G13 
Coefficient of determination (R) 
2=0.63587 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.79741 
Standard Error = 48.46924 
Durbin Watson Test = 1.48415 
Analysis of variance 
Square of variation Sum Of square DF mean square 
Regression 57434.00294 1 57434,00294 
Error 32889.74706 14 2349.26765 
Variable in the equation 
Variable 8 Beta Std Error BF 
Years 12. 99706 0.79741 2.62861 24.448 
(Constant) 150. 90000 
Dependent variable - price From variable list 
Regression list' 
Segoum observed price Predicted Price Residual 
1 182.0000 163.8971 18.10294 
2 206.0000 176.8941 29.10588 
3 226.0000 189.8912 36.10882 
4 212.0000 202.8882 9.111765 
5 189.0000 215.8853 -26.88529 
6 209.0000 228.8824 -19.88235 
7 244.0000 241.8784 2.120588 
8 272.0000 254.8765 17012353 
9 225.0000 267.8735 -42.87353 
10 231.0000 280.8706 -49.87059 
11 283.0000 293.8676 -10.86765 
12 288.0000 306.8647 -18.86471 
13 203.0000 319.8618 -116.8618 
14 390.0000 332.8588 57.14118 
15 392.0000 345.8559 
46.14412 
16 430.0000 '358.8529 
71.14706 
y= 150.900 + 12-99706t (2.62861) 
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Appendix G14 
Coefficient of determination (R)2 = 0.00945 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.09721 
Standard Error = 1333.41924 
Durbin Watson Test = 2.38710 
Analysis of Variance 
Square of uariation Sum of square Degree of Mean Square 
freedom 
Regression 237468.26538 1 237468.26538 
" 24892096.17211 14 1778006.86943 
Error 
Variable in the equation 
Variiable B Bete Std Error BF 
Years 36.42794 6.09721 72.31481 0.134 
(Constant) 713.55000 
Dependent variable: quantity - ftom variable list 
regression list 
Segnum Observed Quantity Predicted Quantity Residual 
1 817.0000 739.9779 77.02206 
2 972.0000 766.4059 205.5941 
3 2179.000 792.8338 1386.166 
4 781.0000 819.2618 -38.26176 
5 786.0000 845.6897 -59.68971 
6 616.0000 872.1176 -256.1176 
7 720.0000 898.5456 -178.5456 
8 607.0000 924.9735 --317.9735 
9 182.0000 951.4015 0769.4015 
10 190.0000 977.8294 -787.8294 
11 41.00000 1004.257 -963.2574 
12 50.00000 1030.685 -980.6853 
13 176.0000 1057.112 -881.1132 
14 5260.000 1083.541 4176.459 
15 26.00000 1109.969 -1083.969 
16 1608.000 1136.397 
471.6029 
y= 713.5500 + 26.4279t 
(72.3148) 
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Appendix C15 
Coefficient of determination (R)2 = 0.53245 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.72969 
Standard error = 29.21565 
Durbin Watson Test = 1.09620 
Anal ysit of variance 
Square of variation Sum of-square Degeee of freedom mean Squa 
Regression 1 3608.23824 1 13608.238; 
Error 1 1949.76176 14 853.55441 
Variable in the equation 
Variable B Beta Std Error 8 F 
Years 6.32647 0.72969 1.58444 15.943 
(Constant) 114.22500 
Dependent variable: price - from variable list 
regression list 
Segnum Observed Price Predicted Price Residual 
1 122.0000 120.5515 1.448529 
2 143.0000 126.8779 16.12206 
3 158.0000 133.2044 24.79559 
4 142.0000 139.5309 2.469118 
5 127.0000 145.8574 -18.85753 
6 153.0000 152.1838 0.8161765 
7 163.0000 158.5103 4.489706 
8 173.0000 164.8368 8.163235 
9 146.0000 171.1632 -25.16324 
10 154.0000 177.4897 -23.48971 
11 195.0000 183.8162 11.18382 
12 173.0000 190.1426 -17.14265 
13. 145.0000 196.4691 -51.46912 
14 168.0000 202.7956 -34.79559 
15 257.0000 209.1221 470 87794 
16 269.0000 215.4485 53.55147 
y = 114.225 + 6.32647t 
(1.5844) 
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Appendix C16 
Coefficient of determination (R) 
2 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) 
Standard error 
Durbin Watson test 
0.01453 
= 0.12055 
= 1123.00424 
2.02476 
Analysis of variance 
Sq. of variation Sum of square Degree of freedom 
Regression 74393.19995 1 
Error 5044554.13330 14 
Variable in the equation 
variable B Beta Std Error 
Years -65.20000 -0.12055 268.44936 
(constant) 1657.86667 
Dependent variable - value 
Seqnum 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Prom "variable list 
regression list 
Observed value 
997.0000 
1389,000 
3443.000 
1109.000 
998.0000 
942.0000 
1173.000 
1050.000 
265.0000 
292.0000 
79.00000 
86.00000 
255.0000 
8836.000 
66.00000 
432.0000 
Predicted Value 
1592.667 
1527.467 
1462.267 
1397.067 
1331.867 
1266.667 
1201.467 
1136.266 
1072.066 
1005.866 
940.666 
875.466 
810.266 
745.066 
679.866 
614.866 
y_ 1657.8667 - 65.2000t 
(268.449) 
mean square 
74393.19995 
1261138.53333 
F 
0,059 
Residual 
-895.6667 
-138.4667 
1980.733 
-288.0667 
-333.8667 
-324.6667 
-28.467 
-86.266 
-807.066 
-713.866 
-861.666 
-789.466 
-555.266 
+8090.934 
-613.866 
-182.866 
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Appendix C1? 
Coefficient of Determination (R2) = 0.20649 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.45441 
Stnde error = 6389.91536 
Durbin Watson test = 2.31374 
Analysis of variance 
Sq. of variation Sum of square Degree of freedom mean Squar 
Regressi on 170438256.10937 1 17438256.109 
Error 654982189.89844 14 46784442.135 
Variable in the equation 
Variable B Beta Std. error B F 
Years -70 8.01765 -0.45441 370.94649 3.64305 
(constan t) 23423.15000 
Depend'! e nt variable quantities from variable list 
regression list 
Se num ObseDved Q uantity Predicted Quantity Residual 
1 12939.00 22715.13 -9776.132 
2 33278.00 22007.11 11270.89 
3 17285.00 21399.10 -4014.097 
4 13550.00 20591.08 "-7041.079 
5 22336.00 19883.06 2452.438 
6 24256.00 19175.04 5080.956 
7 25199.00 18467.03 6731.974 
8 10110.00 17759.01 -7649.009 
9 12127.00 17050.99 04923.991 
10 28841.00 16342.97 12498.03 
11 16631.00 15634.96 996.0441 
12 15881.00 14926.94 954.0618 
13 14699.00 14218.92 480.0794 
14 11 605.00 1351.90 -1905.903 
15 14196.00 12802.89 1393.115 
16 5547.000 12094.87 -6547.868 
y- 23423.1500 - 708.0176t 
(370.9464) 
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Appendix G18 
Coefficient of determin ation (R) 
2= 
0.69356 
Coefficient of multiple correlation (R) = 0.83280 
Standard error = 1.86701 
Durbin Watson test = 2.17125 
Analysis of variance 
Square of variation Sum of squares Degree of freedom mean square 
Regression 31.55714 1 31.55714 
Error 13.94286 14 3.48571 
Variable in the equation 
Variable B Beta Std Error 8 F 
Years 1.34286 0.83280 0.44630 9.053 
(constant) 25.80000 
Dependent variables Pr ice From variable list 
regression list 
Segnum Observed Price Predicted Price Residual 
1 29.0000 27.14286 1.857143 
2 26.0000 28.48571 -2.485714 
3 29.0000 29.82857 -0.8285714 
4 32.0000 31.17143 0.8285714 
5 34.0000 32.51429 1.485714 
6 33.0000 33.85714 -0.8571429 
7 30.0000 35.20002 -5.2002 
8 31.0000 36.54288 -5.54288 
9 32.0000 37.88574 -5.88574 
10 28.0000 39.2285 -11.2285 
11 32.0000 40.57146 -8.57146 
12 35.0000 41.91432 -6.91432 
13 31.0000 43.25718 -12.25718 
14 32.0000 44.60004 -12.60004 
15 72.0000 45.9429 26.0571 
16 32.0000 47.28575 -15.28575 
y= 25.80000 + 1.34286t 
(0.44630) 
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Appendix G19 
Trade in oilseed61965-1975 by major trading countries 
Soyabean - m a or exporters 
1965 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
USA 6196.0 88.8 11839.1 93.8 12496.0 75.9 
China 576.6 8.3 410.0 3.2 360.0 2.2 
Canada 82.6 1.2 28.6 0.2 9.0 0.1 
Brazil 75.3 1.1 289.6 2.3 3334.0 20.3 
Paraguay 1.3 - 0.9 - 102.0 0.9 
Romania - - - - 
Others 43.4 0.6 53.5 0.4 158.0 1.0 
World 6975.2 100.0 12621.5 100.0 16459.0 100.0 
o abean - ma or importers 
1965 
Countries 
Japan 
Fed. Rep. 
of Germany 
Italy 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Spain 
United King- 
dom 
Belgium 
France 
Others 
World 
1970 
Quantity 
'000 tons 
% of 
total 
quantity 
'000 tons 
% of 
total 
1847.5 27.8 3244.8 26.5 
1975 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
3334.0 21.3 
1292.9 19.5 2074.6 16.9 3464.0 22.1 
449.5 6.8 845.3 6.9 1217.0 7.8 
404.2 6.1. 535.4 4.4 402.0 2.6 
392.0 5.9 1105.6 9.0 1282.0 8.2 
340.9 5.1 1230.7 10.1 1737.0 11.1 
287.0 4.3 365.7 3.0 754.0 4.8 
139.9 2.1 324.5 2.7 6198., 0, - 4.5 
t09.5 1.6 442.6 3.6 416.0 2.7 
1370.8 20.6 2072.0 17.0 2373.0 15.1 
6634.2 100.0 12241.2 100.0 15677.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed 
by the writer 
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Appendix C20 
Cnnr, m- für oYnnri-PT9 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Philippines 866.2 63.6 425.2 46.3 761.0 70.1 
Indonesia 126.0 9.2 185.1 20.1 30.0 2. a 
Papua New 
Guinea 74.7 5.5 85.6 9.3 96.0 8.8 
Si Lanka 41.6 3.1 15.5 1.7 1.0 0.1 
New Hebrides 28.7 2.1 31.2 3.4 27.0 2.5 
Mozambique 28.6 2.1 45.1 4.9 27.0 2.5 
Malaysia 
(Sabah) 24.9 1.8 15.0 1.6 31.0 2.9 
British 
Salomons 24.9 1.8 21.4 2.3 25.0 2.3 
Pacific Is. 12.7 0.9 14.2 1.5 7.0 0.6 
West Samoa 12.6 0.9 9.8 1.1 20.0 1.8 
Gilbert Is. 9.2 0.7 5.8 0.6 6.0 0.5 
Tonga 7.0 0.5 8.0 0.9 19.0 1.7 
Others 105.6 7.7 56.8 6.2 35.0 3.2 
World 1362.7 100.0 918.7 100.0 1085.0 100.0 
- major importers 
1965 1970 1975 
Coontires Quantity 
% of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
USA 278.9 20.6 197.6 22.4 - - 
Fed. Rep. Cer: 242.5 17.9 150.6 17.1 413.0 40.6 
Netherlands 136.0 10.0 77.9 8.8 167.0 16.4 
France 95.6 7.1 54.5 6.2 64.0 6.3 
Japan 94.2 7.0 126.9 14.4 90.0 8.9 
Sweden 69.4 5.1 55.4 6.3 39.0 3.8 
United Kingd om 56.5 4.2 32.0 3.6 29.0 2.8 
Australia 33.0 2.4 28.3 3.2 7.0 0.7 
Singapore 26.7 2.0 17.2 1.9 27.0 
. 
2.7 
Norway 22.1 1.6 19.0 2.2 11.0 1.1 
lI 
Others 299.5 22.1 123.8 14.0 1690 0 16.6 
world 1354.4 100.0 883.2 1ü0.0 016.0 1uu. u 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by writer 
Now 
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Appendix G21 
Rapeseed - major exporters 
1965 
Quantity 4 of 
Countries '000 tons total 
Canada 275.0 40.2 
France 126.4 18.5 
Sweden 73.5 10.8 
Denmark 45.2 6.6 
F. D. R. 4.8 0.7 
Others 158.8 23.2 
World 
seed- 
683.7 100.0 11231.7 100.0 1 973.0 100.0 
1970 
Quantity 
'000 tons 
% of 
total 
705.8 57.3 
200.4 16.3 
53.5 4.3 
. "28.0 2.3 
36.9 3.0 
207.1 16.8 
1975 
Quantity 
'000 tons 
% of 
total 
676.0 69.5 
47.0 4.8 
118.0 12.1 
56.0 5.8 
10.0 1.0 
66.0 6.8 
or importers 
Countries 
1965 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1970 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1975 
Quantity 7 of 
'000 tons total 
Italy 132.5 20.7 216.8 19.9 12.0 1.1 
F. D. R. 109.8 17.2 75.1 6.9 117.0 10.8 
Japan 108.2 16.9 344.9 31.6 659.0 61.2 
Banglädesh 73.2 11.5 89.0 8.2 43.0 4.0 
Algeria 59.4 9.3 58.5 5.4 40.0 3.7 
U. K. 32.7 5.1 51.3 4.7 45.0 4.2 
Netherlands 20.5 3.2 35.7 3.3 48.0 4.4 
USA 14.4 2.3 38.2 3.5 32.0 3.0 
France 4.5 0.7 62.3 5.7 40.0 3.7 
Mexico 0.1 - 12.9 1.2 - - 
Others 83.6 13.1 105.8 9.7 41.0 3.8 
World 638.9 100.0 1090.5 100.0 1077.0 100.0 
L 
Sources FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G22 
Palm Kernels - major exporters 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Nigeria 422.2 63.5 185.3 40.5 173.0 51.0 
Sierra Leone 50.1 7.5 59.9 13.1 29.0 8.6 
Indonesia 32.9 4.9 42.4 9.3 32.0 9.4 
Cameroon 21.5 3.2 22.7 5.0 12.0 3.5 
Togo 15.3 2.3 17.1 3.7 6.0 1.8 
Ivory Coast 14.3 2.2 18.1 4.0 29.0 8.6 
Angola 14.3 2.2 12.5 2.7 5.0 1.5 
Guinea 12.0 1.8 13.0 2.8 9.0 2.6 
Malaysia 0.1 - 5.2 1.1 25.0 7.4 
Others 82.0 12.3 80.9 17.7 190.0 5.6 
World 664.7 100.0 457.1 100.0 339.0 100.0 
Palm kernels - major importers 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
U. K. 207.0 31.1 38.0 8.8 75.0 25.6 
F. R. C. 126.0 18.9 76.0 17.7 42.0 14.3 
Netherlands 113.0 17.0 146.0 34.0 98.0 33.4 
France 66.0 9.9 60.0 14.0 12.0 4.1 
Poland 26.0 3.9 13.0 3.0 - - 
Japan 22.0 3.3 33.0 7.7 7.0 2.4 
Portugal 17.0 2.6 12.0 2.8 7.0 2.4 
Malaysia - - - - 20.0 6.8 
Denmark 14.0 2.1 18.0 4.2 17.0 5.8 
Switzerland 7.0 1.1 4.0 0.9 9.0 3.1 
Others 67.0 10.1 30.0 7.0 6.0 2.0 
World 665.0 100.0 430.0 100.0 293.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentage 
0 
computed by the writer 
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G23 
Sunf lowe 
Countries 
Bulgaria 
USSR 
Romania 
Hungary 
Yugoslavia 
Tanzania 
Canada 
China 
USA 
G. D. R. 
France 
Australia 
Others 
seed - major exporters 
1965 1970 
Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons total 
1975 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
91.5 38.3 97.3 20.4 4.0 1.1 
83.7 35.1 142.7 29.9 61.0 17.4 
18.7 7.8 44.3 9.3 1.0 0.3 
10.4 4.4 24.1 5.0 27.0 7.7 
9.0 3.8 118.4 24.8 1.0 0.3 
6.9 2.9 10.0 2.1 3.0 0.8 
6.2 2.6 2.6 0.5 8.0 2.3 
4.7 2.0 2.3 0.5 3.0 0.8 
1.8 0.4 210.0 59.8 
0.5 0.2 0.2 - - - 
094 0.2 22.2 4.6 . 8.0 2.3 
- - - 15.0 4.3 
6.6 2.8 11.8 2.5 10.0 2.8 
World 1 238.6 100.0 
1477.7 
100.0 
1 
351.0 100.0 
Sunflower seed - major importers 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons tots '000 tons total '000 tons total 
G. D. R. 65.0 33.0 92.5 17.9 40.0 12.4 
Italy 63.0 32.0 179.7 34.7 4.0 1.2 
F. R. C. 32.6 16.5 79.0 15.3 126.0 39.2 
Czechoslovak ial 6.6 8.4 65.0 12.6 60.0 18.7 
Australia 5.0 2.5 6.3 1.2 - - 
Japan 3.9 2.0 45.4 8.8 2.0 0.6 
Belgium 2.6 1.3 1.5 0.3 4.0 1.2 
France 0.4 0.2 1.9 0.4 22.0 6.8 
Netherlands 1.0 0.5 17.2 3.3 3.0 0.9 
Portugal - - 4.1 0.8 24.0 
7.5 
Others 6.9 3.5 25.3 4.9 36.0 11.2 
World 197.0 100.0 517.9 100.0 321.0 100.0 
wý--- ^"Tý--ý^ ýý-^book. Percentages computed 
by the writer 
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Appendix G24 
3aff lower seed - major exporters 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total 1000 tons total '000 tons total 
USA 171.7 96.5 59.9 76.8 73.8 100.0 
Others 6.3 3.5 18.1 23.2 - 100.0 
World 178.0 100.0 78.0 100.0 73.8 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G25 Trade in vegetable oils 1965-1975 by major Trading Countries 
Soyabean oil-ma. ior exporters 
1965 
- 
1970 1975 
Quantity % Of Quantity % of Quantity % % of Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
USA 545.1 78.8 674.5 59.8 353.0 25.9 
Denmark 41.3 6.0 56.4 5.0 34.0 2.5 
Netherlands 17.5 2.5 86.5 7.7 162.0 11.9 
Canada 15.8 2.3 21.4 1.9 2.0 0.1 
F. R. C. 15.5 2.2 69.0 6.1 294.0 21.6 
Belgium 6.0 0.9 27.4 2.4 85.0 6.2 
Japan 5.6 0.8 13.2 1.2 - - 
France 4.0 0.6 29.3 2.6 80.0 5.9 
Spain 0.1 - 85.6 7.6 41.0 3.0 
Romania - - 5.3 0.5 - - 
Others 40.5 5.9 57.3 5.1 - - 
World 691.4 100.0 1 125.9 100.0 1364.0 100.0 
I 
So abean oil - major importers' 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Pakistan 50.5 7.6 88.5 8.9 63.0 4.6 
morocco 44.5 6.7 38.5 3.9 77.0 5.6 
India 40.5 6.1 78.5 7.9 4.0 0.3 
Iran 27.6 4.1 96.8 9.8 153.0 11.2 
Netherlands 22.9 3.4 35.9 3.6 74.0 5.4 
Tunisia 22.2 3.3 28.2 2.9 54.0 4.0 
Peru 14.0 2.1 21.3 2.2 54.0 4.0 
Sweden 8.1 1.2 37.6 3.8 42.0 3.1 
Italy 1.8 0.3 37.1 3.7 107.0 7.8 
France 1.2 0.2 37.2 3.8 90.0 6.6 
Others 434.1 65.0 489.8 49.5 242.4 34.0 
World 667.4 100.0 989.4 100.0 713.8 100.0 
Sources FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G26 
ounanut o 
Countries 
Senegal 
Nigeria 
tlroentina 
USA 
Gambia 
France 
China 
Netherlands 
F. R. G. 
Brazil 
Others 
World 
Groundnut oil 
Countries 
- major exporters 
1965 
Quantity ö of 
'000 tons total 
970 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
142.5 34.3 146.1 34.0 
92.2 22.2 90.3 21.0 
79.2 19.1 42.6 9.9 
27.7 6.7 14.5 3.4 
16.3 3.9 16.0 3.7 
11.5 2.8 20.4 4.7 
5.0 1.2 7.0 1.6 
4.2 1.0 3.0 0.7 
3.8 0.9 3.4 0.8 
- - 31.9 7.4 
33.0 7.9 54.5 12.7 
415.4 100.0 429.0 100.0 
- major importers 
1965 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1970 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1975 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
209.0 51.6 
12.0 3.0 
14.0 3.4 
44.0 10.8 
11.0 2.7 
6.0 1.5 
10.0 2.5 
38.0 9.4 
61.0 15.1 
405.0 100.0 
975 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
France 155.6 36.7 142.6 33.1 180.0 44.0 
U. K. 69.5 16.4 95.8 22.2 29.0 7.0 
F. R. G. 49.1 11.6 52.3 12.1 38.0 9.2 
Dominican Rep . 15.1 3.6 5.5 1.3 
6.0 1.4 
Hong Kong 10.4 2.5 12.3 2.9 14.0 3.4 
Netherlands 10.1 2.4 9.4 2.2 9.0 2.2 
Belgium 9.0 2.1 21.4 5.0 21.0 5.1 
Switzerland 5.3 1.3 3.8 0.9 8.0 2.0 
Singapore 5.0 1.2 6.0 1.4 1.0 0.2 
Italy 0.2 - 8.2 1.9 24.0 
5.9 
Others 94.4 22.3 73.4 17.0 23.8 7.91. 
World 423.7 100.0 430.7 100.0 341.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Aooendix G27 
oconut oil - major exporters 
1965 
Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total 
Philippines 241.4 
Sri Lanka 88.3 
Netherlands 35.9 
Papua N. Guine a 25.9 
Malaysia 18.3 
Singapore 17.1 
Fiji 15.0 
Mozambique 6.5 
F. R. G. 1.3 
Fr. Polynesia 0.3 
Others 24.8 
World 474.8 
1970 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1975 
Quantity wo of 
'000 tons total 
50.8 338.0 54.9 614.0 59.6 
18.6 57.9 9.4 50.0 4.8 
7.6 31.9 5.2 67.0 6.5 
5.5 21.7 3.5 27.0 2.6 
3.9 42.5 6.9 36.0 3.5 
3.6 38.1 6.2 26.0 7.5 
3.2 19.0 3.1 16.0 1.6 
1.4 7.3 1.2 4.0 0.4 
0.3 12.4 2.0 115.0 11.1 
0.1 10.8 1.8 11.0 1.1 
5.2 36.2 5.9 65.0 6.3 
100.0 615.6 100.0 1031.0 100.0 
Coconut oil - mafor importers 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of quantity ; 'D of quantity of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
USA 174.7 38.1 260.5 43.7 409.0 42.7 
F. R. G. 55.3 12.1 31.6 5.3 36.0 3.8 
UK 42.7 9.3 48.1 8.1 38.0 4.0 
Canada 18.0 3.9 21.5 3.6 26.0 2.7 
Italy 150 8 3.4 19.8 3.3 32.0 3.3 
China 10.8 2.4 20.9 3.5 44.0 4.6 
Singapore 10.0 2.2 14.1 2.4 15.0 1.5 
South Africa 6.8 1.5 10.1 1.7 12.0 1.2 
Poland 6.0 1.3 6.3 1.1 12.0 1.2 
France 3.9 0.9 18.7 3.1 47.0 4.9 
Others 114.1 24.9 144.8 24.3 287.0 30.0 
World 458.1 100.0 596.4 100.0 958.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G28 
Cottonseed oil - major exporters 
.ner I 'JOD 1970 1975 
Countries Quantity % of Quantity o of Quantity % of '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
USA 255.6 72.4 154.8 63.2 297.0 79.2 
China 22.2 6.3 7.7 3.1 4.0 1.0 
USSR 20.8 5.9 26.2 10.7 2A_n 7_ 
Syrian Arab 
Re pub. 
Sudan 
Uganda 
Israel 
Guatemala 
Nicaragua 
Argentina 
Others 
World 
15.8 
9.8 
8.7 
2.0 
1.9 
1.3 
1.1 
13.6 
352.8 
4.5 
2.8 
2.5 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
3.9 
100.0 
, -- -I--. -, 9ý 
8.4 
9.1 
9.0 
5.0 
. 1.4 
9.3 
1.0 
13.2 
245.1 
3.4 
3.7 
3.7 
2.0 
0.6 
3.8 
0.4 
5.4 
100.0 
11.0 
11.0 
4.0 
11.0 
375.0 
2.9 
2.9 
1.0 
2.9 
100.0 
L. otzonseeo oil - ma or importers 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
F. R. C. 79.1 21.0 31.6 11.6 13.0 2.9 
UK 33.1 8.8 41.1 15.1 8.0 1.7 
Egypt 28.8 7.7 56.2 20.6 280.0 61.4 
Iran 26.7 7.1 1.3 0.5 19.0 4.1 
Canada 21.6 5.7 14.0 5.1 11.0 2.4 
G. D. R. 20.8 5.5 26.2 9.6 29.0 6.4 
Venezuela 15.4 4.1 15.8 5.8 38.0 8.3 
Sweden 7.0 1.9 4.7 1.7 10.0 2.2 
Japan 2.1 0.6 3.8 1.4 10.0 2.2 
El Salvador 1.4 0.4 1.6 0.6 2.0 0.4 
Others 139.9 37.2 76.6 28.1 36.0 7.9 
World 375.9 100.0 272.9 100.0 456.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade . Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G29 
Palm oil - major exporters 
Countries 
Nigeria 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
Zaire 
Singapore 
Benin 
Cameroon 
Netherlands 
(Ivory Coast 
Papua N. Guinea 
Others 
World 
1965 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
152.4 
143.2 
125.9 
79.0 
47.7 
13.3 
12.9 
5.7 
1.2 
2 4.7 
2 3,2 
20.4 
12.8 
7.7 
2.2 
2.1 
0.9 
0.2 
36.7 
618.0 
5.9 
100.0 
j970 
(quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
7.6 
40 2.0 
15 9.1 
118.9 
133.3 
15.0 
8.4 
19.3 
12.5 
0.8 
44.4 
17.6 
13.1 
14.7 
1.7 
0.9 
2.1 
1.4 
30.1 
90 6.2 
3.3 
100.0 
1975 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
31.0 
1035.0 
386.0 
55.0 
140.0 
14.0 
9.0 
57.0 
114.0 
18.0 
187.0 
2046.0 
1.5 
50.6 
18.9 
2.7 
6.8 
0.7 
0.4 
2.8 
5.6 
0.9 
9.1 
100.0 
Palm oil ma for imoorters 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity V/ of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
UK 117.2 20.1 162.7 18.2 206.0 10.8 
F. R. C. 102.6 17.6 115.9 13.0 210.0 11.0 
Netherlands 64.5 11.0 89.3 10.0 186.0 9.8 
Iraq 50.1 8.6 66.0 7.4 116.0 6.1 
Singapore 48.8 8.3 140.8 15.8 128.0 6.7 
France 36.7 6.3 41.1 4.6 50.0 2.6 
Italy 32.0 5.5 42.9 4.8 51.0 2.7 
Belgium 27.7 4.7 25.5 2.9 30.0 1,6 
Japan 16.4 2.8 40.3 4.5 108.0 5.7 
USA 3.0 0.5 63.9 7.2 442.0 23.2 
Others 85.4 14.6 103.4 11.6 68.1 4.3 
World 584.4 100.0 891.8 100.0 1593.8 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G30 
___.. " ... M-1 
will iuw aCtvu ums.. - maj or expo rters 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity 01 , of Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
USSR 221.2 70.1 351.0 48.0 388.0 62.2 
Argentina 35.5 11.2 101.2 13.8 - - 
Romania 33.0 10.5 119.1 16.3 110.0 17.6 
Hungary 15.0 4.8 18.9 2.6 29.0 4.6 
F. R. C. 6.1 1.9 11.6 1.5 19.0 3.0 
Bulgaria 1.0 0.3 46.9 6.4 20.0 3.2 
Netherlands 0.2 0.1 38.6 5.3 7.0 1.1 
Belgium - - 20.2 2.8 13.0 2.1 
France - - 7.3 1.0 20.0 3.2 
Yugoslavia - - 3.4 0.5 - - 
Others 3.8 1.2 13.3 1.8 18.0 2.9 
World 315.7 100.0 731.2 100.0 624.0 100.0 
Sunflower seed oil - maior importers 
Countries 
1965 1970 
Quantity % of Quantity % of 
'000 tons total '000 tons total 
1970 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
F. R. C. 69.1 20.2 - 130.4 18.7 105.0 15.1 
Cuba 49.9 14.6 54.7 7.8 70.0 10.1 
G. D. R. 42.8 12.5 50.8 7.3 50.0 7.2 
Czechoslovaki a 25.2 7.4 45.2 6.5 35.0 5.0 
Iran 20.0 5.8 15.5 2.2 46.0 6.6 
Algeria 16.0 4.7 23.1 3.3 30.0 4.3 
Switzerland 10.7 3.1 28.3 4.0 27.0 3.9 
Belgium 9.2 2.7 36.3 5.2 23.0 3.3 
Netherlands 8.3 2.4 51.8 7.4 21.0 3.0 
France 1.3 0.4 58.1 8.3 91.0 13.1 
Spain - - 76.0 
10.9 
Austria - - - - 
19.0 2.7 
Others 89.6 26.2 204.7 29.3 101.0 
14.5 
World 342.1 100.0 698.9 100.0 
694.0 100.0 
Sources FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed 
by the writer 
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Appendix C31 
'aim Kernel o ll - major exporters 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Zaire 32.9 30.2 50.3 29.6 28.0 10.8 
Netherlands 19.7 18.1 31.5 18.5 30.0 11.6 
Benin 17.0 15.6 18.6 10.9 16.0 6.2 
Brazil 12.0 11.0 14.4 8.5 1.0 0.4 
F. R. G. 7.2 6.6 3.2 1.9 7.0 2.7 
UK 4.6 4.2 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.4 
Paraguay 3.1 2.8 6.6 3.9 4.0 1.5 
Nigeria 1.0 0.9 32.8 19.3 19.0 7.3 
Switzerland 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.4 
Malaysia - - 2.3 1.4 109.0 42.1 
Others 10.5 9.7 9.6 5.6 43.0 16.6 
World 108.8 100.0 170.1 100.0 259.0 100.0 
Palm kernel o il - major importers 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
USA 37.9 40.6 37.4 23.5 72.0 26,, 0 
F. R. C. 14.5 15.5 22.6 14.2 17.0 6.2 
Italy 10.1 10.8 9.9 6.2 12.0 4.3 
France 6.1 6.5 9.9 6.2 22.0 8.0 
Canada 4.5 4.8 5.2 3.3 5.0 1.8 
South Africa 2.9 3.1 2.0 1.3 4.0 1.4 
Netherlands 1.6 1.7 19.5 12.2 41.0 14.8 
Argentina 1.6 1,7 1.9 1.2 4.0 1.4 
Belgium 1.5 1.6 9.0 5.7 4.0 1.4 
UK 0.9 1.0 33.4 21.0 64.0 23.2 
Others 11.8 12.6 8.4 5.3 31.0 11.2 
World 93.4 100.0 159.2 100.0 276.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G32 
Rapeseed oil - mit für exnnri-ara 
Countries 
1965 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1970 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1975 
Quantity jo of 
'000 tons total 
France 32.3 34.1 39.4 22.0 118.0 33.4 
F. R. G. 24.5 25.9 33.0 18.1 64.0 18.1 
Sweden 16.4 17.3 20.0 11.2 39.0 11.0 
Poland 7.8 8.2 37.6 21.0 52.0 14.7 
China 3.8 4.0 16.7 9.3 12.0 3.4 
Japan 3.6 3.8 6.9 3.9 2.0 0.6 
Netherlands 1.2 1.3 7.4 4.1 33.0 9.3 
Canada - - - - 20.0 5.7 
Hungary - - 8.0 4.5 7.0 2.0 
Hong Kong - - 1.2 0.7 1.0 0.3 
Others 5.1 5.4 8.7 4.9 5.0 1.4 
World 94.7 100.0 178.9 100.0 353.0 , 100.0 
srýAr1 nil 
Countries 
major importers 
1965 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1970 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1975 
Quantity % of 
1000 tons total 
Algeria 12.7 18.0 16.3 9.9 25.0 9.0 
Netherlands 11.2 15.9 6.1 3.7 9.0 30 2 
F. R. C. 7.7 10.9 15.0 9.1 19.0 6.8 
Hong Kong 3.7 5.2 21.6 13.1 24.0 8.6 
Czechoslovaki a 3.0 4.2 20.0 12.2 1.0 0.4 
Italy 0.6 0.8 22.1 13.5 14.0 5.0 
India 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.1 6.0 2.2 
UK 0.3 0.4 14.7 8.9 7.0 `2.5 
Morocco - 1.3 0.8 84.0 
30.2 
Chile - - 2.5 1.5 
21.0 7.5 
Others 31.1 44.1 44.6 27.1 68.0 24.4 
World 70.6 100.0 164.3 100.0 278.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix G33 
Trade in Oilmeal s 1965 - 1975 
By Major Trading Countries 
Sovabean meal - ma for exoorters 
Countries 
1965 
Quantity ö of 
'000 tons total 
1970 
Quantity I. of 
'000 tons total 
975 
C14 Quantity of 
'000 tons total 
USA 1968.9 70.3 3660.4 68.2 3783.0 43.3 
Canada 232.0 8.3 150.8 2.8 59.0 0.7 
F. R. G. 202.3 7.2 264.9 4.9 569.0 6.5 
Netherlands 116.3 4.2 365.3 6.8 229.0 6.4 
Denmark 116.2 4.1 130.0 2.4 71.0 0.8 
Brazil 105.1 3.8 525.4 9.8 3128.0 35.8 
Belgium 26.6 0.9 131.3 2.4 212.0 2.4 
Italy 7.1 0.3 10.1 0.2 29.0 0.3 
Norway 4.3 0.1 57.9 1.1 134.0 J.. 5 
Paraguay 3.5 0.1 23.4 0.4 31.0 0.4 
Others 19.1 0.7 51.4 1.0 170.0 1.9 
World 2801.4 100.0 5370.9 100.0 8745.0 100.0 
Soyabean meal - major importers 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity ö of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
France 485.8 19.9 843.3 17.5 1496.0 17.7 
F. R. G. 470.2 19.2 997.6 20.7 766.0 9.0 
UK 247.7 10.1 248.3 5.1 250.0 3.0 
Denmark 223.3 9.1 242.9 5.0 443.0 5.2 
Netherlands 162.5 6.6 530.9 11.0 850.0 10.0 
Belgium 1130 ? 4.6 346.0 7.2 383.0 4.5 
Italy 109.0 4.5 264.9 5.5 448.0 5.3 
Hungary 40.4 1.6 228.0 4.7 390.0 4.6 
Czechoslovaki a 9.0 0.4 34.0 0.7 310.0 
3.7 
Poland - - 103.0 2.1 
539.0 6.4 
Others 584.8 24.0 990.6 20.5 2592.0 30.6 
World 2446.4 100.0 4829.5 100.0 8467.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
0 
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Appendix G34 
Groundnut meal - major exporters 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
India 735.2 49.1 655.1 43.9 536.0 46.3 
Senegal 196.4 13.1 199.7 13.4 301.0 26.0 
Argentina 131.7 8.8 64.6 4.3 29.0 2.5 
Brazil 121.8 8.1 201.2 13.5 37.0 3.2 
Nigeria 114.5 7.6 162.1 10.9 8.0 0.7 
Burma 67.1 4.5 40.0 2.7 10.0 0.9 
Sudan 18.1 1.2 36.5 2.4 32.0 2.8 
Gambia 16.3 1.1 18.5 1.2 30.0 2.6 
France 14.4 1.0 16.4 1.1 14.0 1.2 
Niger 6.7 0.4 11.1 0.7 17.0 1.5 
Others 75.4 5.1 87.1 5.9 144.0 12.4 
World 1497.6 100.0 1492.3 100.0 1158.0 100.0 
Groundnut meal - major importers 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
UK 488.5 37.5 374.0 22.4 211.0 17.8 
France 190.7 14.6 243.3 14.6 254.0 21.5 
F. R. G. 111.6 8.6 114.7 6.9 82.0 6.9 
Hungary 99.1 7.6 64.4 3.9 44.0 3.7 
Czechoslovaki a 82.1 6.3 190.0 11.4 70.0 
5.9 
Japan 37.1 2.9 141.9 8.5 26.0 2.2 
Belgium 34.1 2.6 52.5 3.2 32.0 2.7 
Netherlands 19.2 1.5 12.3 0.7 9.0 0.8 
Poland- - - 200.0 12.0 
205.0 17.3 
USSR - - 99.4 
6.0 70.0 5.9 
Others 239.4 18.4 174.7 10.4 180.0 
15.2 
World 1301.8 10010 1667.2 100.0 1183.0 
100.0 
Sources FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix 635 
Lottonseeo m eal - ma or export rs 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Turkey 153.7 14.0 176.0 13.8 218.0 19.5 
Syria 127.9 10.9 80.8 6.3 9.0 0.8 
Sudan 123.4 10.6 183.5 14.4 94.0 8.4 
India 104.6 8.9 105.7 8.3 192.0 17.2 
Argentina 88.3 7.6 88.8 7.0 42.0 3.8 
Uganda 69.8 6.0 77.4 6.1 16.0 1.4 
Tanzania 42.5 3.6 34.5 2.7 43.0 3.9 
Nicaragua 12.6 1.1 38.0 3.0 60.0 5.4 
Brazil 0.9 0.1 161.5 12.7 20.0 1.8 
Colombia - - 55.8 4.4 43.0 3.9 
Others 433.9 37.2 273.2 21.3 378.0 33.9 
World 1167.6 100.0 1275.2 100.0 1115.0 100.0 
Cottonseed meal - major importers 
1965 1970 975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Denmark 392.2 29.9 251.8 27.2 499.0 45.9 
UK 239.1 18.3 197.2 15.2 35.0 3.2 
F. R. G. 187.6 14.3 268.6 20.8 179.0 16.5 
Sweden 110.7 8.5 96.5 7.4 710 6.5 
Czechoslovak ia 73.0 5.6 85.0 6.6 40.0 3.7 
Belgium 47.5 3.6 56.1 4.3 17.0 1.6 
Norway 38.1 2.9 68.2 5.3 21.0 1.9 
Hungary 23.6 1.8 14.7 1.1 27.0 
2.5 
Lebanon - - 29.3 
2.3 28.0 2.6 
Poland - 9.7 0.8 
70.0 6.4 
Others 197.5 1501 116.5 9.0 100.0 
9.2 
World 1309.3 100.0 1293.6 100.0 1087.0 
100.0 
Sources FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed 
by the writer 
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Appendix G36 
Coara meal - ma for imnnrfr? r4 
Countries 
1965 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1970 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
1975 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
F. R. C. 320.5 64.6 386.0 69.6 374.0 57.1 
Denmark 65.7 13.2 28.5 5.1 30.0 4.6 
Sweden 39.1 7.9 11.7 2.1 32.0 4.9 
Netherlands 22.8 4.6 90.5 16.3 181.0 27.6 
Malaysia 12.9 2.6 14.6 2.6 14.0 2.1 
Belgium 11.2 2.3 12.5 2.3 13.0 2.0 
Singapore 8.9 1.8 2.9 0.5 2.0 0.3 
France 2.5 0.5 2.7 0.5 1.0 0.2 
Sarawak 1.0 0.2 1.0 002 
Others 12.4 2.5 4.1 0.8 7.0 1.0 
World 496.0 100.0 554.5 100.0 655.0 100.0 
Copra meal - ma for exporters 
1965 1970 975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Philippines 184.9 39.8 243.9 42.8 303.0 43.5 
Indonesia 125.8 27.0 207.9 36.5 396.0 42.5 
Netherlands 41.0 8.8 17.5 3.1 9.0 1.3 
Papua N. C. 13.9 3.0 11.2 2.0 15.0 2.1 
Sri Lanka 9.5 2.0 11.3 2.0 4.0 0.6 
Thailand 8.9 1.9 8.1 1.4 2.0 0.3 
Fiji 5.4 1.2 7.2 1.3 4.0 0.6 
Tanzania 4.4 1.0 6.1 1.1 6.0 0.9 
Singapore 4.3 0.9 15.7 2.7 11.0 1.6 
Mozambique 4.3 0.9 5.2 0.9 4.0 0.6 
Others 62.8 13.5 35.6 6.2 43.0 6.2 
World 465.2 100.0 569.7 100.0 697.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Titade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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Appendix C37 
Sunrlower see n meal - ma jor exp orters 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of' Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Argentina 275.9 78.2 403.8 72.2 188.0 52.5 
Turkey 56.0 15.9 92.7 16.6 26.0 7.3 
Italy 14.6 4.1 7.1 1.3 - 
Uruguay 4.4 1.2 19.0 3.4 6.0 1.7 
Netherlands 1.3 0.4 5.2 0.9 4.0 1.1 
France 0.5 0.1 0.2 - 6.0 1.7 
F. R. C. 0.2 0.1 6.3 1.1 16.0 4.5 
Denmark 0.1 - 0.1 - - - 
USSR - - 24.0 4.3 1.0 0.3 
Others - - 0.5 0.2 111.0 31.0 
World 353.0 100.0 558.9 100.0 358.0 100.0 
Sunflower seed meal - ma for importers 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
UK 69.4 19.7 77.3 13.3 11.0 3.1 
Ne the rla nds 69.4 19.7 90.8 15.6 16.0 4.5 
F. R. G. 51.1 14.5 134.5 23.2 157.0 43.8 
Denmark 50.4 14.3 117.0 20.2 53.0 14.8 
France 27.5 7.8 58.8 10.1 14.0 3.9 
Belgium 27.4 7.8 58.9 10.1 25.0 7.0 
Hungary 12.4 3.5 20.7 3.6 44.0 12.3 
Bulgaria 12.0 3.4 10.0 1.7 20.0 5.6 
Czechoslovaki a 2.0 0.6 8.0 1.4 13.0 
3.6 
Poland: - - 
Others 30.4 8.7 4.3 0.8 5.0 1.4 
World 352.0 100.0 580.3 100.0 358.0 
100.0 
Sources FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed 
by the writer 
I 
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Appendix G38 
Rapeseed meal - major exporters 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity % of Quantity % of Quantity % of Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Italy 52.3 30.1 68.8 29.9 3.0 1.1 
F. R. C. 37.8 21.6 40.5 17.6 80.0 29.4 
France 30.8 17.6 65.2 28.3 65.0 23.9 
Algeria 28.5 16.3 27.1 11.8 28.0 10.3 
Pakistan 17.0 9.7 0.1 - 38.0 14.0 
Ethiopia 4.6 2.6 2.2 1.0 3.0 1.1 
Netherlands 0.4 0.2 3.4 1.5 20.0 7.3 
Morocco - - 5.0 2.2 7.0 2.6 
Denmark - - 1.7 0.7 5.0 1.8 
Chile - - 15.0 6.5 - - 
Others 3.2 1.9 1.4 0.5 23.0 8.5 
World 174.6 100.0 230.4 100.0 272.0 100.0 
Rapeseed meal - ma for importers 
1965 1970 1975 
Quantity ;% of Quantity %of Quantity % of 
Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total '000 tons total 
UK 55.4 32.0 63.4 23.7 49.0 15.6 
F. R. G. "43.4 25.0 65.8 24.6 41.0 13.1 
Netherlands 26.4 15.2 35.7 13.4 85.0 27.1 
Belgium 24.9 14.4 35.1 13.1 48.0 15.3 
Denmark 10.1 5.8 16.8 6.3 44.0 14.0 
France 5.6 3.2 5.7 2.1 7.0 2.2 
Austria 5.1 2.9 8.0 3.0 1.0 0.3 
Japan - - 0.5 0.2 - - 
Norway - - 36.0 13.5 
35.0 11.2 
Italy - - 0.4 
0.1 2.0 0.6 
Others 20 5 1.5 - - 2.0 
0.6 
World 173.4 100.0 267.4 100.0 
314.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed 
by the writer 
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Appendix G39 
Palm Kernel meal -- major exporters 
1965 1970 
Quantity f of Quantity of Countries '000 tons total '000 tons total 
Netherlands 
Benin 
Denmark 
Nigeria 
Paraguay 
Cameroon 
Malaysia 
China 
Zaire 
Brazil 
Others 
World 
66.2 
16.1 
7.9 
3.9 
1.9 
1.3 
a 
5 2.3 
149.6 
44.3 
10.8 
5.3 
2.6 
1.3 
0.9 
34.8 
100.0 
73.6 30.0 
18.1 7.4 
11.6 4.7 
33.3 13.6 
1.9 0.8 
2.0 0.8 
0.6 0.2 
50.7 20.7 
48.3 19.7 
4.9 2.1 
245.0 100.0 
1975 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
44.0 11.8 
19.0 501 
7.0 1.9 
20.0 5.3 
5.0 1.3 
145.0 38.8 
10.0 2.7 
40.0 10.7 
45.0 12.0 
39.0 10.4 
374.0 100,10 
lm kernel meal - ma for importers 
Countries 
1965 1970 
Quantity % of quantity % of 
1000 tons total '000 tons total 
1975 
Quantity % of 
'000 tons total 
F. R. G. 217.9 96.2 227.3 94.2 299.0 89.0 
France 8.4 3.7 8.1 3.4 6.0 1.8 
Belgium 0.3 0.1 1.8 0.7 5.0 1.5 
Netherlands - - 0.4 0.2 21.0 6.2 
Sweden 3.5 1.5 3.0 0.9 
Others 0.2 - 2.0 0.6 
World 226.6 100.0 241.3 100.0 336.0 100.0 
Source: FAO Trade Yearbook. Percentages computed by the writer 
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1)trSTIONNAIRE FOR INUWHANTS : 
Code .............. 
NAME Date ................ 
To 
im "........ 0.00.0.0 
i) Seasonality 
of 
Purchases 
What Proportion of your Total 
Purchases Fall In 
Comment ......................... 
2) Seasonality of Sale 
Are your sales spread evenly throughout the year 
Yes .......... 
No 
0009000009 
If No 1) when are your 
peak periods 
2) when are your 
slack periods 
.. 0.90900000000 
000000000000000 
t 
(1 5) . Pr/) I /II- 
R, a tint e Lt Li 
Cti1, ý1 Yý Ct ý' ti 
ý-P 
y't S16 'r t, C'i Yt tý 
ý- 
td r+ ý- .' LI Y' lC it ii 'Yý Ci. 
t f'C QS it kC 
Ftc PirwpJalco-Y, Lýýb"L`lt dj L9i7 
f. 
ctit'. v Li. Y, gý< 
-v eda'-tcse 
ry, Of f r- t- R a- p v. A., t- 
\/\" ,a -j ýI, 
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What are your purchases of dura /c j year ; 
Variety Sacks 
Feterita 
Mayo 
Mugod 
Othere 
Total 
ýý... 
4) What are your purchases of sesame Itzsf yQcl 
Variety Sacks 
White 
Red 
Mixed 
..... 
Comment ...................... 
WvhV-redo you buy from 
Producer Other Others specify 
..... Merchants ...... ....... 
Producer 
Co - 
operative Auction 
Markets 
6) That proportion of your Dura do 
you send to different part5of 
the country 
........... """. . ....... """"" 
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7) Do you send dura to Port Sudan 
for export 
Yes 
.,, ".,. 
No 
....... 
If yes : Proportion : ......,..,. 
8) What proportion of sesame do you 
send to Prrt Sudan for export 
00000.00900.00.. 00.. 09000.00.00.00 
9) Transport to Different Parts 
of the Country : 
Rail ......... 
Rop. d ......... 
Co 
st 
000 
Co st 
090 
10) Are you satisfied with the present 
transport arrangement 
.. 00.0.000 
11) How many motor lorries do you own ........... 
12) How do you sell your dura and sesame 
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13) Seasonal Prices 
per sack paid to Producers IC15 t ', eet v: 
Dura Nov : Dec : an : Feb : Mar : Apr 
May : Jun : Jul : Aug : Sep :" Oct 
Sesame Nov : Dec r Jan : Feb : Mar : Apr 
May : Jun : Jul : Aug : Sep : Oct 
Comment 
14) W: iat are the values Normal 
of your sales in month 
Dura 
Sesame 
1 aeke hh' cj 
15) Costs of dura and sesame i"f year : 
Dura 
Taxes 
Labour 
Purchases of stook 
Transport 
Sacks 
other 
Total 
Good Bad 
month month 
Sesame 
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16) Have you a relation in the dura and sesame Trade 
Growers Merchants Other 
17) Have you any other occupation 
Yes 
No 
If Yes, Specify 
18) How much capital is needed to Finance your business ? 
19) Do you sell dura and sesame on credit 
Yes 
No 
If Yes, what proportion of sales are on credit and rate 
of interest usually charged 
20) - Do you Advance money to producers 
Yes 
No 
21) Do you store dura and sesame after 
harvest 
Yes 
No 
If Yes, How many sacks have you normally 
in stock 
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22) 'Where do you store normally 
h iatmura for Dura 
Your own stores 
Rented stores 
Silos 
23) If you have your own stores, what storage capacity 
have you got : 
24) What are the II'ain risks in your business : 
25) What improvement would you like to see 
- -zv" 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPORTFRS 
Code ................ 
General Information : 
1) Type of Business -- 
Private 
owned 
Private 
company 
Public 
company 
Co-op State Orgn 
If 
other, specify 
...... 000000.000000000000000000 
2) Establishment date of present form of business ........... 
Is this the same as date when the business started ? 
Yes No 
If Noy a) is the present business a successor to one single firm ? 
Yes No 
If Yes,, what type of firm ................................ 
If No. b) is it an amalgamation of one type or several types ? 
Yes No 
Specify types ............................................ 
3) What Agricultural corr_m_odities do you export NOW ? 
`. 
Dura G'nuts Sesame Other Oilseeds Fruit/Veä Othe 
4) 'Yht! t other A,, rric. commodities did you export in the past ? 
corº-n_odities ............................................ 
year stopped ........................................... 
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5) 
6) 
7) 
Comment on why you stopped exporting a particular commodity 
000000000qq*o0o0,000000a000*00a9*00000000a000900a00000600* 
00 00000 so9 * 00 0.0 00 0 000 00" """""""""""""..................... 
Are you primarily engaged in exporting Agric. commodities ? 
Yes No (i. e. 90 %o of turnover or more) 
If No, list other activities and jive anrroximate share of 
of turnover last year among all activities .......... 
activities ................................................ 
jo share ................................................... 
Who do you buy from, and rough % distribn. of what from 
each (by volume) ? 
Cor. 'rrod1 ty Direct from 
producer 
Agents in 
prodn area 
Other 
m'chants 
Other .... . 
.......... 
Dura 
% distribn 
g'nuts 
% distribn. 
Commodity Direct from 
producer 
Agents in (Other 
prodn area m'chants 
Other...... 
000.0.. 0900 
Sesame 
distr. 
Gum Arab. 
distr. 
Other 
....... 
% distr 
-44o- 
8) 
9) 
How many metric tons of each commodity did you handle last year ? 
Comm. Stock in hand 
at begin. last 
season 
Purchases 
of current 
crop 
Sales Wastage Stock in 
hand at 
end seaso 
Dura 
U' nut s 
Sesame 
Gum 
Other 
Stock in hand + Purchases - Sales - Wastage = Stock in hand at 
end season 
a) What %o of last season's crop did you export directly yourself ? 
DURA 
0.00.000 
(other) 
............ 
b) If you did not export the whole crop yourself who did you 
sell it to ? 
DUR 
YA 0000000000. 
(other) 
..................... 
c) When you exported directly, who did you sell it to ? 
...... 0900.000000000.. 00000000.00.0000000000000000 
d) To what countries did you export the cornodity directly last 
year give. % distribn. between countries) ? 
0000000000000000 l' 0p 
ýo 
le 19 10 0 l' l' l' l' 00 l' 0-0--0--% 
10) What were terms of trade ? 
[O. n. C. I. F Penalties/ Quality Others ..... 
Clauses Specificn. ............ 
Comment on typesýof penalties and quality specificn. & other 
conditions ............... ................................. 
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GLOSSARY OF LOCAL TI UAS 
Feddan :: Area measure equal to 4200 sq meters 
DURA : Sorghum. (Sorghum vul gare 
SIMMSIM : Sesame (Sesamum Indicum) 
%A iFC :" Mechanised Farming Corporation 
M. C. P. S Mechanised Crop Production Schemes 
A. B. S. : Agricultural Bank of the Sudan 
SYEIGIITý 
1 Kilogram = 2.20462 Pounds = 2.2258 Bottles 
1 Pound = 1.0096 Bottles 
1 Bottle = 0.9905 Pounds = 0.4493 kgs. 
1 Metric Ton = 1,000 Kgs. 
= 2,204.62 Pounds 
= 2,225.8 Bottles 
= 22.258 Small l; an 
= 0.98421 Long Ton 
= 1.10231 Short Ton 
AREA 1 FeCdan = 49200 Sq M 
= 0.420 Hectare 
1.0379 Acres 
1 Acre = 0.964 Feddan 
= 0.405 HectarC 
1 Sq Km = 100 Hectare 
= 238.1 Feddans 
1 Sch Mile = 616.67 Feddans 
640 Acres 
